THEORIES OF CHANGE:

MONITORING AND EVALUATION CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT

IN THE

GOVERNMENT OF TANZANIA

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Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Education (with coursework component)

February 2011

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Produced on archival quality paper
ABSTRACT

The topic of this thesis is the development of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) capacity in the public sectors of developing countries. The purpose of the study is to deepen our understanding of how capacity in M&E develops in the complex public sector developing country contexts. The premise is that identifying the assumptions and propositions underpinning how public sector capacity is expected to develop are instrumental to this understanding.

The thesis proceeds through an in-depth case study of the Government of Tanzania, using a ‘theories of change’ approach that examines the interrelationship between context, mechanisms and outcomes. The theories of change approach aims to bring to the surface these three elements to highlight how change is expected to occur, whether the theories espoused are similar to those that are in use, and whether they are partial, confused or contradictory.

From the theories of change that emerged through the review of Government of Tanzania M&E capacity development efforts, this thesis found that there has been limited consideration of context and mechanisms while desired outcomes are articulated more clearly. This situation has resulted in inadequate recognition of the barriers to introducing monitoring and evaluation to a complex developing country, unrealistic expectations, ineffective capacity development strategies being used and limited learning about how to improve success.

The implication of these findings is that there is a critical need to change the current approach to developing M&E capacity development in the Government of Tanzania if the desired outcomes are to be realised. The suggested approach requires much deeper evaluative thinking and theorising about change processes, commitment to evaluation for learning and openness about the complexities and uncertainties of international development.
DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

This thesis does not contain material which has been accepted for any other degree in any university. To the best of my knowledge and belief, this thesis contains no material previously published or written by any other person, except where due reference is given in the text.

Signature: [Handwritten Signature]
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

There are many people to thank and it is impossible to list everyone by name. However, I would like to thank:

- My husband, Michael Ward, for his continued encouragement, humour and reassurance. His patience is endless and amazing.
- My supervisor, Dr Pam St Leger, provided ongoing guidance and encouragement regardless of what country and time zone I happened to be in during the last five years.
- Dr Lunogelo, from the Economic and Social Research Foundation, perhaps unconsciously helped me stay on track by reminding me to look at ‘old’ things in ‘new’ ways.
- Friends and family for their support and in particular to former colleagues who assisted to try and find a resolution to issues experienced in the initial version of this research.
- The research participants for being willing and open.
- Many people who may not have realised how they have helped but have by sharing thoughts and observations and asking questions about many things related to this research topic.
- Tracy Harwood who edited this thesis in line with the Australian Standards for Editing Practice according to (a) Standard D, Language and Illustrations; and (b) Standard E, Completeness and Consistency. Ms Harwood is a professional editor with environmental science and generalist experience.
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# Abbreviations

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>Chama Cha Mapinduzi</td>
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<tr>
<td>COSTECH</td>
<td>Commission for Science and Technology</td>
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<td>CSD</td>
<td>Civil Service Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>DfID</td>
<td>United Kingdom Department for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESRF</td>
<td>Economic and Social Research Foundation</td>
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<tr>
<td>LGA</td>
<td>Local Government Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDA</td>
<td>Ministry, Department, Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>MKUKUTA</td>
<td>Mkakati wa Kukuza Uchumi na Kupunguza Umaskini Tanzania (or National Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTEF</td>
<td>Medium Term Expenditure Framework</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Government Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NORAD</td>
<td>Norwegian Agency for Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD-DAC</td>
<td>Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development – Development Assistance Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PO-PSM</td>
<td>President’s Office – Public Service Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRSP</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy Plan</td>
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<td>PSRP</td>
<td>Public Sector Reform Program</td>
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<td>SIDA</td>
<td>Swedish International Development Agency</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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<td>URT</td>
<td>United Republic of Tanzania</td>
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

In the last several years, developed countries have increased their focus on reducing poverty in developing countries. This has resulted in commitments to increase levels of development assistance significantly. Accompanying these trends, there has been renewed interest and pressure on ensuring that capacity of developing countries is, indeed, increased and sustained and how to measure the results that development assistance is delivering. The future of international development assistance may be influenced by how these issues progress.

In 2005, the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness noted the capacity to ‘plan, manage, implement, and account for results of policies and programs is critical for achieving development objectives from analysis and dialogue through implementation, monitoring and evaluation’ (p. 5). Better monitoring and evaluation (M&E) is seen as a critical component of more effective aid and public sector management. As such, the drive for improved M&E capacity so that donors and recipient governments can account for results has accelerated to the extent that M&E has been described as a growth industry and a public good (Leeuw, 2001).

This drive has occurred even though developing country public sector capacity has been difficult to develop (World Bank, 1998, 2005; Commission for Africa, 2005; DfID, 2006). Thirteen years ago Morgan (1997) suggested that it was possible that many capacity development projects would demonstrate few tangible outcomes and experience has revealed his forecast to be perceptive. The explanation that has emerged is that donors, consultants and recipient governments have continued to rely on overly technical approaches that do not adequately take into account the complexity of the specific context, acknowledge and cope with the uncertainty of success in such contexts nor experiment with new approaches to stimulate change in complex contexts (Boesen and Therkildsen, 2004; Norad, 2006; Unsworth, 2009; Hyden, 2008).
Finding ways to address the challenge of developing M&E capacity in the public sectors of developing countries is the subject of this thesis. The purpose is to deepen our understanding of how capacity in M&E develops in complex contexts. The thesis proceeds through an in-depth case study of the Government of Tanzania, using a theory of change approach. Theories of change are proposed as one avenue to aid understanding better complex development contexts and their influence on M&E capacity development efforts with the aim of finding new and better ways to achieve the desired results.

The remainder of this introduction presents the researcher’s professional background and interest in M&E capacity development, the starting assertion of this research along with the key research questions, definitions of the key concepts and an outline of the structure of the thesis.

1.1 The researcher’s background

My professional work as an international development consultant has focused primarily on program management and developing public sector capacities. Being achievement oriented, I am interested in and concerned with how to achieve sustainable capacity. In my work, I am immersed in capacity development, how to monitor and evaluate it and how to develop the capacity of staff from program implementation teams, government and donor organisations to monitor and evaluate it. It is not always an easy professional journey. Reflection on my experiences, and that of others, has influenced my research interests as I have struggled with the immediate challenges of how to influence change, develop people’s interest in M&E and overcome resistance in complex developing country contexts.
1.2 The starting assertion and key research questions

This thesis commences with the assertion that: if theories of change are articulated, then alternative and more successful M&E capacity development strategies and interventions may be designed. These may in turn increase the effectiveness of capacity development interventions and ultimately achieve better development outcomes.

The overarching research question is:

How does monitoring and evaluation capacity develop in developing country public sector environments?

The key research questions are:

1. What theories of change underpin the Government of Tanzania’s and donors’ efforts to develop M&E capacity?

2. What strategies are used to develop M&E capacity and how effective are they?

3. What issues affect the development of M&E capacity in the Government of Tanzania?

4. How might the Government of Tanzania, donors and development practitioners improve their efforts to develop M&E capacity?

Thus, the research aims to contribute to current discussions on public sector capacity development, particularly as it relates to M&E. More specifically, the research may assist the Government of Tanzania and donors to increase their knowledge and understanding of the processes used to develop capacity and what mechanisms these processes may intend to stimulate. It is also expected that this research will be of interest to Tanzanian public servants, donors and development practitioners who are involved in efforts to develop public sector capacities in Tanzania.
1.3 Key concepts

This thesis uses concepts, defined below, from the international development and evaluation fields that relate to M&E capacity development.

Capacity is the ‘ability of people, organisations and societies as a whole to manage their affairs successfully’ (OECD-DAC, 2006: 12).

Capacity development is defined as ‘The process by which individuals, groups, organisations, institutions and societies increase their abilities to perform functions, solve problems and achieve objectives; to understand and deal with their development need in a broader context and in a sustainable manner’ (UNDP, 1997). Therefore, capacity is linked to performance and the need for improved capacity arises when there is a perception that performance is inadequate (Morgan, 2006).

Monitoring is a management function that aims primarily to provide managers and main stakeholders with regular feedback and early indications of progress or lack thereof in the achievement of intended results (OECD-DAC, 2002).

In contrast, evaluation is a time-bound exercise that attempts to assess systematically and objectively the relevance, performance and success, or the lack thereof, of ongoing and completed programs, projects and management initiatives (OECD-DAC, 2002).

In international development the collective term monitoring and evaluation (M&E) is used frequently, whereas in non-development settings monitoring is seen either as a type of evaluation (Owen, 2006) or distinct from evaluation and called performance measurement, performance management or performance monitoring (OECD-DAC, 2002). In this thesis, M&E is used unless there is a need to distinguish between monitoring and evaluation.
M&E capacity development is defined as ‘the intentional work to continuously create and sustain overall organisational processes that make quality and evaluation and its uses routine’ (Baizerman et al., 2002: 109).

Theories of change are the collection of assumptions, principles and propositions to explain the relationship between the program’s actions and expected outcomes (van der Knapp, 2007).

1.4 Content and format of research

The thesis comprises 11 chapters.

Chapter 1: Introduction (this chapter) outlines the research topic, the context of the study, the starting assertion and research questions, and key concepts underpinning the study. It also outlines the structure of the thesis.

The literature review is divided into four chapters and examines theories of change, public sector capacity development and in particular monitoring and evaluation capacity. Drawing predominantly on literature from the evaluation field, Chapter 2: The Theoretical Framework – Theories of Change describes theories of change and their functions and argues that articulating missing, confused and conflicting theories has the potential to improve program design, implementation and evaluation.

Chapter 3: Public Sector Capacity Development summarises key theories underpinning developing country public sector reforms and highlights how M&E is seen as a core function of contemporary public sector management. Boesen and Therkildsen's (2004) framework of different types of capacity development strategies is outlined and used to examine the theories of change on which key capacity development strategies are founded.

Chapters 2 and 3 briefly highlight the importance of context as a key component of theories of change and this is examined more deeply in Chapter 4: Context and Capacity Development. Two frameworks (Hofstede’s (2001) four-value dimensions
of national cultures and Rogers’ (2003) individual, organisational and innovation characteristics that influence the diffusion of new ideas and technology) are used to explore how context may influence change.

Chapter 5: Why Monitoring and Evaluation Capacity? brings key concepts raised in the earlier chapters together to examine the assumptions underpinning the growth in M&E and how it is expected to contribute to greater accountability or increased learning, the two core purposes of M&E.

The research design is described in Chapter 6: Research Design and is based on a case study approach to examine three components (context, mechanisms and outcomes) of the theories of change that underpin M&E capacity development in the Government of Tanzania. The chapter also justifies the selection of Tanzania as the country case study, and presents the methods and limitations of the study.

Chapters 7 – 10 are presented in a way that emphasises the inductive nature of theorising with data. Each of these chapters is presented as a part of a ‘data story’ where data on one or more of the components of theories of change is presented to build up to an emerging picture of the theories of change about M&E capacity development in the Government of Tanzania. Each of these chapters identifies linkages between elements of the emerging story and the literature presented in Chapters 2 – 5.

Chapter 7: Data Story 1 – The Tanzanian Public Sector Context summarises the first component of theories of change, context. Based on secondary data, the discussion examines the recent history of public sector and political reform in Tanzania and how contextual factors have influenced reform efforts. The chapter concludes with a summary of contextual factors that may affect M&E capacity development positively or negatively.

Chapter 8: Data Story 2 – The Monitoring and Evaluation Systems in the Tanzanian Public Sector describes the current state of the Government of Tanzania’s M&E systems, which may be described as the outcome of capacity development efforts
to date. It therefore describes the third component of theories of change. The discussion uses Hofstede’s and Rogers’ frameworks, described in Chapter 4, to examine the possible links between the context described in Chapter 7 and the outcomes outlined in this chapter. Using secondary and interview data, it is argued that the key values and principles underlying M&E differ from those that seem to be more prevalent in the public sector context being examined.

Chapter 9: Data Story 3 – Monitoring and Evaluation and Good Public Management presents the findings from the document analysis and outlines possible theories of change, in particular the mechanisms, which seem to explain how the government and donors expect M&E capacity to contribute to improved public sector management in Tanzania. The chapter links the analysis presented in Chapter 8 and concludes that context seems to have received insufficient consideration, resulting in an unrealistic assumption that the mechanisms that might lead to change in developed countries are the same as those in the Tanzanian public sector. A number of alternative mechanisms are proposed.

Chapter 10: Data Story 4 – Strategies to Develop Public Sector Monitoring and Evaluation Capacity examines the different types of strategies used to develop M&E capacity and how they are expected to result in improved capacity. The data from the document analysis and interviews is analysed according to Boesen and Therkildsen's (2004) framework of different types of capacity development strategies and argues that while a diversification in the types of capacity development strategies suggests a growing understanding of the complexities of change processes and the influence of context there still seems to be a tendency to address political challenges with functional solutions.

Finally, Chapter 11: Conclusions and Implications draws together the theorising presented in the body of this thesis in line with the research questions and reflects on the starting assertion and assumptions. It is argued that changing the current approach to developing M&E capacity in the Government of Tanzania is necessary if the desired outcomes are to be realised. The suggested approach requires much
deeper evaluative thinking and theorising about change processes, commitment to evaluation for learning and openness about the complexities and uncertainties of international development.

The literature review which follows begins with outlining how the theories of change approach offers an avenue for articulating assumptions about how capacity develops and how this process may strengthen knowledge, learning and program implementation. The subsequent literature review chapters examine particular theories of change that are relevant to this thesis.
This chapter draws on the literature from the evaluation field to introduce the concept of theories of change, key theorists’ perspectives and some advantages and disadvantages of the approach. Despite some criticisms of the theory of change approach, this thesis assumes that theories of change assists people to understand better M&E capacity development in uncertain, complex contexts. This chapter presents the theoretical basis of the thesis and frames discussions in subsequent chapters.

**2.1 Definitions of theories of change**

Capacity development programs are purposeful interventions that aim to bring about social change. The way a program is designed and how it is believed that this design will lead to the desired outcomes implies that programs operate with some underlying foundation or theory (Chen, 1990). Articulating theories, therefore, may provide clarity for understanding development processes and outcomes by making assumptions explicit.

Chen (1990: 40) defines theory as a ‘set of interrelated assumptions, principles, and/or propositions to explain or guide social action’, while van der Knaap (2004) refers to theory as the collection of assumptions, norms and values regarding the causal links between a program’s actions and the outcomes. These definitions differ from the conventional definition of positivist-scientific theory, which is usually defined as a set of proposals with the purpose of explaining and predicting an event (Chen, 1990). In contrast, theories of change may be considered grounded theories that grow out of data. As people go through the process of puzzling about what the data means, they accept, firstly, that social realities are characterised by ambiguity
and, secondly, that there are ambiguities in the theories generated (Weber, 2006). Shadish (1987: 95) describes program theory as ‘hunches and intuition built on common sense and on accumulated professional wisdom and experience about the nature of social programs and how they change’. It explicates the assumptions that stakeholders use to explain why and how an intervention might or does work (Patton, 2008). Program theory is therefore what the implementers believe is occurring, and may or may not be influenced by social theories. A general theory may be developed from a specific case and the set of ideas tested on other cases. Consensus of opinion is not sought; but rather, what might be important is decided through a negotiated process (Pawson and Tilley, 1997).

Theory of change evaluation approaches come under the guise of many names. Rogers (2008) helpfully outlines these in her article on using program theory to evaluate complicated and complex programs published in the journal Evaluation. Funnell (1997) refers to program theory and program logic. Weiss (1995, 1998) uses the term theory-based evaluation and theory of change. Chen (1990) calls it theory-driven evaluation, Schorr (1997) theory-of-action, Douthwaite et al. (2003) impact pathway analysis, Donaldson and Lipsey (2006) theory-driven evaluation science, emphasising rigour and systematic enquiry, and Nagarajan and Vanheukelen (1997) intervention logic. Clark and Anderson (2004) distinguish between theories of change and logic models, noting that logic models illustrate programme inputs, activities, outputs and outcomes yet do not explain how and why the outcomes are expected to occur. Rogers (2008), however, does not make this distinction between logic models and theories of change. Rather, she distinguishes between simple, complicated and complex logic models. Rogers (2008) suggests that programs may be categorised as: simple, representing a particular theory of change; complicated if they are implemented through multiple agencies, and have multiple concurrent, and possibly alternative, causative threads; and complex where causality is recursive, that is, lessons are learned from gains made from small changes or ‘tipping points’ and outcomes are emergent (Rogers, 2008). In contrast, logic models widely used in international development are often based on the
logical framework approach. This approach has been criticised for presenting a sense of order, certainty and predictability that may not match the development reality of non-linear causality, uncertainty and ambiguity (Gasper, 2000; Lavergne and Saxby 2001). Bakewell and Garbutt (2005) also warn that the approach may impose particular ideologies on stakeholders in developing countries. Plausible logic models represent how program activities relate to intended outcomes (Chen, 2005), are informed by program theory, which should draw on social science theory (Donaldson and Lipsey, 2006).

While Pawson and Tilley (1997), Shadish (1987) and Chen (1990) focus on theories that help articulate the nature of the social program and how change occurs, Weiss (2000) distinguishes between two types of theory of change – implementation and programmatic. In line with the other theorists mentioned above, she describes programmatic theory as the causative mechanisms that make things happen. In comparison, implementation theory1 describes the steps to be taken in the implementation of a program. A program may have an overall programmatic theory, yet if the program is implemented across different sites, it may have different implementation theories to explain how to trigger the causative mechanisms (Rogers, 2008). Weiss’s implementation theory reflects the input-activity-output components shown in a programme logic model. The addition of the programmatic theory, that explains the how and why, reflects the theory of change that Clark and Anderson (2004) argue is missing from logic models.

Mechanisms are an important element of theories of change. Chen (2004) refers to mechanisms as a leverage, determinant or intervening variable. Leeuw (2003: 7) describes causes as mechanisms that ‘can be considered the “engines” that drive the policies or programs and are believed to make them effective’. Pawson and Tilley (1997) also introduce the concept of mechanisms through their notion of

1 Implementation theory is also referred to as theory of action (Rogers, 2010) or action model (Chen, 2004). Chen notes an action model consists of the implementation organization, program implementers, peer organisations / community partners, intervention and service delivery protocols, the ecological support context, and target group.
realistic evaluation. In realistic evaluation, program theory consists of context, mechanism and outcomes. Context refers to the spatial and institutional location as well as the norms, values and interrelationships existing in these locations. Mechanisms are the choices and capacities that lead to regular behavioural patterns. Neither mechanisms nor contexts are seen as limitless. Outcomes, intended and unintended, are the results generated from program implementation. Programs, Pawson and Tilley (1997) argue, present opportunities that people, who operate within structures and organisations, can choose to take. The resulting outcomes will depend on how the mechanisms that are supposed to work are actually acted out in a particular context. Therefore, theories of change may also be considered generative theories that consist of external and internal causal factors. An external causal factor may trigger an internal causal factor if the right conditions are present in the right circumstances (Pawson and Tilley, 1997). For instance, a training program to develop knowledge and skills is an external causal factor to trigger the internal causal factor or trainees’ motivation to apply the new knowledge and skills on the job. The internal causal factor will only work, however, if there is a supportive manager and colleagues in the work place before and after the trainee attends the training. This is the right condition and right circumstances to support the internal causal mechanism being activated.

For Leeuw (2003) and Pawson and Tilley (1997), social theories underpin mechanisms and it is these theories that are tested through program implementation. Programs can develop a range of testable propositions from various constructions of the three components of theories of change: context, mechanisms and outcomes. Once tested, hypotheses concerning mechanisms may be developed which may lead to the development of generative causal propositions or theories of change (Pawson and Tilley, 1997). Realistic evaluation also gives significance to people and their actions, increasing the complexity of developing explanations of change. People’s own awareness of the rules and patterns that provide or limit their opportunities may lead to a desire for change. Yet, realising change is dependent on the resources available to those wanting the change as well
as the resources of those who do not want change. Context also transforms the actual path of change, it may hinder people’s actions and influence whether mechanisms are triggered or not. Therefore, incomplete and imperfect knowledge of the context makes change unpredictable and explaining change difficult (Pawson and Tilley, 1997).

An example of how a theory of change related to smoking may be expected to work is outlined below.

**Box 1: Illustration of a theory of change**

An anti-smoking program that aims to decrease smoking might comprise a programmatic theory based on improving people’s knowledge about the negative effects of smoking. The logic might be: ‘if people have improved knowledge about the negative effects of smoking, then people will smoke less or not start smoking’. The implementation theory might then include the production of brochures containing information on the negative effects of smoking. These brochures would be expected to trigger the programmatic theory. The ‘brochure’ represents the external causal factor to improve people’s knowledge whereas ‘fear of sickness or dying’ represents an internal causal factor, or mechanism, that leads to behaviour change. Using Pawson and Tilley’s definition, the mechanism is triggered when a person makes a choice to smoke less or not at all in order to limit their chances of getting sick or dying from smoking. This assumption that fear is a motivating factor, may be informed by social theories, hunches or intuition.

Different implementation theories could be used to trigger the same programmatic theory. For instance, television commercials may also be developed alongside brochures by the program. Similarly, the same implementation theory could be used to trigger different programmatic theories. For instance, the brochure may also be used to trigger mechanisms related to social norms where non-smokers put peer pressure on smokers to smoke less.

How the internal causal mechanisms are acted out depends on context. For instance, if a large proportion of the population smoke, there may be limited peer pressure. If popular culture promotes smoking as cool or sexy then this may be a stronger influencing factor on smokers than fear of sickness or dying.

Through implementing the anti-smoking program it is possible to test the programmatic theory. For instance, to see if increased knowledge is gained through the brochures, if the fear of sickness or dying mechanism is triggered and, if so, if smoking decreases.

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2 This illustration has been adapted from an example developed by Rogers (2010).
2.2 **Missing, confused and imprecise theories**

The absence or lack of articulated theories underpinning social programs is highlighted by a range of authors. More than 35 years ago, Rossi (1972: 42), cited in (Deutscher, 1979), noted that:

*A large part of the problem presented by broad aim programs lies in the absence of reasonable social science theories which could serve as a guide to the design of social action programs.*

This problem is more recently reiterated by Cacioppe and Edwards (2004: 102), who state that:

*Currently, a substantial number of organisational development programs run with little coherent explanation of why various activities are used and what occurs in terms of an organisation’s development.*

Rather than having absent theories as Rossi suggests, other theorists suggest theories may be numerous and confused (Weiss, 2000), imprecise (Bickman, 2000), or have hazy objectives and implicit mechanisms to bring about change (van der Knaap, 2004).

Stame (2004) and Mason and Barnes (2007) note that, in general, program designers tend to give only a cursory explanation to what is expected to happen – the how, why and when. Rarely is a program’s theory of change made explicit at its commencement. Development policy makers, designers and practitioners also tend to design programs with their own biases, assumptions and in line with the latest trends in development ‘thinking’ without necessarily making these influences explicit. They may also observe selectively, seeing what they believe (espoused theory) rather than what they say or do (theory-in-use), thereby influencing the decisions made and actions taken (Argyris and Schön, 1974). Argyris and Schön (1974) explain this phenomenon in the following way:

*When someone is asked how he would behave under certain circumstances, the answer he usually gives is his espoused theory of*
action for that situation. This is the theory of action to which he gives allegiance, and which, upon request, he communicates to others. However, the theory that actually governs his actions is this theory-in-use (Argyris and Schön 1974: 6–7).

The point is that theories of change need to go beyond surface-level explanations and look more deeply to articulate actual theories-in-use.

Stame (2004) notes that programs developed without consideration of research and theories have been given a position of ‘absolute rationality’ at a time when most contemporary policy analysis emphasises ‘bounded rationality’ and incrementalism. On the other hand, the absence of articulation of theories of change may be influenced by political processes, decisions and unequal power and knowledge. While van der Knaap (2004) comments that the development of public policy must be legitimised in a democratic manner, this does not always happen even in countries calling themselves democratic. Governments may not wish to open up debate for serious discussion, nor be accountable for their objectives and how they are actioned.

Of particular importance to this thesis is Morgan’s (2006) suggestion that there is an absence of a theory of capacity development implying that capacity development programs are theory-less. This situation may be explained by of the following factors. Firstly, the concept of capacity development has been influenced by multiple disciplines and ideologies about development processes. For instance, Fukuyama (2004) outlines the range of theoretical disciplines that underpin the four elements of institutional capacity. He suggests that management, public administration and economics underpin organisational design and management; political science, economics and law underpin institutional design; political science

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3 Rationality, according to Stame (2004), refers to ‘uncertain but sensible’ arguments based on probability, expectation and personal experience. Bounded rationality has developed with recognition that people are only partly rational since in complex situations it is impossible to formulate and solve complex problems and process and consider all alternatives. People are emotional and irrational in the remainder of their actions. Logic differs from rationality since it is concerned with verifiable facts and the demonstrated links between them.
supports the basis of legitimation; and sociology and anthropology underscore social and cultural factors. Secondly, the current popularity of the systems approach to capacity development, discussed in more detail in Chapter 3 of this thesis, is favoured because of its comprehensiveness and holistic nature. Yet this comprehensiveness, along with the multiple disciplines and ideologies on which capacity development draws, results in a certain vagueness and lack of focus (Lusthaus et al., 1999). Morgan (2006) proposes the subject of capacity development may lack intellectual status within the broader development community precisely because it lacks an accepted and tested theory and a common language and understanding that such a theory would provide. As a result, some people find it difficult to engage and buy-in to the concept.

Baser and Morgan (2008) propose there are benefits in retaining the concept. Firstly, the authors suggest that the concept of capacity encourages practitioners to consider how development needs to be operationalised therefore thinking beyond the ‘what’ and ‘why’ to the practical implementation issues. Secondly, the authors argue that the concept of capacity pushes donors, development practitioners and developing country public servants to consider the purposes of development cooperation; in particular, whether the purpose of capacity development interventions is capacity as an end in itself or if capacity is intended to lead to other outcomes. Baser and Morgan (2008) stress the distinction is important since they suggest that capacity usually leads to results, whereas results do not necessarily lead to capacity. Lastly, they suggest that the concept of capacity development encourages those involved in development to consider issues of adapting to change, resilience and sustainability.

It is these perceived gaps in understanding program theories that has led to an increasing interest by evaluators in theories of change and consequently theory-based evaluation to articulate or test theories of change. Several evaluators (Preskill and Boyle, 2008; Stame, 2004; Mason and Barnes, 2007; Rogers, 2003 and Leeuw,
support the need to articulate program theories and the use of evaluation to test those theories.

2.3 Functions of theories of change

Van der Knaap (2004) outlines four functions of theories of change. Firstly, a theory of change can increase focus and reduce complexity. Some caution is noted, though, in that the focus could also lead to a distortion. Secondly, articulation of a theory can provide a framework for the stakeholders participating in policy or program debate processes. After debate, the theory can serve as a starting place for: (a) adjustments to be made following monitoring; and (b) learning for improvement or innovation. Stame (2004) argues that theory-based evaluations may help develop public sector capacities as well as playing an education role for the public to help them to understand better, and deal with, the political processes around program development and implementation. Theories of change can also inform and educate stakeholders about the program and the limits of change. Building on this notion, Reeler (2007) advocates for good theories of change to assist those involved in development to build their thinking and understanding of complex social processes. Similarly, in a recent review of the quality of the UK Department for International Development’s evaluation, Perrin (2009: 28) argues that:

there is a need for the development and use of more appropriate theory-of-change models that articulate and begin to encompass the complex and diffuse nature of the linkages between what DFID does and wider impact.


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4 Leeuw uses the term policy theory. This is the same as program theory (Leeuw, 2003).
M&E systems consist of a ‘missing middle’ or the link between an output and long-term outcome\(^5\).

From a policy or management perspective, Chen (1990) promotes theory-driven approaches to evaluation, claiming that articulating the program's underlying theory of change allows it to be tested in ways that reveal whether program failure may be attributed to implementation failure or theory failure. As Henderson (2002: 187) asks:

> Why, after five decades of continuous study and so many proposed theories of organisational change, have we made only moderate progress in effectively executing change? Is it flawed theory, failure to execute effectively in practice, or both?

Patton (2008) reiterates the need to distinguish between theory failure and implementation failure, particularly if M&E is to be useful for decision making. Theory failure relates to the fact that the theory or idea on which a program was based did not work. Implementation failure means that the effectiveness of the underpinning theory of change was not tested because it was not adequately implemented. It is only when a plausible theory of change has been articulated that a program should be evaluated in terms of its implementation (Rogers, 2008).

Chen’s (1990) move towards theory-driven evaluation aims to counter method-driven approaches as well as expanding on the possible purposes of evaluation beyond the traditional judgments on goal attainment. Theory-driven evaluations, according to Chen, should be able to provide programs with the missing social science theory (Stame, 2004).

### 2.4 Adoption of theory of change approaches

While there have been recent proponents, such as Stame (2004), van der Knaap (2004) and Rogers (2008), of theory-based approaches to improve program design,

\(^5\) The concept of the missing middle is discussed in more depth in Chapter 5.
implementation and evaluation, Wholey et al. (1970) and Weiss (1972) made this call over 30 years ago as a result of early evaluations failing to lead to program improvements. In 1972, Weiss suggested that the use of evaluation results could be improved if there was an analysis of the theoretical underpinnings of programs, articulation of the linkages between inputs and outcomes, and analysis of the effectiveness of different program components. The continued appeal therefore raises the question about why theory-driven approaches have not been substantially adopted to improve programs.

Weber (2006) outlines three explanations why theory-of-change approaches have not been adopted extensively. Firstly, interest in variables and statistical associations lead to a disinterest in understanding processes and causality. Secondly, differing epistemological and ontological positions by academics lead to a lack of critical engagement across perspectives as they hold onto their established theoretical positions. Lastly, mechanism-based approaches are seen as an avenue to generate better grounded theories as opposed to grand theories.

While supporting theorising approaches, Weber (2006) nonetheless notes a number of risks. Firstly, theories may be too mechanistic or reductionist, focusing on linear input-output relationships without leaving space for ambiguity. As donors and development practitioners seek greater understanding, an instrumental agenda may continue to be pursued:

> which seems to compel us ceaselessly to search for ‘solutions’ to the problems. We swing between the frustration of not understanding and the need to find out what to do (Chabal, 2009: 3).

Stufflebeam (2004) also questions whether programs can be ‘worked out’ and, as a consequence, questions the basis of theory of change approaches and evaluations. Scriven (1998) calls ‘for the least theory that practice requires’, suggesting that theory is not needed to establish what works and why since a basic program logic is sufficient and understanding ‘why’ is often a secondary importance to understanding how an intervention works.
Stufflebeam’s (2004) and Scriven’s (1998) skepticism highlights a central tension underlying theory of change approaches, which is the extent to which it is expected that programs can be worked out. The positivist–rationalist may argue that it is possible to ‘know’, that knowledge can be generated that can tell us what works and why. As such, the ‘right’ knowledge can be used to develop the ‘right’ theory to design the ‘right’ instruments for the ‘right’ implementation for the ‘right’ outcomes. Evaluation, in this context, then consists of seeking the truth and must lead to improvements in existing theory or the development of new ones (van der Knaap, 2004). However, knowledge and truth are relative (ibid.).

Pawson and Tilley (1997: 76), while promoting explanation, acknowledge that there is a limitation in the ‘explanatory ambitions of realist evaluation’. Sanderson (2002: 12) takes a similar position, suggesting that there is a need to be modest in terms of our expectations of what theory-based evaluation may deliver. From a constructivist perspective, there is no ‘single best solution’ and while evaluation may be a learning process it may not be a process that leads to the development of universal laws or theories (Pawson and Tilley, 1997).

Rogers (2008) counteracts Stufflebeam’s and Scriven’s position, suggesting that theories of change remain a useful approach for evaluating not only simple, but also complicated and complex interventions. She stresses that the aim is not to develop logic models that are more detailed and intricate and applied prescriptively through performance measures. Rather, it is the discussions that take place in the development of complicated and complex program logics that are valuable. Rogers (2008: 44) endorses the ‘need to be qualitative, communicative, iterative and participative’ in developing emergent program theory to guide planning, management and evaluation of particular activities. While uncertainty and ambiguity may encourage managers and evaluators to find safety in simple logic models, Rogers (2008) notes that identifying the elements of complication or complexity and addressing them in useful ways is a positive step. Therefore, users of theories of change need to be cognisant of broader frameworks and patterns.
since mechanisms are usually developed as part of a broader body of theory (Weber, 2006).

Polarising positivist and constructivist approaches seems unhelpful when looking at capacity development. As van der Knaap (2004) emphasises, theory of change approaches draws on both positivist and constructivist paradigms. While learning is a constructivist concept it may also be viewed as positivist if learning is for program improvement, since positivists believe that it is possible to identify causal links and learn what works and what does not. Constructivism also localises debates on causal linkages by asking ‘what works for whom in what circumstances’ and highlights the uncertainty of outcomes when solutions are exported from one context to another. Weiss (1987, cited in Stame, 2004: 61) comments that ‘evaluation is a rational activity in a political environment’. Within international development, evaluating capacity development interventions is politicised by donors wishing to demonstrate development outcomes, by recipient governments who may wish to obtain further funding, and by consultants who are sometimes considered to be only as good as their last job. Citing Patton’s (2002) call for ‘pro-meaningfulness’ which uses the strengths of positivist and constructivist approaches, van der Knaap (2003) argues that the strengths and weaknesses of theory-based evaluation call for a broader understanding of rationality. Rationality has moved beyond the strict deductive theoretical development of universal laws to a requirement for learning. Those developing, implementing and evaluating policies and programs must be open to uncertainty, complexity, questioning and discussion.

2.5 Summary

As outlined at the beginning of this chapter, this thesis is premised on the basis that articulating program theories as they relate to M&E capacity development is useful for anyone working in development. Therefore, discussions on M&E capacity development must be ‘social, interactive and of a dialogical nature’ (Hoppe, 1998: 13 cited in van der Knaap, 2004:29). While program theory assists to reveal possible
mechanisms and infers a degree of causality, the primary relevance for capacity development with its complex, messy and experimental characteristics is to articulate propositions of how change is thought to occur in given contexts. The act of articulating helps assumptions and biases to be brought into the open for discussion, clarification and testing in different contexts to increase learning.

To ensure clarity in the discussions throughout the rest of this thesis, the following understanding of theory of change is used.

Theories of change are the collection of assumptions, norms and values regarding the causal links between a program’s actions and the outcomes. Theories of change comprise three components: context; mechanisms; and outcomes. Context is the institutional environment which includes the norms, values and interrelationships existing in the environment. Mechanisms are the choices and capacities that lead to regular behavioural patterns. Capacity development strategies may be implemented to trigger mechanisms, which is choices and capacities. Outcomes, intended and unintended, are the results generated from program implementation.

A theory of change may be divided into implementation and programmatic theories. Implementation theory describes the steps to be taken in the implementation of a program and includes the details normally found in program plans which outline the activities which will be implemented. The implementation theory will include capacity development strategies. Programmatic theory concerns the causative mechanisms that make things happen. Therefore, implementation of the implementation theory is expected to trigger the programmatic theory so that new regular behaviours are created. A program may have an overall programmatic theory, yet if the program is implemented across different sites, it may have different implementation theories to explain how to trigger the causative mechanisms.
The following chapters use this theoretical frame to examine different aspect of theories of change as they relate to M&E capacity development. Chapter 3 investigates some key ideas underpinning public sector reforms over the last three decades and the strategies used to trigger change.
The purpose of this chapter is to review the literature concerning public sector capacity development theories of change. The discussion focuses on two levels of theories. The first level concerns theories about how the public sector should be structured and function while the second level of theories relates to how to achieve change in the public sector: what capacity development strategies will be used; how they will be used; by whom and when; and how they are expected to influence change. These capacity development strategies are the external causal factors which are expected to trigger mechanisms or internal causal factors so that the desired change is achieved.

This chapter does not specifically examine M&E capacity development. Rather, the discussion demonstrates how M&E is part of other theories of public sector capacity development. The types of strategies used to develop broader public sector capacities are also used to develop M&E capacity. The discussion also refers to some issues relating to context, which are expanded in Chapter 4.

3.1 Summary of trends in international development and public sector reform

This section summarises a number of key international development trends. Theories of development assume that there is a path to economic, social and political development, for instance by pursuing economic growth, establishing particular political models such as socialism or multi-party democratic systems, and developing localised approaches (Chabal, 2009a). Overall, the public sector reforms attempted in developing countries tend to follow trends in developed countries.

The 1960s ‘trickle down’ approach to international development focused on designing and establishing individual functioning government organisations using models from developed countries. Foreign aid was expected to compensate for
savings and foreign currency reserve shortages and to provide financial assistance for technical expertise needed for industrialisation and improving economic infrastructures. Organisational development consisted of training developing country public sector officials in developed country universities. With the move towards neo-liberalism and neo-classic economics in the developed countries in the 1970s, traditional approaches to capacity development moved to strengthening individual organisations, rather than only establishing them, using a number of supply-driven strategies (Bossuyt, 2001). Other influential ideas of the 1970s include development administration and management theories, strategies targeting government service delivery systems, public programs to reach neglected target groups, human resource management, and people-centred development largely focusing on education and health.

The 1980s saw the emergence of the concepts ‘new public management’ (see 3.2.2) in western developed countries and ‘governance’ in international development, which brought a shift in focus from individual organisations to the wider institutional environment encompassing private, public and non-government organisations. The term ‘capacity development’ also came into use at this time. The World Bank (1994) defines governance as ‘the manner in which power is exercised in the management of the country’s economic and social resources for development’. Good governance is participatory, consensus orientated, transparent, accountable, responsive, effective and efficient, equitable, inclusive and followed the rule of law (Currie, 1996). The central government’s role became one of regulating the private sector, promoting civil society and providing core services through outsourcing arrangements. A growth in decentralisation, public–private partnerships, privatisation and competitive tendering followed with strategies focusing on the capacity to bargain, mediate and build consensus among different groups (Bossuyt, 2001). Understanding politics and power in public sector reforms became important factors, reflecting development theories that assume socio-economic and political characteristics influence the application of power and local politics (Chabal, 2009a; Leftwich, 2007).
The 1990s saw the influence of ‘new institutional economics’, whereby economic activity was believed to be underpinned by legal and social, formal and informal, norms and rules (North, 1990). Individuals were seen as rational and strategic in the choices they made about how to obtain their desired outcomes and ‘rational choice’ theories became popular. Individuals were believed to weigh up possible constraints and the likely actions of others since their desired outcomes are dependent on what others do (Leftwich, 2007). Development efforts aimed to increase the motivation of individuals to develop appropriate ‘rules of the game’ and create incentive systems to drive improved institutional and organisational performance. The decade also saw a rise in the use of ‘participatory approaches’ to capacity development, a greater emphasis on civil society as a driver of change, with an increasing focus on local ownership, and understanding the interlinked layers of capacity (Bossuyt, 2001; Chabal, 2009a).

The 2000s has seen the emergence of the ‘systemic approach’ to capacity development, which emphasises supporting clusters of networks and organisations to improve wider societal capacity. This could be seen as an extension of the governance approach, which brought civil society and the private sector into the development picture. Wider societal capacity is seen as necessary if an environment of social trust, accountability and participation is to grow (Bossuyt, 2001). Therefore, developing the capacity of civil society and media to hold governments to account for service delivery is important. Such systemic strategies are based on assumptions about the accountability relationships between different parties. For instance, the public has an electoral accountability relationship with the government, as it can vote it out.

A more recent development of the systemic approach is the growing interest in ‘complexity’, ‘complex adaptive systems’ and ‘wicked problems’. Rather than

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6 Complex adaptive systems are based on interdisciplinary theories that are concerned with understanding ‘the patterns of relationships within them [systems], how they are sustained, how they self-organize and how outcomes emerge’ (Zimmerman, 2005: 3). Wicked problems are seen as ‘complex, open-ended, and intractable [where] both the nature of the “problem” and the preferred “solution” are strongly contested’ (Head, 2008: 101).
viewing institutions and organisations as machine-like, they are viewed as messy, unpredictable and emergent. Institutions are viewed as constantly changing and dynamic so that individuals within them are independent decision makers while also interconnected and interdependent. Therefore solutions can develop from simple rules of interaction and small changes can have significant affects (Zimmerman, 2005; Ramalingam et al., 2008; Head, 2008). Capacity development efforts focus on knowledge networks, information, communication and technology and concern ongoing learning, adaptation and local knowledge (Jones and Kettl, 2003; Browne, 2002). These changes reflect a belief that western transplanted models and tools have not worked and that local and / or adapted models are needed (Chabal, 2009a).

3.2 Institutions, organisations and individuals

Current definitions of capacity development view capacity as existing at three levels: institutional, organisational and individual. This section describes some key theories underpinning current approaches to the development of institutions, organisations and individuals. Understanding these provides the foundation for understanding the choice of capacity development strategies, which are outlined in Section 3.3.

Somewhat confusingly in international development, the terms institutions and organisations are at times used interchangeably (Teskey, 2005). In this thesis, organisations are defined as one element that makes up an institution or state but not the only element. Other elements include political system design (such as the separation of power between executive, legislature and judiciary), the basis of the states’ legitimacy (such as the popular vote), and cultural and social structures (Fukuyama, 2004). Teskey (2005: 4) provides the following analogy to demonstrate the difference between organisational and institutional development:

*Organisational development can be likened to coaching a soccer team. Which players should play in which position? What should be the team’s tactics?* At
what point should we bring on a substitute? Should the team play a sweeper? By contrast institutional development would focus on the rules of the game. Should the offside law be changed? Are the goalposts too small? Should we allow 13 players instead of 11? And perhaps most importantly, should the team give up playing soccer and take up cricket instead?

Institutions and organisations are interlinked and each is influenced by the other. For instance, Teskey (2005) argues that institutional capacity will be determined, firstly, by the specific capacities of state organisations and, secondly, by the degree to which formal and informal rules align to regulate state organisations and promote quality, results and performance. Indeed, a question could be whether capable institutions are needed for capable public sector organisations or are capable organisations needed for a capable institutional environment. The answer to these questions will influence the choice of strategies needed to develop particular types of capacity.

3.2.1 Institutions

Donors have increasingly recognised the influence of institutions on organisational and individual development and, consequently, increased their demands for institutional reform (Bossuyt, 2001). As noted in section 3.1, reforms have aimed to establish new and more effective public institutions to support a market economy through sound financial markets; supportive legal and regularity environments; and effective, efficient, open and transparent judiciaries (Bossuyt, 2001).

Institutions shape individuals’ actions and individuals shape institutions (Chabal, 2009a). The focus is not only on the structure of the state and government but also informal institutions, patterns and processes and the relationships between formal and informal institutions and their impact on politics (Leftwich, 2007). People’s lives are governed by formal rules laws, property rights, separation of powers, and administrative and organisational arrangements which are ‘created, communicated, and enforced through channels widely accepted as official’ (Helmke and Levitsky,
In comparison, informal institutions consist of ‘socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels’ (Helmke and Levitsky, 2006: 5 cited in Leftwich, 2007). Informal rules include moral standards, rules guiding reciprocity for favours and gifts, and the position and standing given to public authorities, professionals, and religious and political leaders (Boesen, Christensen and Therkildsen, 2003). Formal and informal rules persist as long as the majority of people feel they are beneficial. Therefore, change occurs when the majority feel that existing rules are not beneficial and seek to create new ones (Bossuyt, 2001; Leftwich, 2007).

3.2.2 Organisations and individuals

In public sector reform, individual capacity is viewed in the context of organisational capacity and theories of change about organisations and individuals may be considered subsets of theories of change about institutions. Individuals working in organisations are expected to have the necessary knowledge, skills, attitude and confidence to undertake the organisation’s work. Since there is substantial overlap between the strategies used to develop organisational and individual capacity, the two are discussed together in this section.

A key theory of change underpinning public sector reforms over the last two decades has been the concept of ‘managerialism’ that developed as part of the new public management agenda. Theories of change concerning organisations are also often framed by ideas about the speed and scope of change. These two ideas, managerialism and the speed and scope of change, are discussed below.

Managerialism

Kettl (1997) describes ‘managerialism’ as the concept driving reforms in Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom since the 1980s. It is important to this thesis

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7 Annex A contains a list of individual monitoring and evaluation capacities provided by Preskill (2007).
because it also underpins many of the public sector reforms implemented in developing countries. Managerialism aims to replace traditional hierarchical bureaucracies that are characterised by stable structures, with organisations that are flexible and able to change processes as required to operate within an environment of market-style competition (Kettl, 1997). Within managerialism, two different approaches have developed.

Firstly, the ‘let managers manage’ approach, adopted in Sweden and Australia, is based on the premise that managers know what to do but are constrained by existing rules and procedures. Managers are encouraged to focus on problems and are given the freedom to solve them, which in turn prompts organisations to adapt through continuous improvement, part of the total quality management approach proposed by Deming (1986). Managers are to serve the customer rather than the bureaucracy and, as such, this approach emphasises bottom-up rather than top-down management and cooperation. The introduction of customer surveys, customer service standards and tools for measuring how people are treated, and the timeliness, reliability and accessibility of services are aspects of the focus on customers and employees are trained and provided with incentives to encourage a gradual change to a more customer-oriented focus. This approach requires that a balance be created between the increased risk that managers are expected to take and the provision of incentives to support managers from the possibility of unforgiving reprisals (Kettl, 1997).

The second approach is one of ‘making managers manage’, adopted by New Zealand and the United Kingdom. This approach is based on the belief that ‘people have to be controlled or incentivised to make them behave’ (Eyben, 2008: 11). Incentives are the positive or negative external strategies developed to influence the motivation and behaviour of individuals, groups and organisations (UNDP, 2006). Under this approach, based on rational choice theories (Bossuyt, 2001, and Leftwich, 2007), executive agencies are established, traditional government services are contracted to private companies, and senior public servants are
employed on performance contracts with clear goals and processes to measure performance. The treatment of employees is more radical than the ‘let managers manage’ approach as civil service rules are taken apart, privatisation pursued and authority delegated to agency-based managers.

Both approaches focus on establishing goals, measuring results (output and/or outcomes) and using the information to inform decisions. Each approach is also driven by micro-theories of individual motivations (see 3.3.2) and control (Kettl, 1997; Eyben, 2008). However, Kettl (1997) suggests that some reformers have selected reforms without considering the ideas on which they are based. As such, conflicting reforms may be chosen. For instance, ‘let managers manage’ emphasises empowerment and decreases the constraints on managers’ flexibility, while ‘making manager’s manage’ emphasises managers’ flexibility, although the extent of flexibility is considered to be limited by market incentives. Each approach is also a subset of a broader theory about public sector management and therefore alignment and consistency with the broader theory is necessary.

Kettl (1997) argues that managerialism only provides a partial theory of change since it fails to consider the relationship between public managers and elected officials, the connections between public service managers’ performance and government budgets, and governments’ influence over non-government organisations. The customer focus overturns traditional top-down accountability structures, compelling public sector managers to look outside their organisations for outcomes rather than the traditional internal focus on processes. It also ‘uncouples the existing leverage that elected officials typically use in asserting their control over public managers’ (ibid: 456). Difficulties may also arise when theories originating in Western countries are implemented in different contexts found in developing countries. Schick (2002), for example, suggests that if developing countries lack accountability systems, it may be premature to move from public administration that emphasises compliance to public management that emphasises greater flexibility. Public administration focuses on merit-based recruitment and
promotion, paying fair wages, enforcing a day's work-effort for a day's pay, improving the accessibility and courteousness of staff, and maintaining sound budgets that relate to actual expenditure. Public management focuses on performance pay and performance contracting (Schick, 2002). The implementation of partial or misaligned theories tends to result in limited, negative or unintended outcomes since the strategies used to trigger the relevant mechanism may not be targeted appropriately (Schick, 2002; Kettl, 1997).

**Speed and scope of change**

Approaches to organisational development are often framed around the process, speed and scope of change. Weick and Quinn (1999) distinguish episodic and discontinuous change and continuous and incremental change. Radical innovations that are risky and complex may be implemented in an episodic fashion, with the aim of disrupting the equilibrium in inert organisations so that the change is dramatic, intentional, and irreversible. In comparison, incremental and cumulative change occurs over an extended period to allow people to adapt. The premise is that small frequent and concurrent changes gradually become sufficiently common and routine, leading to more significant change. However, Robinson (2007) suggests that incremental efforts may hinder more substantial changes since small slow changes do not tackle the substantive and deeper barriers to change.

The terms transactional and transformational change have also been used to describe the scope of the change that is desired. Transactional change focuses on operational goals such as an organisation’s capacity to produce certain products and generally occurs only during the period when assistance is provided. Change is adapted to fit people’s values. In contrast, transformational change refers to developing longer-term capacity where an organisation produces its own services or outputs. Transformational change has an impact on people’s values and beliefs (OPM, 2006; Munduate and Bennebroek Gravenhorst, 2003). This distinction is similar to Argyris and Schön’s (1978) concept of single, double and triple-loop learning. The authors propose that organisations often tend towards single-loop
learning, which focuses on the most immediately apparent processes and structures. Double-loop learning questions the organisation’s goals, values and strategies and challenges existing frameworks to which the immediately apparent processes and structures are linked. Triple-loop learning goes one step further to encourage analysis and justification for an organisation’s existence. Double- and triple-loop learning may contribute to transformational change. Transformational and transaction change require different strategies to stimulate change (OPM, 2006).

3.3 Key capacity development strategies

While the theories described above guide the type of capacity development strategies that may be selected, capacity development strategies are also underpinned by their own theories of change and as such a layering of theories begins to occur. The particular capacities desired will also influence the type of strategies that are selected to try to develop them.

3.3.1 Functional and political approaches

Boesen and Therkildsen (2004) differentiate strategies in terms of those that are predominantly functional or predominantly political, and according to whether they focus on internal or external organisational systems. Table 1 presents Boesen and Therkildsen’s (2004) model.

The predominantly functional strategies examine internal organisational work and task systems that either get the job done or create an external supportive environment for getting the job done (European Commission, 2005). Driving forces for internal capacity include a sense of norms, coherence and intrinsic motivations as employees are assumed to care about the organisation’s interests. Change is expected to occur through participatory reasoning and joint learning so that the best technical solution can be found (Boesen and Therkildsen, 2004).
Annex B contains a list of possible strategies, focusing specifically on M&E capacity, according to the purposes described in the model presented above.

**Table 1: Categories of capacity development strategies**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Internal elements</th>
<th>Predominantly functional approach</th>
<th>Predominantly political approach</th>
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|                   | Seeks to strengthen formal organisational structures, systems, technology, procedures, skills, management skills to ‘get the job done’. These are transactional changes. Examples of capacity development strategies include:  
  - Business process re-engineering; and  
  - Total quality management.  
  - Changing or strengthening systems, structures, procedures and technology;  
  - Providing or maintaining financial resources, machinery, equipment, or buildings.  
  - Skills and management training, which includes technical skills as well as communication, and leadership knowledge and skills; and  
  - Support from technical experts, to guide the change process. | Seeks to change internal dynamics and internal competitive pressures to get the power ‘right’, accommodate interests and achieve transformational change. Also seeks to diminish unproductive effects of the informal organisation working within the organisation. Examples of capacity development strategies include:  
  - Promoting based on merit;  
  - Firing,  
  - Targeting support to ‘groups of reformers’;  
  - Supporting sanctions against rent seeking;  
  - In-house management development;  
  - Performance-based benefits to key staff. |

| External elements | Seeks to strengthen the cooperative capacity of the organisation to deal with ‘functional’ external actors. Strategies aim to create an enabling environment for doing the job. Strategies include:  
  - Output-based or performance-based budget allocations;  
  - Ensuring predictability of funding flows and changing the resource envelope;  
  - Changing in education system;  
  - Changing in formal/legal mandate; and  
  - Introduction of supervisory agencies, external audit functions and performance monitoring systems. | Seeks to change internal power dynamics and competitive pressures by supporting, building or maintaining external ‘political’ stakeholders or factors. Strategies include:  
  - Building and maintaining coalitions of external stakeholders strong enough to impose change;  
  - Building up client/user pressure for accountability,  
  - Support to advocacy and lobby groups, training of politicians, journalists;  
  - Strengthening the media’s role as a watchdog. |

Source: Adapted from Boesen et al. (2003), Boesen and Therkildsen (2004) and European Commission (2005)
The predominantly political dimension focuses on self-interested sub-groups, changing coalitions and power relationships. Assessments of the political dimensions examine how power and authority are distributed and how different interests are pursued. Loyalty systems become the unit of analysis and therefore assessments include determining if recruitment is predominantly from one region, and whether particular ethnic groups, political party members or professional groups hold senior positions or dominate. People are assumed to be self-interested, and therefore change occurs through conflict, external pressure, coalition building and finding powerful change agents who can force change (Boesen and Therkildsen, 2004).

The distinction between functional and political strategies is particularly important, since donors have predominately supported functional, single-loop learning transactional change strategies. These strategies are based on the assumption that poor performance is due to a lack of structures, systems and resources for getting the job completed. As such, development strategies focus on things that money can easily buy and has an appeal since the strategies focus on aspects that are not technically difficult and therefore models can be copied from better-performing countries. However, success using predominantly functional strategies has been limited since context, or the political aspects of change, have not been given adequate consideration (Boesen and Therkildsen, 2004). According to Pawson and Tilley’s (1997) model of theories of change, one key component has been missing from the equation. On a positive note, lack of success has contributed to the increased interest in the context and complexity of change processes.

The following discussion examines incentives; change agents, champions and opinion leaders; and technical assistance and training in more detail, and how they may be expected to trigger mechanisms. As highlighted above, the strategies may themselves be underpinned by social science theories. Those social science theories that are most relevant to this thesis are discussed below.

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8 The dimension can be linked to the governance approach to development described earlier.
3.3.2 **Incentives and motivations**

Incentive systems aim to create an extrinsic influence on the behaviour of organisations and individuals. The concept of incentives is premised on ideas about motivation, which is the ‘initiation, direction, intensity and persistence of behaviour’ (UNDP, 2006: 5). Motivation may be intrinsic, which is driven from the inside, or extrinsic, which is due to external influences. Theories of motivation, of which two are outlined below, may guide the use of incentive strategies. ‘Expectancy theory’ suggests that individuals believe if they expend greater effort at work, job performance will improve and organisational rewards, such as remuneration, will eventuate. Related strategies concern associating rewards that are desired by individuals with performance (Vroom, 1964). Maslow’s (1943) hierarchy of needs proposes that each level of need, starting at physiological needs such as clothing, shelter and food, has to be met before an individual can be concerned with the next level of need. The subsequent levels are safety needs, such as personal and financial security; social needs such as friends and supportive family; esteem and the need to be respected; and finally self-actualisation or where an individual can realise their maximum potential. Once an individual has met lower-level needs, the individual will be motivated by needs at the next level.

Resources, including performance-based budgeting and performance-based pay, are often used to create incentives for change since lack of resources may be a disincentive to change (Weiss, 2000). Non-financial benefits may include professional development and training opportunities, flexible working hours and schedules including part-time work and leave entitlements, the work environment, travel, job security and status of the organisation and/or position (UNDP, 2006).

The effectiveness of incentives in stimulating change may depend on firstly decreasing perverse incentives that support unwanted behaviour (UNDP, 2006) and whether the institutional or organisational context does not support or encourage the new ideas or practices (Weiss, 2000).
3.3.3 Change agents, champions and opinion leaders

Change agents, champions and opinion leaders are individuals who are able to influence individuals around them to change, or alternatively to not change. Champions are charismatic individuals who actively support new ideas and overcome resistance or indifference; whereas opinion leaders positively influence others’ attitudes and behaviours through their technical abilities and social and communication networks. Change agents are normally professionals, university educated, who aim to influence clients’ opinions to adopt new ideas. Change agents normally differ socially from their clients and therefore they may use opinion leaders or champions, who are more socially similar to clients, to bring about change. Champions are more innovative, are willing to take risks and have good people, persuasion and negotiation skills yet they do not have to be in a high-powered position. However, if the new idea or practice is considered expensive, highly visible or radical then holding a high-level position may be beneficial. In contrast, opinion leaders mirror the predisposition towards new ideas and practices in the broader environment. Therefore, if the broader environment is more risk-averse, opinion leaders will also be more risk-averse, or if the environment is more open to change then opinion leaders will be more open to change (Rogers, 2003). Change agents, champions and opinion leaders are a key element of Rogers’ concept of diffusion of innovation discussed in Section 4.3.3.

How individuals may effect change is based on ideas about influence. In situations of incremental change, change may occur because people are attracted to it. The change agent’s role is to make sense of the change and redirect the change by clarifying and assuring that compliance with the change will be profitable for the individuals (Munduate and Bennebroek Gravenhorst, 2003). This understanding of influence and change is similar to Foucault’s (1980; 1991) conceptualisation of power as a ‘latent force’. He argues that change is something that occurs slowly as new ideas are disseminated and gradually come to be accepted until they are recognised as common knowledge. From this perspective, change is not the direct
result of independent action by key people in positions of authority. In comparison, under episodic change the change agent’s role is to create change and therefore an individual’s position and power may be more important (Munduate and Bennebroek Gravenhorst, 2003; Johnson and Thomas, 2007). This perspective may be seen as aligning with Gramsci’s (1971) view that change occurs through organised efforts to resist the status quo. Weick and Quinn (1999 cited in Munduate et al., 2003) explain the different roles of change agents in terms of (a) a ‘logic of attraction’, in which agents show people how to do something and (b) a ‘logic of replacement’, in which agents tell people what to do.

Munduate and Bennebroek Gravenhorst (2003) further distinguish between change based on public compliance and that based on private acceptance; the former equates to transactional change and the latter to transformational change. Change based on compliance only achieves change at the surface level because coercion is required to force a change and persists only while the behaviour is under surveillance. Therefore, change relies on extrinsic motivation. For change to be based on private acceptance, the individual must feel that the new beliefs and actions are correct, valid and desirable. Thus, the ‘logic of attraction’ and intrinsic motivation underpins private acceptance of change. However, organisations may hope that there is a progression over time from public compliance to private acceptance (Hall et al, 2007).

Social power may be derived from a range of power bases that allows individuals to influence other others. In many African countries, individuals often do not derive as much social standing or power from their position within formal organisations as they do from their position within a range of social networks, based on kinship and ethnic ties, affiliations or perhaps political party connections (Hyden, 2008). Power bases may be found in the form of reward, coercion, legitimacy, expertise, reference and information (Raven, 1999) and each is explained in the following paragraphs.
Reward and coercive powers relies on people believing that the agent can, and will, reward or sanction the behaviour of others. When power is exercised legitimately in the eyes of the target audience, they are more likely to accept that an agent has the right to exert influence and they are obliged to comply. Similarly, when power based on technical expertise is recognised and respected by the target audience, there is a greater chance of private acceptance of the change. This is a particularly important issue for technical assistance, which is discussed in more detail later in this chapter. A target may associate with an expert and change their behaviour, attitudes and values as a result but such changes may not be seen as significant to them. Informational power bases are considered to be the most likely to lead to internalised sustainable changes. The relevance and validity of the information received can influence behaviour, beliefs and values, which are maintained without the influence of an agent or through surveillance (Munduate and Bennebroek Gravenhorst, 2003). However, a key variable is how the information is understood and interpreted by individuals (Weiss, 2000).

Social cognitive theory, which is based on a premise that people learn through observing others’ behaviour, seems to underpin at least some of the ideas about change agents. People may emulate particular behaviours and be motivated by potential rewards, which reinforce their actions. While the behaviours observed may change a person’s way of thinking, factors such as how a person was brought up, and the cognitive ability of their parents, may equally influence their behaviour. Social cognitive theory is consistent with the earlier discussions on individuals being both independent and interdependent as they influence, and are influenced by, their wider environment (Bandura, 1989). Rogers (2003) borrows from these ideas in his work on the development and adoption of innovation. The use of change agents, good practice models or demonstration projects may also be underpinned by social cognitive theory. Weiss (2000) notes that knowledge gained via demonstration projects and dissemination of information may, by itself, be insufficient to bring about change or to overcome barriers such as self-interest and the status quo.
3.3.4  Consultants as technical assistance

Technical assistance is widely used in international development as a way to influence organisational and individual development. Technical assistance is defined as the ‘the transfer, adoption, mobilisation and utilisation of services, skills, knowledge and technology’ and includes the provision of long- and short-term international and national consultants; formal, informal and on-the-job training; consultancies; work placements and mentoring; study visits; seminars; and organisational associations such as twinning arrangements (Baser and Morgan, 2001: 34). This discussion focuses on consultants as technical assistance that may be considered change agents according to Rogers’ (2003) description outlined in the previous section.

There is a substantial amount of literature critiquing the effectiveness of technical assistance in developing capacity (Norad, 2006, Hilderbrand, 2002, Morgan, 2002, DfID, 2002; 2006, ADB, 2007, and IMF, 2005). The influence of consultants is dependent on whether the recipients respect and desire this expertise (Raven, 1999). The provision of technical know-how is insufficient; the critical success factor is how the technical assistance is made available. This relies on the experts’ ability to operate effectively in complex cross-cultural contexts and to adapt generic approaches to organisational structures, systems, procedures and the development of individuals to new contexts (DfID, 2002; Munduate and Bennebroek Gravenhorst, 2003; Rogers, 2003).

Baser and Morgan (2008) distinguish between the direct and indirect use of consultants. Direct use is when consultants are responsible for designing or implementing an intervention, normally with the agreement and/or participation of local partners. In indirect use, Consultants may provide a facilitation or supportive role and work indirectly through country partners. This may include working indirectly on local issues and processes that affect capacity development. Table 2 illustrates the key differences between direct and indirect approaches.
Table 2: Direct and indirect approaches to technical assistance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Direct approach</th>
<th>Indirect approach</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Technical assistance takes a direct role in doing things; it achieves results</td>
<td>The donors ‘results’ are only those that provide support to the country staff to achieve things</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporary control and ownership shifts to the technical assistance</td>
<td>Technical assistance does not work independently; it works through others who take the lead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity development is mainly a side benefit arising out of the effort to do things</td>
<td>The priority is not action and delivery, but support and facilitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ownership by the technical assistance may be stronger than that of the country partner</td>
<td>Capacity development and promoting self-help are important</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country staff do not cede ownership, temporarily or psychologically</td>
<td>Source: Adapted from Baser and Morgan (2008: 108)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each approach is underpinned by different theories of how change occurs. The indirect approach is assumed to give more power to the recipients, on the assumption that this will motivate them. The indirect approach accepts that while change may take a longer time, the capacity developed will be more sustainable because the recipients will own the change as they have done it themselves. In situations where there are low levels of education and limited qualified and experienced professionals it will be more difficult to apply the indirect approach (Morgan and Baser, 2008).

3.3.5 **Formal and informal learning**

Formal learning refers to training programs, educational courses and structured professional development programs. In contrast, informal learning cannot be so easily identified, categorised and measured as it may occur through ‘chat’ with colleagues, observing others and ‘may be more of a diffuse practice than the embedding of a particular technique’ (Johnson and Thomas, 2007: 46). The use of different learning strategies is based on theories about how learning occurs in the
workplace. Johnson and Thomas (2007) suggest that training as a capacity development strategy is generally conceptualised in two different ways, which influence the content, structure and process of the training. Firstly, there is a linear causal path extending from the trainee’s acquisition of learning to application in the workplace. Alternatively, training is understood as a complex and interactive process that requires different opportunities for practise to reinforce the learning. For the latter, Preskill (2008) argues that capacity development should use adult learning principles to increase its success. She cites Silberman’s (2006) research, which shows how learning differs depending on the medium used (Table 3).

Table 3: Silberman’s effectiveness of different learning mediums

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approach</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lecture</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reading</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audiovisuals</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demonstration</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practice by doing</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teaching others</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Providing information aims to increase people’s knowledge so they can make ‘informed’ decisions. If change does not require those affected to make substantial changes and/or the reward for the effort is seen as justifiable then individuals may rationally choose to adopt new ideas and practices. Alternatively, if perceived risks cannot be diffused then adoption may be hampered (Leftwich, 2007; Pawson and Tilley, 1997; Rogers, 2003). However, according to Silberman’s research this may not be a very effective strategy and it assumes the information provided will be interpreted in the way intended (Weiss, 2000).

Constructivist and transformative approaches to learning encourage learners to construct meaning through combining old knowledge and new knowledge in order
to construct meaning (Johnson and Thomas, 2007). An assumption underpinning constructivist learning approaches is that learners will be more motivated by such an approach. A number of authors support this perception of learning. Kolb (1984) proposes four stages, involving concrete experience, reflective observation, abstract conceptualisation and active experimentation that learners need to go through for learning to be realised. The concept of situated learning in the workplace suggests social relations and interactions provide a context for learning, and that learning is influenced by explicit and implicit values (Lave and Wenger, 1991). Communities of practice are ‘groups of people who share a concern or a passion for something they do and learn how to do it better as they interact regularly’ (Wenger, 2006). Learning may occur through sharing problems and solving them together, requesting and sharing information, sharing resources and visiting experience sites (Wenger, 2006). Lastly, transformational learning aims to question individuals’ assumptions, beliefs and values as a way of transforming the individual (Mezirow, 2000).

Constructivist learning approaches differ from instructional learning where learners are shown or told what to do. Debates continue over the appropriateness of each approach in different circumstances and which approach leads to better learning outcomes. Tobias and Duffy (2009: 335) suggest that the best approach ‘ultimately depends on whether either approach engages more effective, deeper cognitive processes or more frequent processing’. Instructional approaches may be more appropriate in well-structured contexts and when the learners are less knowledgeable. Knowledgeable students may benefit from constructivist approaches because they have more knowledge and experience from which to draw (Tobias and Duffy, 2009). Learning has also been compared to an iceberg where the tip above the water represents explicit knowledge and the bulk of the iceberg that is under the water represents implicit knowledge with which new learning processes interact (Eraut, 2004). Much learning occurs implicitly and often explicit knowledge is not realised for a long time until eventually the learning
becomes accepted as common knowledge (similar to Foucault’s (1991) concept of latent power).

The ability of trainees to take learning from learning environments (whether they are academic settings or workshops) and apply learning to workplace environments is seen by many as a key problem (Eraut, 2004). Citing Lynton and Pareek (2000: 33), Johnson and Thomas (2007) emphasise ‘the simple linking of individual training and effective action ignores the manifold problems of introducing and sustaining change in an organisation’. The organisational development literature posits that learning is not an end in itself, but rather part of the process for achieving a desired outcome such as to gain knowledge and skills so they can do their jobs better (McCourt and Sola, 1999). This idea fits with Boesen and Therkildsen’s (2004) model of internal organisational–functional approaches to capacity development. However, a number of factors are seen to influence transition of learning into practice (McCourt and Sola, 1999; Bana and McCourt, 2006; Johnson and Thomas, 2007; Preskill and Boyle, 2008). These factors include:

- The extent to which training is developed as part of an integrated learning program, which takes into account content, process and environment, and provides learners with regular opportunities to try out new knowledge and skills to reinforce their learning;

- The relevance of the curriculum to the learners so that they can link it with their experience and values;

- The motivation, learning style of learners and ability of people to apply their knowledge, skills and attitudes to actual practice;

- The level of assistance provided to the learner by his or her manager or supervisor and support by colleagues and clients;

- The position and power of the individual within the organisation;

- The extent to which content addresses deeper organisational and institutional issues.
Individual learning may also create a dissonance within organisations unless a culture of individual discovery of new ideas is embedded in organisations, allowing an organisational impact from individual learning (Argyris and Schön, 1978). If individual and organisational learning occurs at different speeds or goals, diverse tensions may also arise (Johnson and Thomas, 2007). However, seeing knowledge and skills transfer, knowledge fit and relevance as the primary issue also ignores the fact that, for some people in some contexts, transferring learning is not a problem. Hager (2009) argues that there needs to be a greater focus on how learning transition can be improved and improving employers’ understanding that the majority of transitional learning occurs on the job. He emphasises that ‘even the best educational courses in the world will not produce “oven-ready workers”’ (ibid: 636).

Johnson and Thomas (2007) stress that examining the influence of individual and organisational learning is difficult given that simple cause and effect relationships do not exist in complex multivaried contexts. Recent research (Boud et al., 2009; Scheeres et al., 2010) questions whether trying to formalise informal learning achieves the opposite of what is intended, which is greater learning. Rather, Boud et al. suggest that formal and informal learning have different purposes and occur in different places and as such, not all learning can be formalised. This supports Eraut’s (2004) analogy of learning being like an iceberg whereby the largest part of learning occurs below the surface and Johnson and Thomas’s (2007) suggestion that learning is actually a diffuse practice.

3.4 Summary

This chapter has highlighted a range of theories that underpin capacity development at the institutional, organisational and individual levels, although by no means does it capture all theories. The predominantly political strategies have a cynical tone to the analysis of problems and solutions compared to the naivety and rational perspective of the functional strategies. Many of these theories can be
categorised on whether they constitute transactional or transformational approaches as represented in Table 4.

Table 4: Theories of transactional and transformational capacity development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Transactional change</th>
<th>Transformational change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Boesen et al. (2003)</td>
<td>Predominantly functional</td>
<td>Predominantly political</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bossuyt (2001)</td>
<td>Traditional approaches to institutional development</td>
<td>Governance, new institutional economics/rational choice and systemic approaches to institutional development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weick and Quinn (1999)</td>
<td>Continuous – incremental</td>
<td>Episodic – discontinuous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weick and Quinn (1999)</td>
<td>Public compliance</td>
<td>Private acceptance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munduate and Bennebroek Gravenhorst (2003)</td>
<td>Transactional – content changed to context</td>
<td>Transformational – content changes context</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foucault (1991)</td>
<td>Latent power model</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raven (1999)</td>
<td>Power based on reward and coercion</td>
<td>Power based on legitimacy, expertise and information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnson and Thomas (2007); Kolb (1984); Lave and Wenger (2006); Mezirow (2000); McCourt and Sola (1999)</td>
<td>Training – linear causal path to learning; transfer of learning; instructional learning; based on educational models of content and quality delivery</td>
<td>Training – complex iterative process; constructivist approaches (action learning, communities of practice, transformational learning); based on organisational model of content, context and process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DfID (2006)</td>
<td>Transactional – organisational capacity improves while getting support</td>
<td>Transformational – sustainable organisational capacity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The influence of context on capacity issues and the effectiveness of capacity development strategies have been raised throughout this chapter. The change process is defined by formal and informal and national and organisational politics; what capacity development strategies are used; if and who monitors and evaluates change; and whether information generated by M&E is acted on (Jones and Kettl, 2003). Therefore, context is integral to capacity development. There is a growing
critique that development interventions have been based on an inadequate consideration of the political, social, cultural and economic context over the last twenty years and this has negatively impacted on the effectiveness of assistance (Boesen and Therkildsen, 2004; Kelsall, 2006; Hyden, 2008; Easterly, 2007).

The following chapter expands on the discussion of context and aims to add depth to this discussion as it typically takes place in the international development literature.
CHAPTER 4: CONTEXT AND ITS INFLUENCE ON CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT

Globalisation, where countries and people are increasingly connected through the economy, information technology, the media and travel, has helped to spread ideas around the world. However, while there is a convergence in the rhetoric about ideas such as new public management in developed countries, there is greater divergence in implementation in developing countries (Jones and Kettl, 2003). The purpose of this chapter is to examine why context is important, how it is thought to influence public sector capacity development, and ways in which context can be understood. To address the last purpose, two frameworks are introduced, one on cultural characteristics developed by Hofstede (2001) and the other on the adoption of innovations developed by Rogers (2003).

4.1 The importance of context

In the literature on international development, a growing number of observers (including Morgan, 1997, 2006; Kelsall, 2006; Cammack, 2007 and Hyden, 2008) argue that understanding better the context can enable better identification of problems and therefore potential solutions. In the literature on M&E, which is the focus of the next chapter, Preskill (2008), Patton (2009) and Owen (2004) also assert that context is critical. These arguments are in line with neo-patrimonial development theories in which the understanding of local factors is seen as critical to understanding local development (Chabal, 2009a). Nevertheless, people are still struggling with how to understand better and take context into account in the design and implementation of capacity development programs.

about Africa needing ‘workable hybrids’, that is, a hybrid of developed country models modified to local contexts, Kelsall emphasises that ‘outside prescriptions only succeed where they work with the grain of African ways of doing things’ (p. 35). Kelsall’s (2006) argument here supports Munduate and Bennebroek Gravenhorst’s (2003) description of transactional change, where the content of reforms is adapted to the context. Meaghan (2006) suggests different groups across the world have faced similar problems, but it is the structure and essence of the solutions that illustrate the cultural response to the problems. Yet Kelsall is also critical of the Commission’s report for not following through on its recognition that context matters. Hyden (2008) similarly notes donors have pushed African governments to implement reforms that are beyond the realm of feasibility and possibility. The tendency has been towards introducing technical blueprints that do not consider the nature of human dynamics of action, interaction and reaction. In turn, this approach has reduced opportunities for trial, feedback and learning among the African public services and donors operating in complex worlds. Hyden (2008: 27) claims:

*The human actors are treated as pieces on a chessboard; as if they can be moved at will and readily adjusted because the new institutions will quietly mould them into their new roles.*

And when human actors do not perform as expected, Cammack (2007) argues, they are branded ‘dysfunctional’ rather than their actions being understood as logical according to a local frame of reference that includes different political, social, cultural and economic pressures. Citing Awortwi (2006: 31–33), Hyden (2008) suggests that public sector reforms are not necessarily mismatched with African culture, norms and values, but rather reformers lack awareness and understanding of contextual realities and act as if there are gaps rather than seeing the building blocks already in place. Easterly (2007) distinguishes between two types of reformers: planners and searchers. Planners tend to supply global blueprints as a technical solution to known problems. In comparison, searchers look for things that
work, discover what is in demand, and admit they do not have the answers. Searchers believe poverty is a result of a complex mixture of political, social, economic and environmental factors and only insiders have sufficient knowledge to find solutions.

4.2 The development of political economy analysis

The interest in trying to understand better context has partly been responsible for the growing interest of donors in political economy analysis along with, as Chabal (2009: 2) notes, the re-positioning of politics to the centre stage of many current development debates. The formulation of the United Kingdom Department for International Development’s ‘drivers of change’ analysis (Leftwich, 2006) and the Swedish International Development Agency’s ‘power analysis’ (SIDA, 2006) can be seen as a product of the governance approach outlined in the previous chapter. Chhotray and Hulme (2007: 9) argue that:

Within DOC [drivers of change], governance is conceptualized as a phenomenon that is fundamentally mediated by the interaction of agents (individuals and organizations pursuing particular interests), structures (history of state formation, natural and human resources, social-economic structures, globalization etc.) and institutions (informal and formal rules concerning the behavior of agents), and there is an attempt to go beyond the predominant good governance donor agenda.

Knowledge of context, politics and power and how institutions (as well as organisations and individuals) work within a given context may be contested (Boesen and Therkildsen, 2005). As noted in Chapter 2, Rogers (2008) and Pawson and Tilley (1997) see dialogue and discussion around theories of change as important for increasing understanding of change. Finding consensus or an ‘absolute truth’ is not the aim. However, the contestability of the findings of political economy analysis may impede how easily it is used or translated into tangible policies, strategies and programs. Use may also be hampered by a
hesitation to publish the analysis, particularly if it is critical of recipient country governments (Chhotray and Hulme, 2007; Williams et al., 2007). These challenges may be why, as Unsworth (2009) claims, donors continue to address development according to technical rather than political issues. However, understandings must be put into the public arena and problems better defined if they are to be used practically in development programs. Chabal (2009) argues that there is a need for Africans and non-Africans who study Africa to discuss issues, including context, problems and solutions, and that a non-African view can be beneficial (this differs from Easterly’s position). Likewise, to achieve an improved understanding of contexts, problems must be looked at without fear and particularly, he notes, ‘political correctness or the suppression of information for reasons having to do with Western guilt are not helpful’ (ibid: 1). Lastly, he argues that non-Africans need to be realistic that there are limitations to what they can do for Africa.

Booth (2009) identifies two gaps in political economy analysis which, if addressed, could strengthen the application of political economy analyses. He suggests political economic analysis also needs to examine institutions from the point of view of the actors’ logics and choices and identify space or opportunities for change. This analysis from the actor perspective could lead to different, possibly better, theories about the influence of politics on change processes. So while a theory about the contribution of politics to change has developed, application of the theory may be limited by users’ hesitation in articulating their theory of change and limitations in the theory of change itself.

### 4.3 Examining context

This section examines the way in which context may influence public sector capacity development. Firstly, Section 4.3.1 summarises lessons outlined in international development literature. Secondly, Sections 4.3.2 and 4.3.3 outline Hofstede’s (1980; 1991) cultural characteristics framework and Rogers’ (2003) description of
innovation and organisational and individual characteristics, and how each may influence capacity development.

4.3.1 Capacity development lessons from the international development literature

Boesen and Therkildsen (2004) identify a number of elements that impact positively on capacity development. First is strong demand for improvements from political leaders, the public and private sector clients, which is exerted from outside the public sector. Secondly, within the public sector, senior management who provide visible change leadership and promote clear direction and performance expectations, while encouraging staff participation and rewarding good performance, are also important. Change management, the authors emphasise, needs to be approached in an integrated manner involving a critical mass of personnel, particularly front-line staff. Quick wins that aim to deepen commitment can be used to increase visibility of the change early in the change process while organisational innovations are trialled, tested and adapted to the context. Lastly, Boesen and Therkildsen (2004) suggest senior managers and change agents must manage change proactively and strategically. Internal and external communication, including feedback loops, are critical as are sequencing, timing, and recognition of challenges and success. In considering the adoption of public sector reforms in different countries, Jones and Kettl (2003: 13) also argue a need for:

- time, energy and patience, and a commitment to careful, and unvarnished evaluation. It requires the will to ask questions when the answers could prove inconvenient or embarrassing.

However, the conduct of such evaluations presupposes a certain level of capacity. Preskill (2007) whose experience is in developed countries, suggests that the organisational conditions needed for M&E capacity development include organisational leadership that is committed to learning, effective organisational communication systems, an open organisational mindset about evaluation, a
culture of collaboration, and stakeholder involvement. Importantly, staff require evaluation skills and resources to support capacity development.

Boesen and Therkildsen (2004) also outline a number of conditions that have made capacity development of the public sector difficult and highlight the importance of context as a critical factor. Poor enabling environments are created by conflict situations, poor economic policies, weak parliamentary scrutiny of the executive, and lack of participation by the public in politics due to low trust and unclear or random rules in political systems. They argue that entrenched and widespread corruption in government and clientalism or patrimonialism in society weakens the environmental conditions necessary for change. While patrimonialism is noted as a factor influencing success, Therkildsen (2005) stresses that the politics of public management in developing countries cannot be reduced to solely seeing it through a patrimonial framework. To do so ignores other motivating factors for political and bureaucratic elites such as nationalism, professional integrity, increasing a following through service delivery and civil society demand for accountability. Equally, it ignores how dependence on a few primary commodities, weak tax systems, resource-scarce public institutions and donors also influences politics. Additionally, politics more broadly plays a key role as political will, at a national and organisational level, is required to act on evaluation findings.

The level of fragmentation across government along with the degree of centralisation, hierarchy and authoritarian power affects change. Low transparency, accountability, and commitment to performance, the absence of credible, stable policies and reforms and unpredictable or inflexible budgets and staffing also shape effectiveness. Lastly, poor employment conditions, including salaries and wages, and inadequate numbers or quality of staff in the required places negatively affects development interventions (Boesen and Therkildsen, 2004).

However, the ‘catch-22’ is that to successfully develop public sector capacity, an enabling and capable environment closer in description to that found in developed countries is required. This raises an important issue of whether capacity
development is framed by a western experience of development and, if so, whether it goes against the grain of the African way of doing things. Or is it, as Hyden (2008) suggests, that capacity developers do not adequately understand the contextual realities. The following section explores some aspects of context that may improve understanding of the reality and consideration of how change occurs.

4.3.2  *Hofstede’s cultural characteristics*

Culture is seen as the shared norms, values, behaviours, traditions, ideas, language, artefacts and symbols that connect members of a particular group. It is used to construct identities, to guide how people live and to bring meaning to people and their social, political and economic environment. Hofstede (1991: 4) defines culture as ‘mental programming ... patterns of thinking and feeling and potential acting’. Culture is a learned meaning system that children consciously and unconsciously learn from a young age through their parents. As children’s worlds expand, their learning comes from new environments such as schools, workplaces, community organisations and governments (Meaghan, 2006). Therefore, this learned cultural programming develops and changes over time. This understanding of learning resonates with situated learning theories, which is explored briefly in Chapter 2 of this thesis.

Organisational culture can be described in a similar way but it is also influenced by the broader institutional culture within which it is situated. Organisational culture is the:

*shared systems of beliefs, mores, values, attitudes, practices, roles, artefacts, symbols and language. It represents a group’s collective wisdom and aspiration ... [and] guides how a group solves problems, how they approach mundane tasks ... Culture is reflected in the structure of the social relationships – within and outside the group – and defines obligations and rights among a group of people who possess a common identity* (The Ewing Marion Kaufmann Foundation, 2002: 51 cited in Schick, 2002: 12).
Different organisations influence the socialisation of children and adults and may differ in the standards of behaviour they expect (Gelfand et al., 2004). Schick (2003: 12) suggests that:

... culture bound government agencies have a distinctive personality and characteristic ways of operating that are passed on from one generation of employees to the next. They have a self-image – a shared sense of their fundamental mission or purpose, the things they do, how they respond to outside demands or resolve the internal conflicts – that are not easily uprooted by changing circumstances.

However, organisations and the people who work in them are frequently unconscious of the cultural values and beliefs that underpin norms and behaviours (Trompenaars and Woolliams, 2003; Argyris and Schön, 1978). This lack of consciousness about culture makes it difficult to change or challenge the values, beliefs, norms and attitudes of individuals, organisations and institutions (Painter-Morland, 2006).

Geert Hofstede’s (1980; 1991; 2001) four value dimensions of national cultures – (a) power distance, (b) uncertainty avoidance, (c) individualism and collectivism, and (d) masculinity and femininity – are frequently cited in discussions on international corporations working across different countries. These values can be viewed as different cultural characteristics and are described in turn below. To illustrate the relevance of these characteristics to public sector capacity development interventions, an example of how new ideas and ways of doing things may be received in each case is also provided.

Power distance refers to the degree of inequality within society and the level to which this is acknowledged and anticipated. In a ‘high’ power distance society, the gap between the power of superiors and that of subordinates is significant and the rights of superiors are unquestionably accepted by subordinates in return for superiors looking after their welfare. Conversely, in ‘low’ power distance societies, egalitarianism is valued and, as such, the codes of behaviour, conventions and
societal structures are designed to support equality. Position is earned rather than granted through a right of birth and people do not have a sense that people are born unequal. While power differentials may exist, they are downplayed and subordinates do not expect to defer to those with more power just as superiors do not expect to look after the welfare of subordinates. Therefore, newer management practices that emphasise open communication and participation of subordinates in decision-making processes may not align with a high power distance society. Similarly, leaders who ask questions, support collaboration and create a ‘spirit of inquiry’ within organisations (Preskill, 2007) may not fit well in a high power distance culture.

Uncertainty avoidance refers to the way in which society deals with uncertainty and the level of stress it may feel as a result of uncertainty (Gelfand et al., 2004). In high uncertainty avoidance cultures, lack of structure and predictability is seen as a negative. Therefore, conforming and consensus is valued and behaviour is governed by strict codes. In comparison, low uncertainty avoidance societies are more comfortable with ambiguity, risk taking, differences of opinion, and questioning of norms, and value innovation, independence and freedom from structures. High uncertainty avoidance cultures would be more conducive to newer organisational structures, such as matrix management teams, where a person may work under several managers at a time to complete different projects.

Collectivist and individualistic societies are Hofstede’s (1980; 1991) third cultural dimension. While societies have aspects of both collectivism and individualism, the comparative weighting of each is significant. In more collectivist societies, the goals and needs of the group are prioritised over those of any individuals within the group. If individuals are loyal to the group, the group will take care of them. Individuals are defined by the family, tribe or sub-group (eg based on ethnicity or class or other) into which they are born and interdependence and conformity are respected. In a more individualistic society, individuals are identified by themselves and their personal qualities rather than by any group to which they may belong.
While individuals may be part of many groups, their loyalty and commitment to them may be limited and flexible. For public sector development, the values dominant in collectivist societies may not readily facilitate the introduction of management tools such as performance appraisal systems that emphasise individual performance.

The last value dimension relates to masculinity and femininity. Masculine societies are those that value attributes such as assertiveness, strength and ambition, which are generally considered to be more masculine attributes. Typically, in these societies, there is a stronger division between gender roles with women restricted from positions of power and influence. Feminine societies are those that value attributes of tenderness, nurturing, cooperation and modesty. Feminine societies are differentiated less on the basis of gender; both men and women are expected to display feminine attributes (Hofstede, 1980; 1991). To illustrate, the phrase ‘work to live’ may be seen as feminine whereas ‘live to work’ may be viewed as masculine (Meagahan, 2006). For the development of the public sector, incentives such as career progression could be used to motivate staff in masculine cultures but may not align as well with feminine cultures.

A fifth dimension, the value of ‘long-term orientation’, was later added to the original four dimensions (Hofstede and Bond, 1988). Long-term orientation is underpinned by values to do with thrift, perseverance, and status. In comparison, societies with a short-term orientation value tradition, meeting social responsibilities and protecting one’s ‘face’ (Hofstede and Bond, 1988).

It is important to note that Hofstede’s five categorisations have been criticised on a number of fronts including questionable applicability to non-western societies; tendency to represent national cultures as homogeneous and defined by the boundaries of the nation-state; implication that cultures are unchanging; and failure to adequately represent the actual diversity of cultures in existence. These criticisms also reflect broader concerns of commentators, for example Booth (2009), who is cautious against overstating common and ongoing characteristics of
social patterns in sub-Saharan Africa. This thesis acknowledges these criticisms, however, proposes that Hofstede’s framework is useful to draw generalisations for the purpose of comparison. In this thesis, the framework is used to think about different contexts within which public sector capacity development is pursued and are not taken as absolutes.

4.3.3 Rogers’ characteristics influencing the diffusion of innovations

The second theory covered in this section is the work on diffusion of innovation by Rogers (2003). This research is relevant in this discussion since M&E, as with many of elements of public sector reform more generally, can be viewed as an innovation in developing countries. Rogers (2003: 12) describes an innovation as:

An idea, practice or object that is perceived as new by an individual or other unit of adoption. It matters little, as far as human behaviour is concerned, whether or not an idea is ‘objectively’ new as measured by the lapse of time since its first discovery. The perceived newness of the idea for the individual determines his or her reaction to it. If an idea seems new to the individual, it is an innovation.

Rogers (2003) distinguishes between different characteristics of innovations, organisations and individuals that affect the diffusion of innovations. Each is explored briefly below.

Innovation characteristics

Innovations, according to Rogers (2003), have five key characteristics that influence the likelihood of their adoption. These are their relative advantage, complexity, trialibility, compatibility and observability. An innovation may be considered an advantage if it is perceived as an improvement on ideas that have preceded it. For instance, an innovation may contribute to economic advantages, social status, convenience or satisfaction. The complexity of an innovation relates to the extent to which it is perceived to be difficult to understand and use: if new knowledge and skills are required to use the innovation, the rate of adoption will be slower. The
ability to trial innovations allows adopters to experiment with an idea before they have to commit themselves to it fully. If innovations can be easily trialled, this may influence the rate of adoption. Similarly, if an innovation is perceived as being consistent with the values of the existing social system, then there is a higher likelihood of adoption. Innovations are also likely to diffuse more rapidly, and be adopted in a more sustainable way, if the innovation is ‘re-invented’ in the adoption and implementation process. Lastly, if an individual can observe an innovation and the results of its adoption by others, adoption increases.

Most innovations are technical in nature, consisting of hardware and software elements. Hardware relates to the physical elements of the innovation whereas the software refers to the information component. Software elements are harder to observe. Computers, for example, consist of hardware elements, such as motherboards, and software elements such as programs and instruction manuals. Some innovations, such as policy, consist only of the information element making adoption more problematic (Rogers, 2003).

Organisational characteristics

Organisational characteristics will negatively or positively influence innovation decisions and adoption (Rogers, 2003). An organisation will be less innovative if its power and control is centralised in the hands of a few. Boesen and Therkildsen (2004), as noted earlier, also emphasise the influence of centralisation and where power lies within organisations or systems as a factor determining capacity to achieve change. While centralised power has a negative influence on innovation adoption, Rogers (2003) notes that once a decision has been made to adopt an innovation, centralisation can turn into a positive driver for adoption because the power of the central authority to direct change is accepted. Secondly, formalisation, or the extent to which an organisation emphasises compliance with rules and regulations, negatively affects the adoption of innovations within organisations. Similar to centralisation, formalisation can assist once a decision has been made by the relevant authority to implement an innovation. Thirdly, the complexity of an
organisation’s knowledge, expertise and breadth of occupational specialisation can positively influence the adoption of innovations. Fourthly, the degree of interconnectedness between an organisation and other organisations affects how new ideas flow. Adoption of innovations is positively influenced by greater levels of interconnectedness. Fifthly, the degree to which there are uncommitted resources within an organisation positively affects adoption. Rogers (2003) calls this ‘organisational slack’, emphasising that larger organisations have greater slack than smaller ones. Larger organisations are also generally more innovative than smaller ones (Rogers, 2003).

Organisational innovativeness is also positively influenced by the leaders’ attitude towards change and the openness of the system outside the organisation. Yet Schick (2003) stresses that innovative managers are constrained by the organisations they lead and the systems they operate within. Organisations constrain change as ‘they value internal needs and norms above outside demands and conditions’ (ibid: 85). Thus, it could be argued that if organisations and systems are captured by beliefs that act as constraints to change, adaptation and improvement, then there seems little that an individual may be able to do (Schick, 2003). Although, as cited in the previous chapter, Leftwich (2007) suggests that individuals may still have space to shape organisations in certain circumstances.

Decisions to adopt innovations may be undertaken in different ways and may be influenced by the characteristics of organisations or the broader institutional environment. Optional innovation decisions are made by individuals separate from other organisational members. Collective innovation decisions are made by a consensus of the organisation’s members. Authority innovation decisions are made by a small number of powerful individuals (either due to social standing or technical expertise) within a system and for which the organisation’s employees must comply. The decision-making process influences adoption (Rogers, 2003).
Individual characteristics

Section 3.3.2 described change agents as those individuals who influence others to adopt change. Rogers (2003) distinguishes five categories of change agents and characterises them according to the level of their innovation. The most innovative are termed ‘innovators’ and are described as venturesome with the ability to understand technology and ability to cope with uncertainty. The author suggests innovators usually need to be financially secure, given that unsuccessful innovations may lead to a loss of money. Innovators are the leaders in adopting innovations as they venture outside their local networks and explore new worlds. At the opposite end of the spectrum are the ‘laggards’, who Rogers (2003) describes as the most local in their outlook and with a strong focus on the past. Decisions are made based on what has been done before and therefore adoption of innovations, even if they are aware of them for some time, tends to be very slow. Rogers (2003) sees laggards as traditionalists with an unstable financial situation, which makes them risk averse in trying and adopting innovations.

In between the innovators and laggards are the ‘early adopters’, ‘early majority adopters’ and ‘late majority adopters’. Early adopters are more locally grounded than innovators, and tend to be local leaders who have the respect of their contemporaries. Rogers (2003) suggests that it is this category of adopter that the majority will look to, to see what they do. They could be considered to be opinion leaders, thereby influencing whether or not the others adopt an innovation. Concern for maintaining their position and influence is what drives early adopters to make thoughtful and well-judged decisions. The next group is the ‘early majority’, which is characterised by the average person, who infrequently holds a position as opinion leader, but comprises about a third of all adopters. Following the early majority are the late majority adopters or those people who are sceptical of new ideas. This category comprises another third of all those who adopt innovation and they will only adopt after the majority has adopted an innovation and at the stage where norms have changed towards the innovation. Rogers (2003) suggests that
2.5% of people are innovators, 13.5% early adopters, 34% early majority adopters, 34% late majority adopters and 16% laggards.

4.4 Summary

Understanding context and its influence on change and capacity development is complex. Hofstede’s (1991) and Rogers’ (2003) work provide useful frameworks that can be used to understand better how context influences public sector capacity development in the international development field. However, an important qualification is to remember that contextual characteristics are not static or universal. Some argue that only individuals within a system can accurately understand their context, although this is contested by others, such as Chabal (2009), who argues that an outsider’s perspective can also be beneficial. As Argyris and Schöen (1978) note, insiders may not always see the context in which they operate. In the past, donors and consultants have been reluctant to discuss context, perhaps because of its complexity and possibly also the political sensitivities of doing so in recently post-colonial situations. However, talking about context may also be difficult because it questions the merits of spending large amounts on development assistance in contexts that are not supportive of achieving change. Discussion of contexts can be challenging to the agendas of both donors and recipient governments. However, if aid is to be more effective open discussions of how context may influence change will be needed.

The next chapter brings the discussion more squarely to the perceived benefits of M&E. Context, again, will be highlighted as a key issue that influences how M&E is perceived and valued and also how it affects improvements in accountability and learning, two key aims from M&E capacity development interventions.
CHAPTER 5: WHY DEVELOP MONITORING AND EVALUATION CAPACITY?

Over the last decade, there has been such a rapid rise in the importance given to monitoring and evaluation (M&E) in international development that it has been described as a growth industry (Leeuw, 2001) where M&E has become a mantra (MacKay, 2006). Chen (1990) argues that the emergence of M&E as a profession reflects the trend, described in Chapter 3, of growing rationalisation and accountability in modern western society. However, Leeuw and Furubo (2008) suggest that there needs to be a level of demand for M&E information and M&E activities need to be integrated and based on a distinct epistemological foundation to qualify as an ‘M&E system’.

This chapter firstly examines some of the key factors driving the growth of M&E in developing countries and beliefs about the advantages of M&E and the different evaluation theories in which they are grounded. Secondly, the chapter draws on literature from the management, organisational development, and evaluation and psychology to examine how M&E is expected to contribute to improved accountability and learning, its two primary aims. Perrin et al. (2008) ask: how are accountability activities, such as M&E, expected to create more relevant, efficient and effective public services?; and are particular accountability activities more effective than others at generating improved accountability? The same questions can be posed with regard to learning since, as Carlsson and Engel (2002: 16) note, ‘research has hardly touched a systematic assessment of the learning effects of different M&E approaches, tools and techniques’.
5.1 Key factors driving the increased interest in monitoring and evaluation

As described in Chapter 3, public sector reforms over the last 25 years have sought to change the role of governments. With a growing perception that development assistance has not lead to sustainable improvements, developed western country governments have come under increasing pressure to demonstrate that their limited financial resources are being spent efficiently and that development outcomes are being realised (Morgan and Qualman, 1996; Bolger, 2000; Owen, 2004). The new public management approach and the development of new international agreements, such as the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness have influenced the way development assistance has been delivered. Project-based assistance, where donors maintained a high degree of control over the design, implementation and management of development initiatives, has decreased while programs and budget support has increased. With a smaller role for donors under the new aid arrangements, the roles and responsibilities of developing country governments to plan, implement, and monitor and evaluate their own development has become the centre of focus (World Bank, 2007).

As a consequence, often the primary motivating factor for developing country governments to develop their M&E capacity is to meet donor demands for accountability and information on development outcomes (Ofir, 2007; World Bank, 2007; OECD, 2004). As such, significant expectations are being placed on developing countries to develop M&E capacity that is multi-purposed, multi-dimensional, multi-method, multi-layered and that meets the needs of multiple stakeholders (World Bank, 2003; Holvoet and Renard, 2006; Booth and Lucas, 2002). Holvoet and Renard (2006:77) claim that ‘donors want a lot, and they want it fast’, contrary to the lessons for successful capacity development discussed in Chapter 4 of this thesis. Hence, the weight of donor expectation may undermine developing countries’ ability to develop sensible and realistic M&E systems (Holvoet and Renard, 2006; Booth and Lucas, 2002).
Other changes within developing countries may also increase the demand for M&E systems. New political representatives, greater advocacy by non-government organisations, the public and media can drive change. Similarly, there may be pressure to provide information to different bodies or the desire to improve government policy making, planning and implementation through learning about past and current experiences. Within government, restructuring organisations, new leadership, perceived gaps in M&E knowledge and skills, or a desire for program improvement may be motivating factors. Within international development, governments or organisations may also seek new or increased funding from multilateral and bilateral donors who require M&E to be built into projects as a condition of funding (Preskill and Boyle, 2008).

5.2 Perceived benefits of monitoring and evaluation

A key belief driving the development of M&E systems is that M&E processes and/or results are valuable, that they are ‘worthy’ things that positively contribute to good public sector management and service delivery outcomes. Governance, accountability and transparency can be improved and a performance-focused culture developed through routine, information-based feedback systems (World Bank, 2007; Dahler-Larsen, 2006; MacKay, 2006). The regular measurement of public sector performance, using quantitative and qualitative indicators that focus primarily on the efficiency of inputs, activities and outputs, serves as a ‘source of authority, to inform, legitimate and control managerial decisions’ (Abma and Noordegraaf, 2003:287). Through the cycle of data collection, analysis and decision making by the government, the government’s legitimacy is built when it uses the analysis to learn, be accountable and demonstrate its achievements (Bedi et al., 2006).

The expectation is that measurement will ensure that organisations perform their mandated roles and once measurement information is available politicians, bureaucrats, parliamentarians and others will use the information to make decisions
Therefore, information has an instrumental use leading to decisions and actions assumed to be better and more likely to lead to positive outcomes. Moreover, evaluation skills, as described by Morra-Imas and Rist (2006:1), are ‘central to effective development work’ as they contribute to learning about current performance and capacity gaps, support the adaptation of programs during implementation and guide the development of future programs.

While the World Bank (2007) and Morra-Imas and Rist (2006) favour M&E, other parties such as developing country governments are often not as positive since the implementation of M&E may influence or challenge power structures and cultural norms and practices (Morgan and Qualman, 1996; Owen, 2006; Rogers, 2003; Patton, 1998). Patton (1998) suggests that the M&E field has its own culture, with norms and values that are felt to be beneficial to inquiry processes, and provides an ordered process to thinking about reality and the generation of knowledge. Evaluators value being clear, specific, systematic, making assumptions explicit, applying program concepts and ideas and separating statements of fact from interpretations and judgments (Forss, 2002). However, these characteristics may not be valued by all parties and the culture of M&E may be incompatible with existing cultures and contexts in developing countries.

5.2.1 Beliefs and evaluation theory

Evaluation theories underpin beliefs about M&E, although these theories may not be explicitly recognised. Alkin (2004) distinguishes between three groups of evaluation theories relating to methods, making judgments and use. Issues of confused, partial and missing theories, noted in Chapter 2, also apply to evaluation theories and efforts to develop M&E capacity. Evaluation theories drive how the different elements of M&E are understood, including the purposes and questions considered most important to ask; who conducts and/or participates in the evaluation and how they participate; the methodologies used; the audiences of the evaluation; and how the evaluations are used (Shaw et al., 2006). How such
elements are understood will determine what kind of capacity in M&E is desired. Those evaluation theories that are most relevant to this research are summarised below.

Evaluation theories concerning use are also referred to as ‘decision orientated evaluations’, as the purpose is to assist program managers to make decisions (Alkin, 2004). The beliefs outlined at the beginning of Section 5.2 about the contribution of M&E to better public sector management and service delivery clearly relate to theories about evaluation ‘use’. Wholey’s (2004) focus on the use of evaluations for ‘performance monitoring’ has been incorporated into the approaches of the World Bank (2007). He emphasises the use of evaluations for management purposes and proposes four stages of evaluation: evaluability assessments; rapid-feedback evaluations; performance monitoring; and intensive evaluation. The first stage assesses the feasibility of conducting an evaluation, the second collects easy-to-collect information, the third measures performance against a baseline or expected performance, and the last uses groups to compare differences between where an intervention was implemented and where it was not to determine the effectiveness of a program.

Stufflebeam’s ‘cycle of evaluations’ approach reflects how evaluation is used in international development projects and programs. Stufflebeam (2001) focuses on addressing decision makers’ most important questions, and providing timely and relevant formative and summative information at different points of a cyclical process of context, inputs, process and product. The more recent interest in impact evaluation and use of experimental and quasi-experimental methods in international development programs echoes the interests of Donald Campbell and Thomas Cook (Alkin, 2004). The focus on monitoring outcomes over process, which characterises much development evaluation, would seem to draw on Scriven’s ‘summative evaluation’. Scriven argues that making judgments and determining worth as more important elements of program evaluation than explaining why a program works (Alkin, 2004). The latter seeks to determine what has happened but
not why it has happened, suggesting that there is less interest in learning and program improvement. Learning is the focus for Preskill (Preskill and Torres, 2001; Preskill, 2004) who concentrates on evaluation for organisational development and learning; that is, transforming organisations through the evaluation process.

5.3 Accountability and monitoring and evaluation

Accountability has become synonymous with contemporary public sector politics and is ‘one of the slogans used to lobby for more and better evaluation’ (Owen, 2004: 1). Yet how M&E is expected to contribute to better accountability is not always clear. This section examines the concept of accountability, how M&E is expected to promote accountability and the link between context, accountability and M&E.

5.3.1 The concept of accountability

Tetlock (1992 cited in Frink and Klimoski, 2004) describes accountability as a norm enforcement mechanism, one that is vital to any social system as it creates order, control and predictability. In any society, individuals are socialised to understand to whom they are accountable and for what (Bovens, 2005). The key elements of accountability are standards, information and sanctions (Rubenstein, 2007), each of which can have different meanings in different contexts (Lawson and Rakner, 2005).

Agents (the account givers) are expected to adhere to socially and culturally constructed standards that need to be specific enough to allow principals (the account holders) to determine if norms and standards have been breached by agents and whether sanctions need to be applied. Transparent information is necessary for principals to determine if agents have adhered to standards. The act of ‘giving account’ is assumed to deter rational, self-interested individuals from abusing their power (Tetlock, 1992; Bovens, 2005; Rubenstein, 2007).
This concept of accountability involving agents being held to account by external account holders or principals has recently been expanded to include: (a) willingness to take responsibility; (b) answerability, whereby decision makers are responsible for justifying their decisions publicly (Cornwall et al., 2000; Lawson and Rakner, 2005); and (c) responsiveness, whereby regardless of possible sanctions principals may wish to respond to agents’ interests (Bovens, 2005; Mulgan, 2000). Responsibility implies that an account holder is accountable to their internal self. Owen (2005) disagrees with the linking of responsibility to accountability since the latter involves sanctions whereas the former does not.

A range of accountability relationships exist in any society. In democratic political systems, public accountability ideally involves the exercise of control through both vertical and horizontal accountability relationships. The social contract between democratically elected government officials and citizens is an example of a vertical control relationship. Citizens are able to use the power of the ballot to vote government into power, as well out again if it does not perform (Bovens, 2005). Examples of horizontal control relationships are those between the various arms of government, and the legislature, executive, judiciary and official oversight organisations, where each provides a check and balance on the power of the others (Lawson and Rakner, 2005). By bringing greater transparency, responsiveness and answerability, both types of accountability relationships have the potential to increase the government’s legitimacy in the eyes of citizens (Bovens, 2005).

In the workplace, the vertical accountability relationship between employer and employee is regulated through a contract, of which an accountability system is a part. Such systems include tools of formal reporting relationships, M&E systems, employment contracts, performance appraisal systems, reward systems and disciplinary procedures (Frink and Klimoswki, 2004). The relationship between public sector managers and civil society organisations or media is also vertical, although less formal and direct than a relationship based on electoral processes (Lawson and Rakner, 2005). However, this relationship also constitutes a check and
balance on the actions of government (Mulgan, 2000). External, vertical accountability relationships may also exist between a developing country government and international multilateral and bilateral donor organisations (Lawson and Rakner, 2005). This external accountability relationship is often more significant than those that may exist within a developing country. The issue is recognised in the Paris Declaration, which calls for mutual accountability between recipient and donor countries through shared goals, commitments and monitoring to improve answerability and hence regulates the behaviour of both parties (AccountAbility, 2009; Eyben, 2008).

The accountability relationships described above imply direct cause and effect between the decisions and actions of rational individuals and the outcomes of those decisions and actions (Painter-Morland, 2006). However, relationships cannot be understood only in mechanistic linear terms. It is important to try to recognise the influence of informal, norm enforcement mechanisms that are not expressed formally through written documents such as laws or procedures. Informal rules may be considered tacit knowledge, which is ‘the kind of intuitive grasp of something that is hard to verbalise ... very difficult to analyse and even more difficult to manage’ (Painter-Morland, 2006: 92). While understanding informal accountability mechanisms is difficult, trying to do so gives an insight into the complex, and often implicit, patterns of behaviour that have a significant influence on change efforts (Painter-Morland, 2006; Eyben, 2007). By focusing on the informal rather than only the formal, it becomes more apparent when agents’ efforts to change might be hampered by their personal biases, organisational culture, or peer, family or social pressures. This broader understanding also facilitates an understanding of change resulting from the interaction of individuals in organisational and other social systems. Through this approach new explicit and implicit understandings of accountability emerge over time and are more complex than simply seeing that a

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9 Under the Paris Declaration it is intended that the accountability relationship between donors and developing country governments be a horizontal one. However, since donors have the aid ‘cheque’ the relationship may be more akin to a vertical relationship.
new state of being emerges following the introduction of some external system (Painter-Morland, 2006). This description of how change occurs corresponds with Foucault’s (1980; 1991) concept of latent power described in Chapter 3.

5.3.2 Monitoring and evaluation to promote accountability

M&E systems may be used to clarify performance standards, although the systems may not necessarily articulate the sanctions if standards are not reached (Frink and Klimonski, 2004). If sanctions are thought to be reasonable, and not too harsh, M&E systems may increase agents’ willingness to be answerable. However, if sanctions are perceived as severe this may decrease agents’ willingness to be answerable or held accountable. The level of trust between the principals and agents regarding how information will be used may also influence whether or not M&E systems contribute to improving answerability and accountability.

If M&E systems are too rigid, procedure bound, and disregard the complex environments in which change happens, they may stifle rather than facilitate accountability (Frink and Klimonski, 2004). Additionally, if M&E systems do not articulate sanctions then sanctions need to be communicated in some other way. If sanctions are unknown, unclear and considered too severe, people may fear that M&E will produce information showing implementation problems or lack of outcomes for which they will be criticised. As a consequence, M&E systems may be implemented to ensure that only certain information is produced (Leeuw and Furubo, 2008). M&E systems may also be used to produce information to reassure funders and the public that activities are being monitored and problems investigated. Leeuw and Furubo (2008: 165) suggest that the production of reassurance information ‘is almost becoming an economic good that deserves a systematic, industry-type production’. Assurance information can also be produced to confirm rather than to question policies and programs. For example, goal displacement can occur if managers are encouraged to increase outputs, and focus
on making the numbers, regardless of their effectiveness in bringing about the desired changes (Perrin, 1998). Perrin (1998: 371) cites Davies (1997) who claims ‘People work to the indicators and spend increasing amounts of time generating accountability information’, a behaviour that may decrease space for learning.

Therefore, the existence of M&E systems and information may not necessarily positively influence the behaviour of agents (Frink and Klimonski, 2004). Rather, it is agents’ expectations of prospective M&E that influence their responses. For instance, if an agent expects that M&E will lead to reward or sanction, then this expectation may influence their behaviour. If no reward or sanction is expected, then behaviour will not be influenced. Frink and Klimonski (2004: 3) note:

"rather than seeing accountability primarily as a state of affairs, we tend to view it as a state of mind which is derived in part, from a state of affairs."

The state of mind, as Frink and Klimonski (2005) term it, in developing countries is also likely to be influenced by where the demand for M&E for accountability is originating. If demand for accountability and M&E systems is driven by external principals, such as donors, the effect is likely to be less (Ebrahim, 2005). While donors have their own accountability relationship with aid recipient governments, they may also act on a temporary basis as surrogate principals and negotiate standards, collect information or sanction agents on behalf of the true principal until internal demand strengthens.

However, this surrogate role has its limitations since surrogates may not be authorised to act on behalf of principals; principals are unable to sanction surrogates; and surrogates may agree to standards, collect information and sanction agents in ways that are different to what true principals may have used (Rubenstein, 2007). For instance, if the surrogate negotiated different, lesser or greater standards than the principal may have negotiated, Rubenstein (2007) suggests that principals may be worse off as they may be balancing numerous elements that they value. The effectiveness of the surrogacy relationship may also be affected by the level of trust between the surrogate principal and the agent and
the surrogate principal and true principal. It may also be difficult for surrogates to determine what sanctions may be meaningful and are not considered so severe that they decrease an agents’ willingness to be answerable or held accountable. This may particularly be the case if principals and agents find it difficult to articulate their tacit knowledge about informal accountability rules and norms. Surrogates are also not a permanent solution since a surrogate does not have electoral representation (Rubenstein, 2007).

Sanderson (2000) and Van Thiel and Leeuw (2002) also note that the M&E field has grown despite there being little evidence that M&E information is being used in an instrumental way. As such, the expected linear contribution of M&E to better decisions, transparency, and accountability may be unrealistic. This may be the case if M&E is introduced into new contexts.

5.3.3 Context and accountability

Given that standards and sanctions for accountability are socially constructed and culturally specific, inconsistencies may occur between local accountability systems and imported M&E systems. As mentioned above, informal rules may also be stronger than formal rules, either those already existing or new rules that might be introduced as part of public sector reform programs, for instance. Informal rules will affect the pace and success of reform aimed at strengthening M&E capacity and the effectiveness of M&E in contributing to improving public sector accountability, as envisaged by donors. Gelfand et al. (2004) use three cultural dimensions to discuss different understandings of accountability and what this means for different types of organisational accountability systems. Two of these dimensions, ‘individualism–collectivism’ and ‘power distance’, originate from Hofstede’s (2001) study on cultural characteristics described in the previous chapter. The third, ‘cultural tightness–looseness’, derives from anthropological and sociological literature (Gelfand et al., 2006).
Gelfand et al. (2004) note that most accountability research focuses on individual accountability rather than collective accountability, although the latter may be more appropriate to understanding accountability in developing countries. In individualistic cultures, accountability for successes and failures rests primarily with individuals, whereas in collectivist cultures accountability rests mainly with groups or with individuals connected to organisations through groups. Individualist cultures are also more likely to hold individuals to account, whereas in collectivist cultures deviations from standards are more likely to be explained in terms of contextual forces (Gelfand et al., 2004). Standards are also more formalised and explicit in individualist cultures where manuals, guidelines, regulations, written communication, detailed job descriptions and performance appraisals are common. Even when standards are the same in both types of cultures, Gelfand et al. (2004) argue that standards will be communicated differently, with more explicit means of communication being used in individualistic cultures. Therefore, it may be that people in more collectivist cultures have greater difficulty explaining to others their tacit knowledge.

As a broad generalisation, developing countries are more likely to be collectivist, yet the public sector reforms being implemented are imported from western and more individualistic contexts. A divergence between local and imported systems or practices may also occur if different meanings are communicated within a public sector organisation compared with outside it (Tetlock, 1992). Tetlock (1992) and Gelfand et al. (2004) argue that if organisational systems, such as M&E, communicate accountability messages that are consistent with those being communicated outside the organisation (either explicitly or implicitly), then there is alignment of accountability messages. If alignment is limited, then different accountability messages may cause conflict and confusion between individuals, groups and organisations. In terms of Rogers’ (2003) diffusion of innovation theory, M&E systems may not be easily compatible with existing systems in developing countries and therefore adoption would be expected to be poor.
Gelfand et al. (2004) define ‘tight systems’ as those that have many clearly defined social norms, thus reflecting order and predictability. Norms are strictly enforced, there is limited scope for individual discretion on how to behave, and little tolerance for variations from norms. Organisations in tight cultures are likely to have formal policies, practices and standards that are monitored and enforced through clear sanctions for deviance. A higher degree of agreement on policies, practices and standards also exists horizontally between colleagues, and vertically between individuals and supervisors and between groups and other organisations. As such, there is a greater sense of shared or mutual accountability in tight cultures. ‘Loose systems’, in comparison, are defined by their lack of formality, order and discipline, and high tolerance for deviant behaviour. Sanctions are less severe than in tight cultures (Gelfand et al., 2006). Tightness–looseness differs from another of Hofstede’s characteristics, uncertainty avoidance, which Gelfand et al. (2006) note is concerned with the stress felt by societies when futures are uncertain. While tight societies are likely to also be high in uncertainty avoidance, they may not necessarily be so.

As noted in the previous chapter, hierarchical cultures have large power distances. Those in powerful positions are normally able to structure relationships and allocate resources. Thus, traditional top-down approaches to accountability in government are inconsistent with new management approaches that support equal two-way relationships and communication (Gelfand et al., 2004). It is therefore logical to assume that to improve public sector accountability, systems need to be based on an alignment between the reality and demands of modern-day government (Caulfield, 2004).

Informal accountability systems are also important to consider because it may not be easy to identify formal standards in poor, unstable or multicultural contexts where the obligations of principals and agents may differ across contexts or not be specific enough to foster normative acceptability (Rubenstein, 2007). For instance, principals may have insufficient capacity to sanction powerful agents due to their
own poverty, illiteracy and social exclusion (Lindenberg and Bryant, 2001; Rubenstein, 2007). To enable public, media or watchdog organisations to sanction agents, the active support of other agents is necessary. It is powerful agents who establish laws, systems and processes governing accountability events such as fair and free elections. It is also agents who normally provide information to principals. If principals cannot sanction agents then there is little incentive for the agents to provide information on their performance against standards. The more important the role that principals are supposed to play in terms of sanctioning, the more limited their ability to do so in the ‘absence of accessible, fair and efficient institutions that mitigate the effects of poverty and vulnerability’ (Rubenstein, 2007: 19).

5.4 Monitoring and evaluation and learning

This section examines the assumptions regarding how M&E is expected to facilitate learning and how context may positively or negatively influence the learning process.

5.4.1 The concept of learning

Learning, defined as individual and organisational changes in thinking and behaving, is the other proposed key purpose of M&E. Interest in organisational learning and learning organisations grew over the 1990s as a result of the work of management consultants such as Peter Senge (1990). Organisational learning is defined as ‘a process of developing new knowledge that changes an organisation’s behaviour to improve future performance’ (Power et al., 2002: 275). Learning organisations are those:

where new and expansive patterns of thinking are nurtured, where collective aspiration is set free, and where people are continually learning to see the whole together (Senge, 1990: 3).
Organisational learning aims to use information and experience to examine established routines, to determine the causes of problems and to develop solutions to address them (Mahler, 1997). The concept is based on the assumption that within an organisation there is a shared vision to learn through collective processes to jointly improve outcomes. The shared vision is generated from the shared reality and constraints experienced by the members of the organisation (Spector et al., 2006). Results produced by a team are assumed to be greater than the sum total of all the separate efforts of each individual working on their own (Lick, 2006). Preskill (2008) and Hailey and James (2002: 398) suggest that learning and knowledge management are essential capabilities for organisations that wish to ‘survive and thrive’. In the fluid and complex 21st century, organisations need to be able to adapt continuously.

5.4.2 Monitoring and evaluation as a trigger for learning

In terms of the contribution of M&E to learning, Patton (1996: 134) suggests that:

*generalisable evaluation findings about principles of effective programming have become the knowledge base of the evaluation profession. Being knowledgeable about patterns of program effectiveness allows evaluators to provide guidance about development of new initiatives, policies, and strategies for implementation.*

There are two notable gaps in the international development literature on the relationship between learning and M&E. Firstly, discussion on how to promote learning in developing country governments is limited. The primary focus is on learning in multilateral and bilateral international development organisations or in non-government organisations in developing countries. Secondly, as noted in the introduction of this chapter, research on the contribution of different M&E approaches, tools and techniques to learning is partial. Despite these gaps, the implementation of M&E processes and findings in developing countries is seen as useful for learning. Preskill (2008) and Cousins and Shulha (2006) identify benefits
such as assisting organisations and individuals to think about theories of change, how to change a policy or program’s design and implementation, and change understanding of the merit and worth of possible outcomes (Preskill, 2008).

Ackoff (1989) argues that knowledge is created from the application of data and information. Whereas data is the ‘who, what and when’, knowledge is the ‘how’; that is, data is about the facts, and knowledge moves us towards interpreting the facts. Following this continuum, Ackoff suggests that understanding or wisdom, therefore, comes from further analysis and asking ourselves ‘why?’. Using data to ask ourselves ‘how?’ can lead to improvements in efficiency, and using data to ask ourselves ‘how and why?’ can lead to improvements in effectiveness. As Pastuer (2004: 8) notes:

\[
\text{knowledge is transformed into something that generates more generic insights, and so performance can be improved in a wider range of contexts. Learning is therefore less concerned with capturing and storing knowledge, as with transforming knowledge and experience into improved action.}
\]

Further, Cousins and Shulha (2006: 271) argue that ‘in essence, evaluation use is construed as action arising from learning from the evaluation, particularly its deliberative process’. Following this logic, evaluation for learning is ‘instrumental use’. Some evaluators (Patton, 1997; Kirkhart, 2000; Grasso, 2003; Feinstein, 2002; Preskill, 2003) have extended discussions on ‘use’ by looking beyond the instrumental use, assumed by the likes of the World Bank (2007) and Morra-Imas and Rist (2006), to include ‘conceptual’ and ‘process use’, both of which have a learning element to them (Amo and Cousins, 2007). Conceptual use is when the evaluative inquiry process acts to increase evaluators’ and stakeholders’ understanding of the program or policy. However, conceptual use does not necessarily lead to action or behavioural change. Michael Patton describes process use as the ‘changes in thinking and action of individuals, programs or organizations as a result of participation in an evaluation’ (cited in Harner and Preskill, 2007). Therefore, participating in an evaluation generates some degree of learning that is
independent of the findings (Cousins and Shulha, 2006). Processes may be used for: (a) learning how to learn; (b) increasing shared understanding among stakeholders through the dialogue that takes place during M&E; and (c) increasing implementers’ understanding of a program if the process takes place during implementation periods (Forss et al., 2002).

However, the contribution of M&E to learning may be affected by the type of M&E systems that are established. The increased focus on measuring outcomes through such M&E systems as results-based management, and a decreased focus on processes, over the last 20 years is viewed positively by the Development Agencies for Cooperation Working Party on Aid Evaluation (OECD/DAC, 2000). While one gap, outcomes, may have been filled, another gap, processes, may have been created. The focus on outcomes may also have contributed to the assembly line-like production of information described above and the pressure being placed on developing country M&E capacities. Measuring outputs and outcomes is also considered by Schick (2003) to be an inadequate way of determining government performance since the measurements are only a snapshot in time. The measures do not guarantee future performance and do not expose the factors that contribute to or hinder the achievement of results. Dependence on a limited number of short-term outcome measures can also lead to unsound social policy and judgments about programs (Blalock, 1999). There is a danger in ignoring processes in favour of outcomes, which may lead to ‘sacrificing long term value creation for short term performance’ (Brinkerhoff, 2002: 1). Jackson (1998) suggests that results-based management demonstrates a lack of commitment to collecting information on why and how outcomes occur, something that Ackoff (1989) says is necessary for wisdom and understanding. ‘How’ development is achieved has become less important than ‘what’ is achieved or, as Owen (2004: 5) proposes, the new focus has a bottom line mentality – ‘show us the profits, don’t worry about how you got there’.
A number of related concerns are also raised by Booth and Lucas (2001a; 2001b) who use the term ‘missing middle’ to describe the lack of performance information on the middle steps (government activities) and links to the outputs and outcomes of the services provided by government in the results chain. As Mackay (2006: 13) states, there is an ‘absence of much in-depth evaluative evidence linking government actions to actual results on the ground’. This issue, combined with lack of use, is explained by Stame (2004) as a double ‘evaluation deficit’. That is, there is underutilisation of evaluations at lower levels of governance structures, and outcome-monitoring systems are unable to offer explanations about how and why outcomes may have occurred. In developing countries, the deficit may be large since evaluations are often not carried out at the lower level.

Schick (2003), Booth and Lucas (2002) and Holvoet and Renard (2005) call for a deeper level of thinking and analysis to move beyond monitoring to evaluation. Schick (2003) proposes that the mission of performance-management systems should be to understand the past and uncover and explain why governments may perform as they do since performance does not happen by itself, but requires improvement-seeking attitudes and behaviour from politicians, public managers and public servants. Booth and Lucas (2002) suggest that the absence of M&E throughout the results chain is not surprising since development interventions frequently lack an explicit theory of change. However, this also means that programs may be difficult to evaluate (Holvoet and Renard, 2005).

Even where theories of change are articulated, M&E efforts may inadvertently be based on flawed theories of change that may lead to the measurement of inappropriate indicators of success. For example, increased knowledge is often used as a success indicator but increased knowledge does not necessarily lead to behavioural change, which is the desired outcome (Weiss, 2000). Therefore, learning may be hampered by a poor understanding of how a program or policy works or is expected to work, causing data collection and analysis to be misdirected and largely wasted.
It is difficult for M&E systems to be able to do everything, particularly in resource-constrained environments. Systems may be created, perhaps unconsciously, with gaps, weaknesses or blind spots that may create situations where M&E is less able to speak the truth (Leeuw and Furbo, 2008). It is therefore important to recognise the strengths and weaknesses of different types of M&E systems.

5.4.3 Context and learning

Performance monitoring systems provide the ‘who’, ‘what’, ‘when’ and ‘how’, whereas evaluation provides the ‘why’. However, the instrumental use of M&E, where information is linked to decision making, may be dependent on a supportive environment. Carlsson and Engel (2002: 15) outline a number of principles for effective learning environments. These include:

*mutual respect, inclusive thinking, the wish to understand others’ perspectives, willingness to take criticism seriously and the preparedness to renew institutional cultures, rules and procedures.*

Powers et al. (2002: 273) also note that the following attributes are required for learning:

*humility, honesty, openness, and the ability to welcome error ... a natural propensity not to dwell on the past (that is, on mistakes) and to move forward without the painful self-scrutiny necessary to learn from experience.*

Open communication and risk taking are emphasised. Additionally, learning should support individual interests so that people are motivated to participate in learning and are provided with adequate time to learn and sufficient resources to do their job. There should be rewards for learning although individuals also need to be aware of the advantages and disadvantages of participating in learning initiatives (Carlsson and Engel, 2002; Kontoghiorghes et al., 2005).

Research by Hailey and James (2002) into learning in non-government organisations found that learning was the result of conscious management decisions to
implement strategies to overcome barriers to learning. Learning leaders, defined as people who have ‘a learning orientation, a proactive stance towards problems, the ability to reflect critically, and a tolerance of critical feedback’ (ibid: 406) play a vital role in the investment through facilitating group interaction.

Hinton and Groves (2004) add that it is important to understand international development as a complex system that includes multiple actors, relationships and influencing factors of power and politics (as opposed to a prescriptive linear outcomes-oriented perspective). The authors support the use of a ‘systems thinking’ approach to learning whereby models and analysis are used to explore relationships and interactions, to test assumptions and beliefs, and to generate discussion and exchange among team members. The aim of this learning approach is to enhance understanding of different contexts by facilitating dialogue between actors to explore and expand their understanding and interpretation of events, relations and politics (Pastuer, 2004). Hinton and Groves (2004) highlight the importance of questioning the procedures developed for learning as these may inadvertently reinforce harmful cultural and political dynamics. This description of how change occurs corresponds with Foucault’s (1980; 1991) concept of latent power described in Chapter 3. They also draw attention to the need to consider the roles of individuals as well as organisations in bringing about change. This systems-thinking approach to learning corresponds with the systems approach to capacity development outlined in Chapter 3 and the arguments for a theory-based approach presented in Chapter 2.

Organisations that are able to implement ‘triple-loop learning’ (see 3.2.2) are more inclined to to ask questions to find out what other organisations are doing, how they are doing it and to learn from them (Carlsson and Engel, 2002). Yet Argyris and Schön (1978) propose that most organisations tend towards ‘single-loop learning’, in which the main focus is to ‘[explain] away failures’ (Roper and Pettit, 2002: 263). Equally, the motivations of evaluators influence the learning approach. Evaluators may be reluctant to highlight negative issues to a client if they think it will harm
their chances of ongoing work with them. Such behaviour reduces levels of honesty and openness necessary for effective learning (Leeuw and Furubo, 2008).

Lick (2006) also suggests that assumptions should not be made about individuals’ desire for collective learning, teamwork or taking joint responsibility to overcome challenges. Full participation in cooperative learning processes such as those described above assumes that individuals have a high level of self-awareness about their position, power, biases and beliefs. Pasteur (2004: 17) argues that:

*Unless individuals explore what underlies their own typical thinking and action, they are likely to make superficial changes to existing strategies, which will limit the potential for more fundamental learning and change.*

The awareness of self and others, which is needed for learning, is in itself difficult to learn. As Goleman (1998) notes, it is possible to increase the chances of individuals and organisations developing a greater level of awareness through regular self-reflection, but it is not easy.

Other factors at an organisational level also militate against the creation of learning environments. Cornwall et al. (2004: 3) highlight that while space for learning is critical, ‘scant opportunity exists ... for reflection in and on everyday working practice and its relationships with the ideals that policies profess’. Among donor agencies, Pastuer (2004) noted that the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development’s efforts to increase its learning capability were undermined by its propensity towards rewarding competition and independence over teamwork, honest reflection and sharing. The Swedish International Development Agency established learning groups but these lost out in competition with existing workloads and other short-term priorities on which staff time and resources were concentrated (Cornwall et al., 2004). Perhaps the space for learning has been limited because outcomes from learning, or the value of a learning focus, are not readily apparent or are ‘fuzzy’, to use Carlson and Engel’s (2002) term.
5.5 A balance of accountability and learning?

Perrin et al. (2008) and Frink and Klimoski (2004) suggest there are trade-offs in establishing accountability mechanisms to support changes in accountability relationships. These include the trade-off between checking and doing, negative and positive accountability, and accountability for following rules versus a proactive result-focused approach. Table 5 presents Bovens’ (2005) distinctions between functional and dysfunctional accountability.

**Table 5: Functions and dysfunctions of public accountability**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Dysfunction</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic control</td>
<td>Rule obsession</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrity</td>
<td>Proceduralism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improvement</td>
<td>Rigidity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy</td>
<td>Politics of scandal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catharsis</td>
<td>Scapegoating</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Bovens (2005), Perrin et al. (2008) and Ebrahim (2005) note that while accountability is seen as a good thing, too much accountability can lead to an accountability or ‘performance paradox’, which results in dysfunctional behaviours and where innovation and organisational learning are dampened. For instance, an overemphasis on integrity and controlling corruption may hinder efficiency and effectiveness, while too much stress on transparency may lead to inefficient decision making rather than better performance (Perrin et al., 2008). In resource-scarce environments, too much accountability may result in an ineffective distribution of resources (Fenwick, 2008). However, achieving a balance may not be easy.
Perrin et al. (2008) argue that while past approaches to accountability have been seen as having little to do with learning, now public sector managers should now be held accountable for it. Bovens (2005) further suggests that a learning element to accountability derives from account giving, which stimulates a learning process through which norms are created (or re-created), institutionalised and adjusted, if necessary. Citing Lerner and Tetlock’s (1999) research, Bovens (2005) proposes that particular types of accountability relationships will result in open-minded and critical thinking, which is conducive for learning. Lerner & Tetlock (1999: 259) claim that:

*Self-critical and effortful thinking is most likely to be activated when decision makers learn prior to forming any opinions that they will be accountable to an audience (a) whose views are unknown, (b) who is interested in accuracy, (c) who is interested in processes rather than specific outcomes, (d) who is reasonably well informed, and (e) who has a legitimate reason for inquiring into the reasons behind participants’ judgments.*

Lerner and Tetlock (1999) found that if audiences were interested in outcomes rather than processes, or if an audience was only interested in a specific outcome, then the quality and depth of analysis and decision making by those being held to account decreased while cognitive biases increased. In such circumstances, public sector managers may consequently avoid risk taking, evade responsibility, protect themselves from blame and may learn the wrong things. Therefore, the link between accountability and learning is strong yet filled with tensions. This also seems to have implications for the increased emphasis on outcomes rather than processes described earlier in this chapter.

Patton (2009: 112) is sceptical of what he describes as a ‘vision of evaluation unity and utopia’ whereby M&E can be both for accountability and learning. Rather he proposes that it is impossible to ignore the competing, and often conflicting, purposes of M&E. Fenwick (2008) also outlines potential conflicting principles underlying innovation and organisational learning and the demands for standardised practice as is promoted under performance management systems.
(such as total quality management). Since the late 1980s ‘continuous learning’ and ‘total quality’ are two key messages that have permeated workplace learning and training. The aims of total quality management are measurement, predictability and consistency. Compliance with total quality management is aided by training, developing manuals specifying performance standards, and systems that require written ‘forms of tracking and reporting levels of compliance’ (Fenwick, 2008: 1). In contrast, continuous learning is underpinned by the ideals of organisational learning that recognises human factors, complexity, and uncertainty of outcomes. Fenwick (2008) notes that local implementation contexts are variable and complex, and often separated geographically by distances from headquarters or regulatory bodies. Multiple interpretations about what total quality means, politics related to re-organising work and positions, and defective tools make it difficult for workers to apply the manuals and guidelines. Manuals and guidelines are also unlikely to provide for all situations, where different customer and client reactions may be unanticipated.

The growth of interest in M&E may also lead to perverse behaviour. For instance, M&E systems may breed M&E systems. Budget maximisation behaviour in resource-constrained environments can lead to organisational units seeking to increase their size, keep staff busy, expand their roles and responsibilities and ‘shop-for-clients’ (Leeuw and Furubo, 2008). Evaluators and administrators may interpret politicians’ information needs and work to generate more and more information which they believe to be useful for decision making. However, this bureaucratic behaviour may mean that information is produced but not used and may contribute neither to improved accountability nor learning.

5.6 Summary

This chapter has explored the meaning of the concepts accountability and learning and examined how M&E systems are expected to facilitate improved accountability and learning. In looking at how context may influence whether learning and
accountability is generated (as program designers and implementers believe they will), the complexity of change processes is highlighted as is the need to unpick assumptions about how M&E is expected to lead to other changes.

In examining M&E systems being implemented in developing countries, there is significantly more emphasis on performance monitoring and accountability than evaluation and learning. However, it would seem that performance monitoring systems sit more comfortably in cultures that are more individualist, egalitarian and where standards and rules are clear and valued. Therefore, it could be proposed that the type of M&E systems that are being introduced to developing countries are potentially or partially incompatible with existing social accountability systems derived from more collective and hierarchical structures. Notions of organisational learning, as articulated by Senge (1990), also require non-bureaucratic organisations that support open communication and risk taking. This again is often not the case in developing countries and therefore M&E for learning may have limited compatibility with the public sector environments of developing countries. Hyden (2008) notes that while public sector reforms may not necessarily be misaligned with African culture, norms and values, it seems that there are differences, perhaps not irreconcilable, which need to be carefully considered if public sector reform and M&E capacity development interventions are to be successful.

The literature review has encompassed four chapters, each focussing on a specific area of interest to the research question and drawing on literature from multiple disciplines, reflecting the nature of capacity development. These chapters inform the framework for the research design.

While the components of context-mechanisms-outcomes, discussed in Chapter 2, present a useful overarching framework for examining theories of change it can be strengthened by incorporating other frameworks that examine specific aspects of context-mechanisms-outcomes. Boesen and Therkildsen's (2004) categorisation of different types of capacity development strategies provides an avenue for
deepening understanding of mechanisms. It also aids thinking about how multiple strategies may be used as part of an overarching theory of change. However, Boesen and Therkildsen’s model does not adequately provide an avenue for examining context. Rogers (2003) and Hofstede’s (1991) concepts fill this gap and provide a reference for examining contextual characteristics and their influence of people’s behaviours. Chapter 5 focussed on the outcomes expected from monitoring and evaluation capacity development. This chapter differed from Chapters 2 – 4 since it did not highlight any particular analytical framework. However, the literature reviewed enables a comparison to be made with the case study that is the subject of this thesis – to what extent do the theories of change underpinning monitoring and evaluation capacity development interventions in Tanzania align, or otherwise, with the dominant theories of change highlighted in the literature review.
CHAPTER 6: RESEARCH DESIGN

This chapter outlines the research design of the thesis. This includes the key research questions, the starting assertion and assumptions underlying the assertion. The research methodology involves a qualitative case study, is then described and justified. The chapter concludes with a description of how and why the original design was altered as the research has evolved.

6.1 Research questions

As outlined in Chapter 1, the overarching research question for this thesis is:

*How does monitoring and evaluation capacity develop in developing country public sector environments?*

To address this research question the thesis is based on a particular case, the Government of Tanzania. The case study approach facilitates an investigation of the influence of context, a key component of theories of change and as stressed in previous chapters is a critical factor influencing change. It is argued that through examining both the ‘particularity and complexity’ of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) in the Government of Tanzania, it is possible to gain a deeper understanding of the influence of contextual issues that enhance or hinder M&E capacity development (Stake, 1995: xi). Further justification of the case study approach is outlined in section 6.4.

Focussing on this country case, the key research questions are:

1. What theories of change underpin the Government of Tanzania’s and donors’ efforts to develop M&E capacity?

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11 The thesis focuses on efforts undertaken in mainland Tanzania and does not include those in Zanzibar. Under the constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania the mainland and Zanzibar are administered separately.
2. What strategies are used to develop M&E capacity and how effective are they?

3. What issues affect the development of M&E capacity in the Government of Tanzania?

4. How might governments, donors and development practitioners improve their efforts to develop M&E capacity?

6.2 Starting assertion and assumptions

The starting assertion of this thesis is: if theories of change are articulated, then alternative and more successful M&E capacity development strategies and interventions may be designed. These may in turn increase the effectiveness of capacity development interventions and ultimately achieve better development outcomes.

The assertion is based on a number of assumptions whereby.

- It would be possible to identify some, although not all, theories of change underpinning M&E capacity development interventions in the Government of Tanzania. This assumption, that theories are often implicit, confusing and missing, is based on the literature on theories of change discussed in Chapter 2.

- Some of the people funding or implementing capacity development interventions would have an awareness (at least partial), opinion or view of what works and why. This may not be explicitly stated as a theory of change and may not necessarily specify social theories such as rational choice theory. It was expected that the depth of an interviewee’s awareness, opinion or view of what works and why would vary according to the extent to which they were involved in the design and implementation of the strategy and their knowledge of change processes and capacity development.

- Some of the people implementing capacity development interventions would be able to identify which capacity development strategies were more successful and why. As with the assumption above, it was expected that the depth of an
interviewee’s response might depend on the extent to which they were involved in the implementation and M&E of the capacity development intervention and knowledge of change processes and capacity development. It was expected that some interviewees might identify particular contextual factors that influenced success. It was also assumed that M&E capacity development interventions would themselves be monitored and evaluated and reports to donors or by donors would outline some success factors.

- The choice of capacity development strategies would not be guided significantly by the context where the intervention was being implemented. The literature review emphasises that context remains only a weak consideration in the design and implementation of capacity development strategies.

- It was possible to develop some alternative theories of change to those espoused in documents and by interviewees.

6.3 Justification for Tanzania as a research setting

This section outlines the justification for the focus of this research on M&E capacity development in the Government of Tanzania.

Tanzania is located on the eastern seaboard of the African continent and is a low-income country with an average per capita annual income of US$400 and a life expectancy of 55 years. Approximately 35 multilateral and bilateral donor organisations, along with numerous international non-government organisations, were providing development assistance to Tanzania in 2009. It is estimated that development assistance comprises between 35 and 40% of the Government of Tanzania’s budget, or around US$2 billion per annum12 (World Bank, 2009).

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12 Tanzania has a high level of aid dependency and in 2008 received about US$2.3 billion (WRI, 2010). Aid as a percentage of gross national income (GNI) was 16.6% in 2003, 15.7% in 2004, 12.5% in 2005 (Fraser and Whitfield, 2008) and 14.5% in 2006 (WRI, 2010). ‘Aid as a percent of GNI is the amount of official development assistance (ODA) received by a country as a percentage of its Gross National Income (GNI), a measure of citizens’ income. This indicator provides a measure of the recipient country’s dependency on aid’ (WRI, 2010). In 2004, this amount was equivalent to around
Development assistance has been at such consistently high levels for most of the last decade, i.e. at the same time as the country has enjoyed strong macro-economic growth of around 7% per annum. Yet, progress in poverty reduction has been marginal. The 2007 General Household Budget Survey (URT, 2009) showed that, since 2001, the number of people in Tanzania who survive on US$1.10 a day or less has risen by one million to 12.7 million. The 2009 Human Development Index, which measures and compares the development levels of most countries around the world, ranked Tanzania 151st out of 182 countries assessed (UNDP, 2009; World Bank, 2009).

When the findings of the government’s General Household Budget Survey (URT, 2009) were released, a foreign diplomat was quoted in one of the national daily newspapers, The Citizen, as saying:

"It’s a bit of a shock that poverty has reduced so little despite our efforts. Economic growth is moving in the right direction, yet poverty reduction is still marginal (McGregor, 2009)."

The World Bank (2009) also noted that:

"... reaching the MDGs [Millennium Development Goals] therefore remains elusive at this time, even in areas previously considered within reach such as income, poverty, health and access to safe drinking water."

It is interesting to note that a similar situation also occurred in the post-independence period. Even though the annual GDP growth rate was 6% this did not result in development, a situation that Nyerere described as ‘growth without development’ (Lindemann and Putzel, 2008). In the foreseeable future Tanzania seems destined to remain a low-income country characterised by poverty (Collier, 2007) where donors and the Tanzanian Government are under more pressure to demonstrate results from development expenditure (O’Brien and Lundgren, 2008).

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40% of government expenditure: 80% of the development budget and 20% of the recurrent budget (Harrison and Mulley, 2007).

13 Statistics in the UNDP report are based on 2007 data.
However, developing M&E capacity is proving a difficult endeavour even given the extensive support provided by donors in this area over the last decade. Systems to monitor and evaluate Tanzania’s Poverty Reduction Strategy, public sector organisations’ strategic plans, and key public sector reform programs are at various levels of development, yet progress in collecting, analysing and using M&E information has been limited. Consequently, donors make regular calls for improved M&E so that results can be demonstrated.

There has been some recognition of the need for public sector reform to be implemented differently so that implementation improves. For instance, in 2008 the World Bank noted:

> What appears to be needed ... is some more systematic way of thinking about the implementation demands facing public sector organisations in low-income countries such as Tanzania and their absorptive capacity or readiness (World Bank, 2008: 32).

Despite such statements, there are reasons to doubt whether the practice on the ground will change substantially. Ten years ago Therkildsen (2000) observed that valuable international lessons on reform were not being taken into account in the design and implementation of reforms in Tanzania. He suggested that little knowledge was being developed, at the time, about how to improve and sustain performance in the present and likely future context in Tanzania.

Both donors and developing country governments have an interest in improving M&E capacity. In the current environment of international development it is likely that focus of donors on developing M&E capacity will continue and increase. It is also likely that the Government of Tanzania’s current dependence on development assistance will continue in the short term.

### 6.4 Case study approach

As noted in section 6.1, a qualitative case study approach was chosen for this research. A case study is defined as a ‘research strategy which focuses on
understanding the dynamics present within single settings’ (Eisenhardt, 1989: 534). A single case contains a variety of domains, such as sub-sections, groups or events, which may be numerous and therefore need to be sampled (Stake, 2002). For this thesis, the unit of analysis is the Government of Tanzania’s M&E capacity development interventions.

Case studies enable questions concerning ‘how’ and ‘why’ to be asked in relation to the specific context surrounding the research topic and enable the researcher to provide a ‘thick’ description of the phenomenon (Baxter and Jack, 2008; Merriam et al., 2002). Historical, cultural, social and political contexts are of interest in case studies (Stake, 2006). The case study method is, therefore, particularly appropriate for the theory of change approach taken in this thesis, where context is central to analysis (Yin, 1994; Thomas and Mohan, 2007; Lincoln and Guba, 1986). In addition, the complex and intangible nature of capacity development is investigated better through qualitative methods, such as case studies, rather than quantitative. As Patton (2002: 152) notes, case studies can:

*illuminate dimensions of desired outcomes that are difficult to quantify ... Getting into case details better illuminates what worked and didn't work along the journey to outcomes – the kind of understanding a program needs to undertake improvement initiatives.*

The aim of this research was to gain a deeper understanding of M&E capacity development within the Government of Tanzania. The case study approach that is exploratory and characterised by ‘thick’ descriptions, which take context into account, supports the aims of this research.

Four research methods were chosen and developed to answer the research questions (Table 6). They were literature review, review of secondary data, content analysis of key program documents and individual semi-structured interviews. Each

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The terms ‘case study’ is not used in a consistent way. Yin (1994) used the term to describe the process of doing a case study whereas Stake (2006) uses the term to describe the unit of analysis. However, a case study is bounded by time, space or components (Merriam et al., 2002).
method is described below along with a justification for why they are appropriate for the purposes of this thesis. In deciding on the research methods, a number of factors were considered. This included the developing country context of the research location, the characteristics of the potential interviewees, the type of information that may allow the researcher to answer the key research questions, and the availability of potential interviewees to participate in the research.

In Tanzania, the Economic and Social Research Foundation (ESRF) provided support for the researcher throughout the research period. The not-for-profit Foundation, established in 1994, aims to ‘strengthen capabilities in policy analysis and development management and to enhance the understanding of policy options in the government, the public sector, civil society, and the donor community and the growing private sector’ (ESRF, 2011). One of ESRF’s research focus areas is governance and public sector service delivery and therefore has direct relevance to the topic of this thesis. The support provided to the researcher included being the institutional sponsor of the researcher’s research permit in Tanzania, contacting potential interviewees, and providing a sounding-board for research issues as they arose.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research questions</th>
<th>Data collection and analysis methods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What theories of change underpin the Government of Tanzania's and donors' efforts to develop M&amp;E capacity?</td>
<td>To bring to the surface context:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Review of secondary data</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Analysis of documents</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Semi-structured individual interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To bring to the surface mechanisms:</td>
<td>Analysis of documents</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Semi-structured individual interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cross-case analysis of documents and interview data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To bring to the surface outcomes (desired and actual):</td>
<td>Analysis of documents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Semi-structured individual interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-case analysis of document and interview data</td>
<td>Triangulation of data sources</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| What strategies are used to develop M&E capacity and how effective are they? | Analysis of documents  
Semi-structured individual interviews  
Cross-case analysis of document and interview data  
Triangulation of data sources |
|---|---|
| What issues affect the development of M&E capacity in the Government of Tanzania? | Analysis of documents  
Semi-structured individual interviews  
Cross-case analysis of document and interview data  
Triangulation of data sources including secondary data on context |

6.4.1 Review of literature on monitoring and evaluation, theories of change and public sector capacity development

The literature review provides the basis for the design of the research. Due to the complex, multi-disciplinary nature of capacity development as an academic topic, the review drew on literature from a wide range of fields.\(^\text{15}\) Particular attention was given to literature on the social, cultural and political context of M&E capacity development in the thesis. However, there were several gaps, particularly in the international development literature. For instance, literature on theories of change was predominantly drawn from the evaluation literature and did not have an international development focus. There were also few resources available on how consideration of context and political analyses are practically applied in the design and implementation of capacity development interventions. From the psychology field, research on accountability and cultural characteristics was useful. Surprisingly little literature was found on the influence of cultural, particularly national, characteristics on developing country public sector capacity development, although some literature was available from fields such as adult learning.

\(^\text{15}\) This included international development, evaluation, management, organisational development, education, psychology and politics.
6.4.3 Review of secondary data on the Tanzanian public sector context

As background to the case study, secondary data sources were collected and reviewed to understand better the Tanzanian context and the development of M&E capacity within the Government of Tanzania. The secondary data consisted of reports, papers and articles produced by the Government of Tanzania, donors, consultants and academics. Two Tanzanian databases – Tanzania Online (www.tzonline.org) and the Tanzanian Development Gateway (www.tanzaniagateway.org) – were important sources of information.

6.4.4 Content analysis of key Public Sector Reform Program documents

Content analysis of key public sector reform program related-documents was used reveal emerging theories of change. As Miller (1997: 77) notes, ‘Texts are one aspect of sense-making activities through which we reconstruct, sustain, contest and change our senses of social reality. They are social constructed realities that warrant study in their own right’. Who wrote the documents, their purpose, the way in which they were prepared and how the information contained in them was acquired are important to understanding the constructed realities (Babbie, 2004). A framework, based on Pawson and Tilley’s (1997) realist evaluation approach of context, mechanisms and outcomes, was developed to guide the document analysis (see Annex D). While Pawson and Tilley’s (1997) model of context-mechanisms-outcomes was used to frame the analysis of the documents, a realist evaluation approach was not used in this thesis since this research is not an actual evaluation of a particular program. Realist evaluation seeks to identify a ‘inequivocable causal relationship between a program and its outcome’ (ibid, p31) whereas this research was more exploratory in nature seeking to understand better the elements of context, mechanisms and outcomes and possible relationships between them.

The content analysis sought to answer the following questions:

1. What capacity development strategies are used to bring about change?
2. What theories of change, if any, are articulated in the documents?

3. What insights, if any, are provided on how, and why, actual capacities, choices and performance occurred?

M&E capacity development interventions are being implemented extensively across the Government of Tanzania but to limit the analysis the thesis focuses on the Public Sector Reform Program funded by the World Bank and other donors. The M&E capacity development interventions implemented under the Public Sector Reform Program may be considered a sub-section of or sample within the unit of analysis (Stake, 2006). In total, 15 program-related documents were analysed including: program-design documents, monitoring reports, consultancy reports, review reports and end-of-program reports (see Annex C). The lack of information on the development of M&E capacity across all these documents, led the analysis to be expanded to include all capacity development interventions.

6.4.5 Semi-structured individual interviews with key informants

The research relied on semi-structured individual interviews as the main method of primary data collection allowing the researcher to direct the discussion and clarify, probe and follow up on issues as well as to illuminate particular subjects (Thomas and Mohan, 2007). The interviews served the researcher's need for data concerning the unit of analysis (Minichiello et al., 2008). The style of the interviews was conversational or informal and interviewees were asked about their current understanding of key terms, such as M&E and their perspectives on the aims of the interventions together with outcomes, success factors and challenges.

Interviewees were targeted from three groups: the Government of Tanzania which was implementing and monitoring and evaluating relevant interventions; donor organisations who were funding interventions; and development practitioners engaged in interventions related to monitoring and evaluation capacity development or accountability development with the Government of Tanzania. Most of the interviewees were associated in some way with the Public Sector
Reform Program. Government of Tanzania interviewees were predominantly from Ministries with clear accountability mandates. A few interviews were sought with people associated with particular M&E capacity development interventions in the Ministry of Education and Vocational Training. Interviewees were identified through a snowball process (Patton, 2002) in which initial contacts from each of the three groups were asked to recommend other suitable interview candidates. The researcher then contacted most of the potential interviewees directly. For contacts in the Government of Tanzania, the Economic and Social Research Foundation provided a general letter of introduction in accordance with Tanzanian government protocols (see Annex E). In one case, a ministry required specific approval to be granted by their research division before allowing the interview to take place (see Annex F).

A total of 25 interviews were completed between August 2008 and January 2009. The protracted period of time in which the interviews were conducted was due to the part-time nature of the research project. The researcher lived in Dar es Salaam during the research period and therefore was able to conduct interviews over an extended time period which proved beneficial. The Government of Tanzania has an agreed annual ‘quiet time’ (April–August) during which the government seeks to complete its planning and budgeting processes for the upcoming year. Donors try to minimise meetings with the government during this time. Additionally, many staff from donor organisations are away from Dar es Salaam over the period June–August for their summer break. The flexibility that residing in Tanzania allowed meant that the researcher could work around these potential constraints. Interviewees comprised 11 public servants, seven staff from donor organisations and seven development practitioners. The researcher worked as a short-term consultant on a range of monitoring and evaluation assignments during the research period, which enabled her to make contacts with potential interviewees. To avoid potential conflict of interest between work assignments and the study, the following steps were taken. The researcher met one interviewee through a work assignment and interviewed this participant after the assignment was completed.
and met another through discussions about potential work assignments. The researcher also undertook a work assignment for an organisation that also employed another interviewee after all interviews were completed.

Potential interviewees were provided with a Plain Language Statement and Consent form (see Annex G) outlining the aim of the research study, the research process and confidential nature of the research methods. Each participant was asked to sign the consent form stating that they agreed to participate in the interview for research purposes. Interviews were not recorded electronically although handwritten notes were taken. Summaries of the key discussion points were sent to participants to confirm the record of the interview. At this point, interviewees could provide comment, clarification and corrections, as necessary. Each interviewee was assigned a number and these are used throughout the data chapters to maintain confidentiality. Interviewee numbers commencing with: ‘G’ refer to public servants, ‘D’ refer to staff from donor organisations; and ‘DP’ refers to development practitioners.

Interview guides were prepared with open-ended questions (see Annex H). It was not the intention that all questions would be asked in exactly the same way, although this is largely what happened. Interview guides are useful in that they are flexible enough to enable interviewees to explain their perceptions, views and opinions (Minichiello et al. 2008). The average length of an interview was approximately one hour. After 25 interviews, strong patterns had emerged from the data collected and little new data was emerging (i.e. data saturation had been reached). It was decided at this point there was no need to conduct further interviews as they would be unlikely to reveal significant new information (Guest et al., 2006).

Changes to the case study investigation

The case study was initially to be based on four data collection methods (document analysis, semi-structured individual interviews, focus groups and individual case studies) to allow for a more rounded and complete account of the Tanzanian
Government’s understanding of M&E, capacity development and use of capacity development strategies (Patton, 2002; Eisenhardt, 1989). At the commencement of the research, it was expected that individual interviews would provide a foundation from which questions could be developed for focus groups. It was also anticipated that specific case studies, based on the experiences of individuals or particular agencies, could be identified, and would form part of the broader country case study. This approach may have allowed for cross-case pattern analysis to be completed for the more specific case studies. However, these assumptions proved to be incorrect. It became apparent during individual interviews that few if any interventions were being monitored and evaluated and little evaluative thinking was occurring—an important finding given that the purpose of the interventions was to develop M&E capacity. Since the interviews revealed similar information it was determined that focus groups or individual case studies would be unlikely to yield significantly new data and so it was decided not to use these methods.

6.5 Credibility

The credibility of qualitative inquiry is dependent on a belief in its value, rigorous methods and the credibility of the researcher (Patton, 2002). A number of strategies were used to enhance the credibility of this research.

6.5.1 The value of qualitative inquiry

Qualitative research aims to understand, illuminate and explore social phenomena in context-specific settings (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). Debates on the value of qualitative and quantitative methods and their relative objectivity and subjectivity have been extensive. However, quantitative methods are not tantamount to objectivity and qualitative to subjectivity (Scriven, 1972). The important point for the credibility of this research is that the methods selected fit the purpose, questions and issues being researched (Patton, 2002, 2008). Justification for the qualitative case study approach was outlined previously.
6.5.2  *Rigorous Methods*

Rigour concerns the overall planning and implementation of the research including how accurately the selected research methods and techniques were used to produce data and minimize the errors and biases in data collection and analysis. Lincoln and Guba (1985) note that researchers must provide a clear and full account of the research process so that readers can determine the dependability and trustworthiness of the research. This sections provides details relating to how data was triangulated and how a data audit was completed. The data audit is not a validity check on data. However, interviewees were provided with an opportunity to review summary interview notes and provide amendments.

As noted above, interview guides were used to structure interviews, during interviews the interviewer paraphrased and summarised discussions to check understanding, and interviewees were given the opportunity to check written summaries of interviews. These strategies were used to reduce the errors. The interview data were analysed using a cross-case analysis approach whereby the answers from the different interviewees to common questions were categorised and examined. The analysis of key program documents involved searching the text for explicit and implicit references to the components of theories of change (context, mechanisms and outcomes) and analysing them using a cross-case analysis approach. Data matrices were used to condense, organise and classify interview and document information (Miles and Huberman, 1994) (See Annex D for an example).

**Triangulation**

Risks to the credibility of research may arise when unfounded interpretations are made from the data. To increase credibility, data findings were triangulated. For instance, interview data was checked against data from the analysis of key program documents and secondary data (method triangulation). Data from interviews was compared across different types of interviewees to highlight the consistency and
inconsistency of different people's perspectives (triangulation of sources). Triangulating data may still result in an inconsistent picture, but such an outcome does not necessarily mean that some or all of the data is invalid (Patton, 2002). The inconsistencies may highlight the different perspectives of different stakeholders (theory triangulation) and inconsistencies across different kinds of data. These inconsistencies may be important findings themselves, suggesting for instance the difference between espoused theories and theories-in-use. The point is that it is important to examine and understand where and when the differences are, and why.

Both inductive and deductive processes were used in the analysis of data. Inductive processes were used to uncover potential patterns in the data whereas a more deductive process was used to develop possible additional theories of change. Strauss and Cobin (1998: 22) note that ‘At the heart of theorising lies the interplay of making inductions (deriving concepts, their properties, and dimensions from data) and deductions (hypothesising about the relationship between the concepts)’. One of the challenges of the analytical theorising process was to not develop simplistic linear cause-effect relations but rather maintain a more holistic viewpoint that enables an understanding of the complexity of the situation. The inductive-deductive process was undertaken iteratively so that the researcher constantly moved from the data to interpretations to the construction of possible additional theories of change and back again to recheck and retest the emerging understandings. Such an inductive-deductive iterative approach is useful ‘when little is known about a phenomenon, when current perspectives seem inadequate because they have little empirical substantiation, when they conflict with each other or common sense’ (Eisenhardt, 1989: 548).

Another aspect of credibility concerns whether the research explains what the research intended to try to explain (Patton, 2002; Denzin and Lincoln, 1985). One of the challenges of case study approaches is that alternative explanations for the phenomenon are numerous but it is not practical to examine them all. However, the
approach taken in this thesis is to cross-check what other researchers have said about the phenomenon to examine the external validity of the additional theories developed. These theories are positioned as possible rather than definitive theories.

6.5.3 Data audit

To assure the dependability and confirmability of the qualitative research (Lincoln & Guba, 1986), an independent reviewer completed an audit of the interview data. The purpose of the review was to verify the accuracy of the references to interview data in the text. The auditor was provided with full access to the interview summary notes and a penultimate draft of the thesis from which she could randomly select any of the referenced interview data and authenticate its use in the thesis. The reviewer’s attestation to rigour is appended (Annex I).

6.5.4 The relationship of the researcher’s work role and the study

As discussed in Chapter 2, the theories are change approach involves surfacing the assumptions and biases of program designers and implementers and how these influence their understanding of change processes. It is therefore appropriate, and necessary, to bring to the surface the assumptions and biases of the researcher and note how impartiality and neutrality are assured.

I am a female, English-speaking university educated (a Bachelor of Arts in Anthropology and Masters in International Development) New Zealander of European descent. I grew up in a context that could be described (using Hofstede’s cultural characteristics) as more individualistic and masculine, with a low power distance and higher tolerance of uncertainty. I worked in the New Zealand public sector at a time when new public management ideas were being implemented and prior to my career in international development that began in 2000. Over the last 10 years I have undertaken consultancy assignments to develop public sector M&E capacity in developing countries. My personal values include learning and thinking

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16 In Tanzania, the researcher has not undertaken any assignments where public sector M&E
deeply about development and how to achieve better results and I believe that M&E has the potential to contribute to such aims. All of these factors influence the way that I understand and think about the world and engage with it. Throughout the research, a reflexive approach was used to continuously self-question how my background, beliefs and values might be influencing the research and shaping my interpretations and knowledge making. For instance, individual responsibility is valued in New Zealand whereas, based on the research, it did not appear to be as strongly valued in the Tanzanian public sector. Rather than judging a lower level of individual responsibility in negative terms, as may be the immediate reaction given my own values, I looked for explanations to understand better how individual responsibility might be considered negatively or how other types of responsibility might be more valued in the context of the Tanzanian public service.

The data and researcher’s preliminary interpretations were not taken back to the interviewees for further checking, as suggested is necessary by Lincoln and Guba (1985), since doing assumes there is a single reality that can be confirmed by participants. The thesis cannot be seen as a ‘sophisticated but temporary consensus of views about what is to be considered true’ (Seale, 1999: 468). As this thesis has highlighted different realities may exist based on different people’s culture, values and beliefs and between espoused and actual theories. Seale (1999: 468) suggests that it is appropriate that researchers ‘provide readers a reflexive account of their politics ... leaving it to the democratic process in wider society to resolve clashes of interest.’

A number of other strategies were utilised to minimise the potential influence of my biases. These are described earlier in relation to the process used to select interviewees, triangulation, and providing interviewees with the opportunity to review interview summaries and provide comments or corrections.
6.6 Limitations

A number of limitations of this research project have already been noted. These include: the limited information specifically on M&E capacity development interventions, and their effectiveness, in the Government of Tanzania; and the broadly inclusive way in which the concept of capacity development is defined making it difficult to cover all the elements. The discussion below highlights a number of additional limitations.

Caulley (1983: 71) notes that ‘Documentary facts never come “pure” since they do not and cannot exist in a pure form’. His point is that facts are always refracted through the perspective of the author. Therefore, the accuracy of documents may be contested (Miller, 1997). One of the limitations of the document analysis in this thesis is that most of the documents reviewed were authored, commissioned or funded by the World Bank (the largest donor to Tanzania). Many of the authors (consultants paid by the government or World Bank or World Bank staff) were close to the events about which they wrote and some were key actors within them.

Some of the documents analysed made reference to original source documents. Requests were made to the Government of Tanzania, the World Bank and the United Kingdom Department for International Development (DfID) to obtain copies of these documents. However, the Government of Tanzania and the World Bank did not respond to these requests, while DfID informed the researcher that the report was for internal use only. While access to the original documents would have been ideal, their contents are summarised in other documents that are in the public domain.

Some of the limitations of interviews noted in the literature were realised during the research. Patton (2002: 306) suggests that interviewee responses can be distorted due to ‘personal bias, anger, anxiety, politics, and simple lack of awareness ... recall error, reactivity of the interviewee to the interviewer, and self-serving responses’. During interviews with public servants, it was apparent that
some were reluctant to express their opinion freely even though confidentiality was assured; or interviewees provided answers they thought the interviewer wanted to hear. To address these limitations, data collected from the document analysis were compared with data from interviewees; and data from different interviewees were compared.

Some commentators may also consider that not taking the data and preliminary interpretations back to interviewees to be a further limitation despite Seale’s (1999) argument about multiple realities. In hindsight, there may have been some advantages in doing so not with the purpose of seeking consensus or truth but for seeking reactions and adding another layer of data.

The depth of the case study was perhaps constrained in two ways. As noted above, the difficulty in finding suitable specific case studies within the broader case study for further and more in-depth investigation. Another limitation was the limited breadth of information on the topic of capacity development in the Tanzanian public sector environment. The research focused on the core theories of change and capacity development strategies, as determined by the researcher.

These constraints add to the need for qualifications to be made before generalisations drawn from this case study can be applied to other settings (Thomas and Mohan, 2007). Nonetheless, this thesis takes the view of Thomas and Mohan (2007: 315) that ‘it is possible for general conclusions to be reached from a relatively small number of case studies – or even one case study’. Given the importance of context to capacity development interventions, as argued in this thesis, there will always be limits on the degree to which the findings in one setting can be generalised to another. However, as Merriam et al. (2002: 179) suggests, the ‘general lies in the particular’ and readers of case studies will determine what is personally useful and what may apply to his/her context. The researcher cannot do this. Through the comparison of different settings it is also possible to draw out common themes or principles which add to the understanding not only of M&E capacity development in Tanzania but in other similar developing country contexts.
This thesis does not undertake such a comparison but contributes to the literature by providing an in-depth case study for future comparative studies.

6.7 Research timeframe

The research was undertaken on a part-time basis according to the timetable outlined in Table 7.

Table 7: Planned research timeframes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Timeframe</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Literature review</td>
<td>January 2005 – June 2008</td>
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<tr>
<td>Instrument development: preparation of interview</td>
<td>March – April 2008</td>
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<tr>
<td>questionnaires for semi-structured interviews with</td>
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<tr>
<td>public servants, staff from donor organisations and</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>development practitioners</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Individual interviews conducted</td>
<td>July 2008 – January 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Document analysis</td>
<td>July 2008 – June 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Write-up</td>
<td>July 2009 – August 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completion</td>
<td>August 2010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The research originally commenced in January 2005, although two key events, as described in the following section, meant that the study was amended in May 2008.
6.8 Amendments to research study

The research was amended in May 2008 with the approval of the University of Melbourne Human Research Ethics Committee. Two key events, outlined below, impacted on the focus and location of this research project.

The original research, approved by the University of Melbourne Human Research Ethics Committee, focused on piloting a process aimed at increasing knowledge of how capacity develops on a public sector reform program in Papua New Guinea. Six months after data collection commenced in early 2006, the consultancy organisation managing the program put research access on hold while it decided whether continued access would be granted. Ten months later in mid 2007 the researcher was informed that all research access was being withdrawn. Although the organisation consented for data already collected to be used, this was insufficient to complete the study necessitating an amendment to the research.

In late 2007, the researcher relocated to Tanzania to live presenting an opportunity to re-scope the thesis around this country that exhibited many similar conditions to those of Papua New Guinea. An amendment was submitted to the Human Research Ethics Committee, together with a support letter from the Economic and Social Research Foundation in Dar es Salaam (see Annex J) and an application for a research permit submitted to the Government of Tanzania Commission for Science and Technology (COSTECH). The Ethics Committee approved the initial research study in June 2006 and the amendment on 14 May 2008, subject to the research permit being granted. COSTECH approved the research permit (No. 2008-157-ER-2008-85) on 16 June 2008 (see Annex K).

The new research proposal and design used the same theoretical and methodological base as the original. The original literature review was extended to include material on M&E capacity development and draft chapters re-written. The original methods were semi-structured individual interviews, action research and case studies. The methods developed for the second study were semi-structured
individual interviews, focus groups and case studies. Both research designs involved interviews with public servants, staff from donor organisations and development practitioners. Lastly, similar questions were posed in both research designs, although the second project had a narrow focus on M&E capacity development rather than capacity development more broadly.

6.9 Summary

This chapter has outlined the thesis aim (to understand how M&E capacity develops, and can further develop, in the Government of Tanzania), the starting assertion and the assumptions on which the research is based. The research design is based on a qualitative case study approach using three research methods: review of secondary data; document analysis; and semi-structured individual interviews. Some modifications have been made to the research from its original conception, for which the appropriate approvals have been obtained. Changes have also been necessary to overcome limitations that arose during the data collection phase. These limitations to some extent could be expected and are likely to occur if similar research was conducted in the Government of Tanzania or other developing country public sector contexts. Regardless of the limitations in the research design noted in this chapter, the research adds to the case study literature available on public sector reform in Tanzania and more specifically on theories of change relating to capacity development. The literature in these areas is limited and this research therefore contributes to filling this gap.

As outlined in the introduction, the following data and analysis chapters are presented in ways that emphasises the inductive nature of theorising. Each chapter or data story presents data on one or more of the components of theories of change (context, mechanisms and outcomes) and examines how it relates to previous data to identify an emerging theory of change about M&E capacity development in the Government of Tanzania.
The following chapter examines the public sector context in Tanzania and is more substantial than what may normally be expected in a thesis of this length. However, as argued in the introduction and literature review, context is more than just the location where M&E capacity development takes place; context is a part of the theoretical approach and is considered pivotal to understanding how M&E capacity is developing in the Government of Tanzania.
Chapter 7: Data Story 1 - The Tanzanian Public Sector Context

Context is one of the key components of theories of change and this chapter draws on secondary data such as reports, papers and articles produced by the Government of Tanzania, donors, development practitioners and academics. The purpose of the discussion is two-fold. Firstly, to examine the context where monitoring and evaluation (M&E) capacity development is taking place and to analyse how context may influence capacity development. Secondly, to provide the foundation for the analysis of data presented in the following chapters to compare with how context is understood in program documents (Chapter 8) and by interviewees (Chapter 9).

The majority of the discussion is focused on reviewing the history of public sector and political reform since independence and key cultural characteristics. The discussion emphasises the mixture of fluidity and stability and the difficulty in developing a definitive understanding of context as a singular entity. Rather, the discussion highlights the existence of multiple contexts. The discussion concludes by briefly examining the relationship between the Government of Tanzania and donors and government ownership of public sector reforms. Given Tanzania’s reliance on international development assistance and donor’s interest in M&E, this relationship is an important element of the institutional environment.

7.1 Public sector and political reform in Tanzania

Public sector and political reform is not new to Tanzania. This section summarises key changes following independence in the 1960s.

7.1.1 A history of reform

The Tanzanian public sector is a product of the historical social and political development of the country. As a British colony, a Westminster model of
government was established. The bureaucracy steadily altered in the post-independence period from 1961 to become a centralised, socialist state where the public service came to be dominated by a single political party, the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), led by Julius Nyerere. As the centralised state grew, the independence of the public sector decreased. The civil service became subordinate to the political party with many civil servants joining the party ranks. Party branches, led by those in the lower ranks of CCM, existed in government organisations and branch leaders were able to discipline any civil servant regardless of their rank. Public servants were eager to keep CCM happy so as to avoid being labelled colonialists in the new socialist order. CCM also kept workers’ power in check by enacting legislation such as reducing the number of unions (Bana and McCourt, 2006; Lindemann and Putzel, 2008).

The 1970s saw CCM’s control expand further as it used the decentralised government structure to extend its power and influence at the local level (Crook, 2003). As the public service became the single provider of social services, Tanzania experienced a severe drought in 1974, war in Uganda, high oil prices and an increasing debt burden. From this time and through the 1980s, per capita income decreased, there was a shortage of essential commodities, public servants grew increasingly unmotivated and inflation increased. Corruption, which had been spreading, grew significantly particularly as senior public servants were disproportionately affected by the country’s worsening economic situation and sought additional sources of income generation. Overall, the level and quality of services decreased in line with decreasing discipline, capacity and salaries (Bana and McCourt, 2006; Therkildsen, 2007).

17 The Constitution was amended in 1965 to a one-party state.
18 Local government was abolished in 1972 and then reinstated in the early 1980s. From 1961 to 1993, the size of the public service increased approximately 350% from 90,000 in 1961 to 355,000 (Therkildsen, 2007).
### 7.1.2 An uneasy political transition

A parliamentary democracy was established in 1992 although CCM has maintained an overwhelming majority in parliament\(^{19}\) (Fölscher, 2008). The transition has not been smooth and adjustments have been slow and limited in scope. Party discipline has strengthened and the importance of loyalty to CCM has increased as a result of the move to a multi-party system (Sitta, 2008; Lawson and Rakner, 2005). The post-1992 period is described as being punctuated with shifts towards less transparency in an environment of weak cooperation and trust (Hewitt et al. 2002). Frequent charges of obstructive bureaucratic behaviour and corruption have contributed to distrust within government, between government and the public and between the government and donors.\(^{20}\) Vested political and business interests continue to influence what happens in the government. Public servants are defensive and reluctant to let go of their control (Hewitt et al., 2002). This is not to say that change has not occurred. Multi-party elections, economic liberalisation and public sector reforms aimed at improving governance have altered the politics of Tanzania, including that of CCM. Some non-government organisations are seen as at least a partial force for change and there has been changing regional power bases in parliament and of local elites. However, despite the surface-level changes, such as the move to a parliamentary democracy, CCM has maintained its patronage network through party-owned ventures and donations from business owners (Hyden and Mmuya, 2008).

A key feature of CCM’s political dominance has been its resilience to survive through Nyerere’s African socialism and negotiate the new era of economic and political

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\(^{19}\) Presidential and parliamentary elections are held every five years and in all since multi-party elections commenced CCM has won the presidency. On the mainland, CCM won the presidency with 61.8% in 1995, in 2000 71.7% and in 2005 80.3%. Each year has also seen an increased majority in parliament with 80% of elective seats in 1995, 87% in 2000 and 89% in 2005 (Hyden and Mmuya, 2008).

\(^{20}\) There are conflicting interpretations of the level of trust in Tanzania. While most authors (such as Therkildsen and Tidemand, 2007; Bana and McCourt, 2006; Hewitt et al., 2002) describe a low trust environment Chaligha et al. (2002) suggest that Tanzanians have a high level of trust in government even though they also believe the government to be very corrupt.
liberalisation (Ashurst, 2008). The government is mostly left to manage the country within the limits of what is considered politically acceptable by CCM. Where boundaries are crossed, CCM intervenes (Lawson and Rakner, 2005). While, the executive, controlled by the party, ‘continues to dominate the judiciary and legislature thereby constraining political accountability, the ruling party and the state bureaucracy remain de facto closely intertwined’ (Lindemann and Putzel, 2008: 31). Through centralised and inclusive patronage networks, state institutions manage to dominate other traditional, religious, geographic or ethnic institutions who may compete for power. The media and non-government organisations, which could provide a potential accountability check and balance mechanism on CCM and the government, are viewed by members of parliament largely as a means for campaigning and a source of local development projects (Lawson and Rakner, 2005). Bana and McCourt (2006: 406) describe a situation where ‘the retreating single-party rule has left much of its institutional architecture behind on the beach’. While the centralised inclusive institutions may have reduced possible negative consequences of institutional multiplicity (Lindemann and Putzel, 2008), and created a stability regarded as positive by donors, the influence of the socialist mentality and control may also be overlooked by donor-funded reform programs (Bana and McCourt, 2006). Therefore, currently there are few organisations autonomous from the government and CCM.

On the other hand, CCM’s hegemony may not always be a negative for the achievement of change. Hyden (2008) suggests that there are some aspects of CCM’s power that could be seen as an advantage to implementing changes, since its continuity and breadth potentially provides a strong capacity or base to respond to change.21 However, this situation does not necessarily transform into capacity for development (willingness and ability to change), which Hyden (2008) describe as weak. To date it appears that CCM has only changed and adapted in ways that aim

21 This corresponds with Rogers’ (2003) arguments, outlined in Chapter 4, that centralised power may hinder change until a decision to change is taken at the centre, at which time such power becomes a positive factor influencing change.
to maintain or strengthen its power. Although, CCM are conscious of the electorate’s opinion and has changed policies that it believes are unpopular (Lawson and Rakner, 2005). This suggests that CCM believes the electorate has some power.

However, a factor that lessens CCM’s ability to drive significant change is the many differing factions within its ranks (Therkildsen, 2008). The party maintains power through electoral rules that strengthen CCM’s dominance; by rules for party financing that strengthen its capacity to mobilise voters and secure election of its candidates; and by internal procedures of nominating candidates for political office that secures top-down control and upwards loyalty to a central leadership (Therkildsen, 2008). Ashurst (2008) suggests that 40% of parliamentarians want change; 40% are loyal to the CCM party machine; and 20% are undecided.22 Among the reformist parliamentarians, Ashurst observes ‘a delicate balance of caution, diligence and guile at work’ (page 15). Currently the high level of stable centralised power in Tanzania is proving more of a constraint on attempts by the public to influence the government or hold it accountable (Hyden and Mmuya, 2008) through such means as the polling booth. Therefore, while some people may be seen as innovators, innovative behaviour may be tempered by cultural characteristics such as unwillingness to voice opinions or new ideas. The close relationship between CCM and the government also impedes the vertical accountability relationship of the former to the latter. Accountability of the public service to parliament may also be weakened by what Ashurst (2008) describes as the parallel accountability relationship between donors and Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs). This presents a complex picture of strongly integrated relationships at the institutional level that act against reform within the Tanzanian public service.

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22 It is interesting to compare these percentages with Rogers’ (2003) estimation of the proportion of populations that have different innovation characteristics (see Chapter 4, footnote 37).
7.2 Cultural influences

Kelsall (2008) suggests that cultural factors or characteristics add to the complexity of the institutional environment described above. While as noted in Chapter 4 discussing culture in scientific positivist terms is problematic, the following discussion uses Hofstede’s (1980; 1991) cultural characteristics as a framework for exploring how cultural norms that seem to operate in Tanzania may affect reform efforts. In line with the noted difficulty of categorising any culture, the discussion also presents some contradictory characteristics.

According to Hofstede’s categorisation, East Africa, which includes Tanzania, Kenya, Zambia and Ethiopia, is high on power distance, low on individualism, low on masculinity, medium–high on uncertainty avoidance and low on long-term orientation. Olausson et al.’s (2009) study of cultural dimensions of individualism/collectivism, power distance and uncertainty avoidance in Tanzanian small private sector organisations largely supports Hofstede’s categorisation. They differ slightly in noting that Tanzania has a low tolerance for uncertainties and perceives a large power difference in some situations, but not all. Kelsall (2008) summarises key Tanzanian cultural characteristics as unwillingness to voice opinions or new ideas, a culture of consensus and inclusiveness, egalitarianism and fairness, an unwillingness to discipline non-performance, a prevalent culture of petty and grand corruption, lack of work satisfaction and commitment, patience and tolerance, and ability to resolve conflicts harmoniously. Although, he also notes that the situation is more nuanced and harder to define than this list may imply.

7.2.1 Power distance

Tanzania is considered a high power distance culture; that is, less powerful members of organisations and social institutions accept an unequal distribution of power (Hofstede, 1991; Olausson et al., 2009). This characteristic may help to explain the description of Tanzanians as ‘uncritical citizens’ who have a ‘habit of
accommodation’, are not cynical about authority and rarely express independent and autonomous likes and dislikes, or take courageous action (Chaligha et al., 2002). These authors suggest the one-party legacy may have contributed to this tendency to be generally accommodating since the public have never been or allowed to be leaders in social change. However, seeing Tanzania as a high power distance culture does not necessarily align with the characteristics of egalitarianism and fairness that Kelsall (2008) noted. In the case of Hofstede’s categorisation it may be that the grouping of Tanzania with other countries means that Tanzania is not accurately represented. It could also highlight that in Tanzania there is an idealism of egalitarianism that differs from reality. For instance, Bana and McCourt’s (2006) research on human resource management in the Government of Tanzania found that public servants perceived a high degree of unfairness in recruitment and selection processes and distrusted managers who were making decisions. Patronage, sociopolitical affiliations, gender, personal relationships, filial and social connections, corruption and bribery and transparency were all thought to be significant in influencing appointments. Tribal affiliations and home region were perceived to be of less influence, which may be a more positive legacy of the socialist period in which nationalism was emphasised and the aim was to create a classless society (Morgan and Baser, 2007; Therkildsen, 2008). This apparent contradiction may be a reflection that, as argued by Trompenaars and Wolliams (2003) and Arygris and Schön (1978), people are often unconscious of their cultural values and beliefs, so while Tanzanians may espouse egalitarianism and fairness, the practice is different. The lack of trust within the government and more broadly in society may also be a remnant of the socialist era and demonstrate the difficulty in moving beyond it.

7.2.2 Collective and feminine

The political participation and inclusiveness described above would seem to correlate with Hofstede’s (1991) and Olausson’s (2009) conclusions that Tanzania is more collective than individual and more feminine than masculine. Principles of
collectivism and inclusiveness were embodied in Nyerere’s ‘ujamaa socialism’ – indeed, ujamaa means ‘brotherhood’ or ‘family-hood’ (Stoger-Eising, 2000). Strong links clearly exist between individuals and their families in Tanzania. Families, and family-like groups such as CCM, the public service, religious organisations and cooperatives, are the main place where individuals find support and protection (Olausson et al., 2009). It can be concluded that there are strong social expectations in Tanzanians that individuals will behave in ways that give more priority to the interests of family or family-like groups than is the case in more individualistic societies. The collective nature of Tanzanian society may present a barrier to greater connectedness, a characteristic that positively influences the adoption of innovations (Rogers, 2003), since individuals may consider it risky to leave their close-knit support networks in order to engage with individuals who are outside those networks.

However, it is also difficult to generalise about the collective nature of Tanzanian social behaviour. Individuals in modern Tanzanian society live and work in multiple contexts, some of which are more collective and others less so, the boundaries between which are often blurred. For instance, Lawson and Rakner (2005) suggest that most government officials’ behaviour is guided by two modes of operating. Generally, most officials try to do their job serving the public with the limited available resources. Yet, they may also operate in ways that support their own, families’ or friends’ interests. If the work organisations operate in similar collective and feminine ways, this may help to explain what Kelsall (2008) describes as an unwillingness to discipline non-performance. It is difficult to discipline those within your group on whom you rely for protection. Indeed, the incentive not to discipline may be greater than the formal sanctions for doing so.

Tanzanian characteristics of collectivism and inclusiveness would also seem to be apparent in how CCM has recently embraced broader political participation within the party through what Therkildsen (2000) calls a ‘politics of accommodation’. He proposes that CCM has come to accommodate non-performance and non-
compliance by ministers (and other party members) to party positions and decisions as the price for broader political participation. Policy making has come to be seen as not needing agreed binding political support from the party, the public service or the public. This loosening of some control may be the result of CCM’s adaptation to the new political and economic environment.

7.2.3 Tolerance of uncertainty

In the public sector, the politics of accommodation may contribute to an unwillingness to discipline non-performance of individual public servants (Kelsall, 2008) and the lax observance of formal rules (Hyden and Mmuya, 2000), resulting in only a loose control on leaders’ actions (Lawson and Rakner, 2005). This analysis suggests that Tanzania could be categorised as a ‘loose culture’ or an informal organisational culture, using the definitions of Gelfand et al. (2004) and Rogers (2003). It also suggests that Tanzania should have a high tolerance of uncertainty, although this conflicts with Hofstede (1980, 1991) and Olausson et al. (2009), who found the opposite. The coexistence of loose and tight cultural characteristics is evident in the functioning of the CCM. The CCM values loyalty and rule following (Lawson and Rakner, 2005) at the same time as tolerating political non-compliance, for which few sanctions are applied (Therkildsen, 2000). This combination of cultural tightness (e.g. strict rules) and looseness (e.g. few sanctions) contradicts Gelfand et al.’s dichotomous argument, that is, the differentiation between tight and loose cultures. Yet it is consistent with Lawson and Rakner’s (2005: 35) conclusion that in Tanzania ‘there is a rigid adherence to rules alongside flagrant bending or breaking of the rules’.

Therefore, both loose and tight, and low and high tolerance seems to exist in Tanzania, but their expression might be dependent on the specific circumstances and the actors involved. This highlights the complexity of culture, its plurality and the difficulty of drawing high-level generalisations about it.
7.2.4 Public demand and accountability

Different people may have different interpretations of accountability relationships. Similar to Chaligha et al.’s (2002) suggestion that Tanzania’s history continues to influence the public’s behaviour towards government, Lawson and Rakner (2005) conclude that a range of social characteristics, such as Christianity, the market economy and ujamaa socialism, have influenced how Tanzanians understand accountability. The authors found that using concepts such as transparency, controllability and answerability (as defined in Chapter 4) to understand accountability in Tanzania was:

like trying to nail jelly to the wall; the concepts pin down the reality with great difficulty. Reality at local level is a fluid field of interpenetrating institutions and actors, informed by co-mingling cultures of accountability which place rather loose, and not always consistent, restraints on the actions of leaders (ibid: 20).

For example, Therkildsen (1998: 6) notes that, at a local level, people expect their elected councillors to act as patrons and bring development projects to their home village, behaviour that evokes Hofstede’s description of collective characteristics as those that aim to provide protection to the in-group. As such, decisions on local-level planning and budgeting may be negotiated among elected councillors in the context of patronage relationships rather than on a more objective needs basis. Therefore, it could be argued that, using Therkildsen’s example, elected councillors have a stronger sense of accountability to their own social group than to the broader and, perhaps, more elusive concept of the Tanzanian public. This behaviour may not necessarily be viewed negatively, as the councillors are responding to some sort of demand, even though it is different from what is generally viewed as an acceptable norm in many developed countries (Crook, 2003).

If Tanzania is a high power distance culture, it might be logical to assume that less-powerful members of Tanzanian society are accepting of the CCM-controlled public
service, as the CCM is perceived to be the legitimate power holder. Acceptance of CCM’s rule may also be influenced if Tanzanians perceive it to be benign top-down rule rather than significant ‘misrule or bad governance of a predatory state’ (Chaligha et al., 2002: 2). It might be that general public acceptance of under-performing public institutions has developed precisely because these institutions are recognised as not being malicious or the public does not normally rely on them as service providers. This acceptance then translates to the public’s tolerance of the government’s lack of progress in improving services and reducing poverty. In this interpretation, the public service in Tanzania is legitimised more through its association with CCM than its performance in delivering quality services to the public. Acceptance and tolerance could create the space for leaders and policy makers to be more ambitious and experimental in their approach to reform (Chaligha et al., 2002). Therefore, Tanzania could be considered a supportive environment for change since there is a high level of acceptance by the public of government and there is stable power. However, if there is little or no pressure from citizens for government to improve its performance and the government is not significantly motivated to do so without public pressure little change may occur. While Chaligha et al. (2002) suggest there is little public pressure Lawson and Rakner (2005) suggest that although societal organisations, such as school committees, clans and churches, do not have significant influence in improving government accountability, some citizens do pressure the government on issues such as service delivery. Their level of success, however, would seem to be limited as most citizens report having little influence on getting the government to meet its obligations. Ulanga (2008: 9) argues that while ‘Systems and structures may have changed; people’s attitudes and cultures have largely remained unchanged in the public service’ and therefore accountability relationships are not changing greatly.

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23 Lawson and Rakner (2005) found that 50% of citizens surveyed reported they had pressed for space and explanation in the last three years.
7.2.5  A culture of corruption

Kelsall (2008) describes a culture of petty and grand corruption in Tanzania. The lax observance of the rules, limited sanctions, tolerance of non-performance and the politics accommodation, described above, may contribute to an environment where corruption inside and outside the public service is not constrained. Furthermore, the changes desired by donors have had unwanted effects. For instance, Harrison and Mulley (2007) note that economic liberalisation has enabled some politicians to enter new ‘income generating’ relationships with external investors and international contractors. A significant issue for donors is whether, at an organisational or institutional level, the aid system in Tanzania contributes to an environment of systemic corruption that facilitates rent seeking and other self-serving behaviour on the part of public servants. Various studies (Therkildsen and Tidemand, 2007; Jansen, 2009; Policy Forum, 2009) have estimated that the majority of public servants rely on allowances for attending workshops or meetings to supplement their base salary, with estimations that some public servants are able to triple their normal monthly salary through allowances24 (Jansen, 2009). Public servants use a number of tactics to increase opportunities for earning allowances including holding meetings, seminars and workshops in out-of-town venues for which an increased allowance is eligible; participants paying kickbacks to organisers; trainees turning up only for the opening session to collect the allowance owed, and allowing some senior officials to collect several allowances in one day; and workshop organisers deliberately overstating the duration of the workshop to allow participants to collect an allowance larger than that to which they are entitled (Jansen, 2009). According to Kelsall (2008), this behaviour reflects a broader attitude held by public servants towards the low salaries they are paid, encapsulated in the saying: ‘You pretend to pay me, and I pretend to work for you’

24 Most public servants’ salaries are between US$150 and $600 per month. The amount of the per diem paid to public servants depends on the training and the seniority of the participant.
This rent-seeking behaviour, whether acerbated by low remuneration or not, undermines attempts to change the public service. Effort that public servants may be putting into securing additional income is effort that is not going into performing day-to-day tasks or developing capacity to improve the performance of the public sector. This attitude has major implications for capacity development in the Government of Tanzania.

The description of the Tanzanian public service above is largely negative and raises questions about why people may want to work in the public service. Therkildsen and Tidemand (2007) suggest Tanzanians may desire work in the public sector for a number of reasons that are both conducive and detrimental for performance. Some people may be attracted to a career of performing a public service, while others may be specifically attracted to the perceived lack of work discipline and low demands for performance. The authors conclude that public sector employment ‘gives staff a sense of pride about working there’ (ibid: 12) yet is counterproductive ‘if it reflects a social distance to the citizens that employees are supposed to serve. This illustrates that to change accountability relations is an uphill battle’ (ibid: 12).

7.3 The aid relationship

Historically, the relationship between the Tanzanian Government and donors has been mixed. When Tanzania received large amounts of development assistance during the 1960s and 1970s, the relationship between the two parties was relatively good. But when severe economic problems rapidly escalated in the mid 1980s, the relationship soured (Helleiner, 2001; Harrison and Mulley, 2007). At this time, the government viewed donors ‘as inappropriately intrusive and demanding and unable or unwilling to deliver on promises’ (Helleiner, 2001: 1); while donors expressed concern about poor public administration, budget management, levels of corruption and undemocratic processes. The relationship became so bad that a review of the government–donor relationship was conducted by Helleiner et al. (1995). On the basis of his review, a ‘new partnership’ was developed to increase
government ownership so that ‘Tanzania fully owns the development cooperation programmes in terms of planning, design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation’ (cited in Helleiner, 2001: 1). Early in the new partnership, commentators were generally optimistic, even heralding Tanzania as a model for aid partnerships (Hellenier, 2001; Evans and Van Diesen, 2002). However, Tanzania’s continuing dependence on aid, and the disappointingly limited impact of aid on reducing poverty over the last ten years, has seen the relationship between government and donors recently become tense once again. On the government side, advice from donors has tended to be ignored when it clashed with domestic political interests (Lawson and Rakner, 2005). Donors have tended to become increasingly demanding of the government to deliver results. The response of the government has been, to varying degrees, to become more resistant to outside pressure (Harrison and Mulley, 2007; Lawson and Rakner, 2005).

7.3.1 Government ownership of public sector reforms

Development policy in Tanzania is centred on a myriad of large and complicated reform programs based in central and line ministries and spread across core governance areas and key sectors. Even capable and willing organisations or governments could find it difficult to implement the breadth of programs currently being implemented in the public sector (Therkildsen, 2000). In Tanzania, MDAs and local government authorities have few resources beyond salaries and allowances to pay for operational and capital expenditures, hence there is pressure to allocate resources to meet day-to-day work requirements rather than developing capacity to undertake day-to-day functions or extraordinary functions. Where resources may be available, the misappropriation of funds, or insufficient individual knowledge, skills

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25 More than 2000 development projects were being implemented in the 1980s, predominantly donor funded, and while this number may have decreased a substantial number of development initiatives continued (Therkildsen, 2000). The early 1990s saw the beginning of a series of public sector reforms, often taking a sector-wide program approach, which continue to the present time. These reforms are ambitious and cover nearly every aspect of government from public sector administration, local government, public sector financial management, the legal sector, the business environment as well as sectors such as health, agriculture, trade and education.
and attitude, mean that it is difficult to make use of these opportunities (Kelsall, 2008).

Despite attempts to structure the government–donor relationship in Tanzania to ensure government ownership, commentators have more recently concluded that Tanzania’s development agenda is still dominated by donors and the theory and practice of government ownership is less than straightforward (Fraser and Whitfield, 2008). There are appearances of a high level of agreement between the government and donors on the priorities for Tanzania’s development – politicians, for example, occasionally issue pro-reform statements such as President Jakaya Kikwete’s call for the public service to serve Tanzanians with ‘renewed zeal, vigour, and speed’ (URT, 2007b: 15). However, Harrison and Mulley (2007) stress:

... a more complex and problematic view of Tanzania’s aid ownership in which one might identify ‘pockets of ownership’ (Evans and Ngalewa, 2003) surrounded by patterns and processes of governance that do not easily contribute to the construction of aid ownership or partnership with donors.

The challenges of ownership do not appear to have changed greatly in the last decade. In relation to the civil service reform program implemented in the 1990s, Therkildsen (2000) concludes that special interest groups or the public, generally, have a limited understanding of the reforms, whilst in the public service uncertainty and even fear of reforms is widespread. He also suggests that politicians’ support for reforms weakened as service delivery improvements, and hence political benefits, did not materialise from the reforms.

At the beginning of the government’s Public Sector Reform Program, the World Bank (1999b: 8) described a situation where there was weak external and internal demand for change in the public sector, coordination among reform initiatives was poor and there was inadequate M&E of outputs and outcomes. The goals of the reforms were seen as distant from the public’s interests, while MDAs were
uncommitted, with limited capacity and low performance. As implementation of the reforms grew so did the number of ‘uncommitted Tanzanian actors’ (World Bank, 2008: 22). Uncommitted actors included heads of MDAs, politicians, non-state actors and the public. Looking back over the reform experience, the World Bank (2008) suggests that while senior public servants were committed to the reforms, middle- and lower-level public servants were not. Kelsall (2008), similar to Therkildsen (2000), observed that most public servants have limited day-to-day involvement with the reforms and so have little knowledge or opportunity to buy in to the goals of the reforms. The fact that the Government of Tanzania is not paying for the reforms, rather donors are, is another factor militating against government ownership (Harrison and Mulley, 2007).

Despite the problems documented above, some commentators still describe Tanzania as a model for aid partnerships. Harrison and Mulley (2007), for example, described Tanzania as a ‘show-case’ and Ashurst (2008: 13) described the relationship as ‘close and cordial despite regular bickering over the depth of Ministers’ commitment to reform’. However, the 2009 annual national dialogue between donors and the government concluded with the latter expressing concern with the poor state of the aid relationship and suggesting that it may be time for another Hellenier report to review it. Therkildsen’s (2000: 63) analysis of the state of the same reforms ten years ago is instructive to recall: ‘It could be argued that such fragile support [for reforms] is not surprising because the problems of the public service are entrenched and complex and take substantial time to sort out’. If the fragile support is not surprising, it could also be argued that neither is the slow progress in achieving the desired changes. This analysis has major implications for the adoption of new ideas and practices since internal leadership and support are vital elements for successful change (Boesen and Therkildsen, 2003; Rogers, 2003).

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26 Writing almost a decade later, the World Bank (2008) is more positive about the level of commitment at the beginning of the first phase. It states that there was ‘relatively low politicization and relatively high levels of commitment and motivation’ (World Bank, 2008: 2).

27 Discussions between the government and donors are held annually in October/November each year to discuss general budget support.

28 Personal conversation.
7.4 Summary

This chapter has shown that context for public sector reform in Tanzania is plural, complex and presents a challenging environment in which to develop public sector M&E capacity. Nonetheless, the chapter has attempted to delineate key features of these contexts to determine factors that may positively or negatively affect capacity development efforts (see Table 8). At times, particular characteristics may be both a positive or negative influence depending on the situation and how they are acted out.

Table 8: Possible influences on monitoring and evaluation capacity development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Possible positive influences</th>
<th>Possible negative influences</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increasing voice of opposition party and parliamentary committees; Pockets of ownership – could be an opportunity to build on</td>
<td>Limited overall ownership and commitment to the reform by parliament and senior public sector managers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCM centralised power – if CCM decides to support change</td>
<td>CCM centralised power – if CCM does not support change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political stability – provides space for the ruling party to implement changes since it holds a significant majority</td>
<td>Political stability – if ruling party is unwilling to change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centralised public sector organisations – if leaders support change Accountability to the boss – if the boss supports change</td>
<td>High power distance (may lead to lack of sharing of information through the system, willingness to evaluate if there is not good news)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic system – despite weaknesses there are some opportunities for a growing electoral accountability</td>
<td>Immature democratic system – largely still a one-party state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Limited accountability to the public or parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fragmented policy-making processes and weak links between different aspects of the policy/program cycle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Limited capacity and resources</td>
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<tr>
<td>Loose culture – if it generates innovation</td>
<td>Loose culture – disregard for the rules</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low tolerance of uncertainty/tight culture – once new rules are established they will be followed</td>
<td>Low tolerance of uncertainty/tight culture – bureaucratic behaviour, reluctance to change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History of Ujaama socialism – egalitarianism and fairness: may influence desire to see if service delivery is increasing for all citizens</td>
<td>Distrust in the public service and between public service and public: may limit information sharing, opportunities for learning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Corruption (petty and grand) – efforts going towards corruption means positive efforts may not be being spent on Tanzania’s development</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Public sympathy for public service / accommodating public – provides the public service with space to implement improvements

Limited interconnectedness across public service – limits adoption of ideas, sharing of information

Information asymmetry – parliament and public do not have information to put pressure on public service

Feminine characteristics – may support ideas such as public good and organisational good

Feminine characteristics – may limit application of sanctions for non-performance

Aid dependency – provides resources to the public service to implement change

Aid dependency – government may be resentful of the need to rely on outside assistance

Donor pressure for results – if government feels accountable for the development funds it receives then it may be responsive

Donor pressure for results – may lead to resistance if standards and sanctions are not agreed by the public service

Ten years ago, Therkildsen (2000) noted that valuable international lessons on reform were not being taken into account in the Tanzanian reforms, resulting in little knowledge about how to improve and sustain performance under the present and likely future context. As government, civil society and the private sector continually change, it is important that the government, donors and development practitioners are able to better read the context if they are to identify opportunities for reform and to realistically assess constraints. It seems that different people’s perspectives have the potential to add value to this process since Tanzanians may not always recognise the vagaries of the context in which they are embedded in and outsiders may not be able to understand fully the often implicit and confusing norms guiding relations and interactions in Tanzania.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine how the outcomes of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) capacity development efforts since 2000 may have been influenced by the context. The discussion in Sections 8.1 and 8.2 describes the Government of Tanzania’s key M&E systems and assesses their current operational state according to integration and cohesiveness, permanence and linkages between information and decision making. Whereas the previous chapter focussed on the context element of Pawson and Tilley’s (1997) context-mechanisms-outcomes framework, this part of the chapter focuses on the actual outcomes of M&E capacity development interventions. Section 8.3 uses Rogers’ concept of diffusion of innovation to examine M&E from the viewpoint that it is an innovation. The discussion considers how the characteristics of M&E fit, or do not fit, with the contextual characteristics and provides insights into how this may explain the outcomes described in the earlier sections.

The data in this chapter draws on government and consultant reports that were analysed as part of the document analysis and from interviews. The discussion in part also reflects on the context described in Chapter 7.

8.1 The Government of Tanzania’s monitoring and evaluation systems

The Government of Tanzania’s M&E systems consist of two core components. Firstly, the poverty monitoring system monitors the achievements of the National Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (locally referred to by its Kiswahili acronym of MKUKUTA and abbreviated from Mkakati wa Kukuza Uchumi na Kupunguza Umaskini Tanzania). Tanzania was one of the first countries to develop a national poverty reduction strategy and the first country to develop a comprehensive plan
for monitoring its strategy. The development of the latter was a condition for Tanzania to qualify for the Heavily Indebted Poor Country process, which Evans and van Diesen (2002) believe was a key motivation for the government to develop the MKUKUTA monitoring system. The allocation within the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF), a three-year government budget, of the government’s own funds to the MKUKUTA monitoring system was another first (Evans and van Diesen, 2002).

A number of regular products are generated from the MKUKUTA monitoring processes including an annual implementation report, policy briefs to parliament, an annual people’s perceptions report on MKUKUTA implementation, and national annual surveys (URT, 2006). The annual review is expected to draw on performance reviews of ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs) and local government authorities (LGAs) produced as part of the government’s second M&E system and ‘aims to stimulate dialogue on key issues, and inform subsequent planning, budgeting and implementation’ (URT, 2007: 7).

The second component of the government’s M&E system is at the level of MDAs and LGAs. All MDAs and LGAs develop three-year strategic plans and annual action plans (and budgets) consisting of objectives, inputs, activities and outputs. Through these strategic plans, MKUKUTA outcomes are translated into short-term

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30 The Heavily Indebted Poor Country program was established by the International Monetary Union and World Bank in 1996 to assist poor countries to reduce their debt burdens. Assistance was conditional on developing country governments meeting particular performance targets (International Monetary Fund, 2010).

31 The MDA structure of the government can be seen as a product of the implementation of new public management in Tanzania. Ministries consist of departments and oversight executive agencies. The establishment of executive agencies aims to increase managerial autonomy yet maintains government control of profit-making organisations that provide public services for a fee. Whereas a Ministry is a policy making body the executive agency sells public services. See Caulfield (2002) for further information.

32 Monitoring and evaluation systems also exist for the major reforms although these could be seen as temporary in nature since the reform programs in themselves are expected to end at some point. Currently, the reform monitoring and evaluation systems are not well integrated into the MDA monitoring and evaluation system.
organisational-level outcomes and outputs with performance indicators. Each strategic plan is supported by a three-year MTEF that acts as the government’s expenditure management tool so that individual MDAs and LGAs are combined to present a whole-of-government budget for development and recurrent activities (Fölscher, 2008). In 2007, central government reform programs for public sector and financial management reforms, which had a separate strategic planning and MTEF process, were integrated into the MDA and LGA planning, budgeting and reporting system (Fölscher, 2008). The revised system was expected to strengthen the links between the MKUKUTA, MTEF and strategic plans and consequently improve the ‘focus on results, improve decision making, strengthen internal and external accountability and improve the allocation and prioritisation of limited resources’ (URT, 2007: 4).

Once budgets and plans are approved, MDAs and LGAs are to submit quarterly and annual progress reports and three-year outcome reports to the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs (or parent ministries in the case of executive agencies and other public institutions) (URT, 2007). A number of management information systems have been developed to support the planning, budgeting, monitoring and reporting systems. These include a budgeting database for national-level MDAs, a national-level financial management system and one at local government level, a stand-alone database to track MKUKUTA indicators, and a planning database for local government (Fölscher, 2008).

In Tanzania the decisions to adopt the M&E systems described above were undertaken by key influential individuals within the government, particularly central agencies such as the Ministry of Finance and previous Ministry of Planning. Following the authoritative decisions made by only a few people, all MDAs were

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33 The development of MDA planning, budgeting and reporting systems are supported by the Public Sector Reform Program led by the President’s Office-Public Sector Management (PO-PSM) whereas the LGA systems are supported by the Local Government Reform Program led by the Prime Minister’s Office – Regional and Local Government. Financial management reforms are supported by the Public Financial Management Reform Program led by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs.
expected to comply. However, although MDAs did not necessarily have a voice in this decision (and it may have been impossible for all MDAs to have a say, in practical terms), they have a significant influence over whether or not M&E is adopted successfully.

8.2 The current state of monitoring and evaluation systems

8.2.1 Permanence

The Government of Tanzania can be described as resource constrained with a high dependence on aid (D004) in both financial and human resource terms. Into this environment, M&E systems have been introduced with a breadth and complexity that is overstretching the government’s implementation capacity. Most of the funding for these systems comes from donors. One interviewee estimated that 90% of the costs of the MKUKUTA monitoring system come from donors and felt the implementation of the new Tanzanian Statistical Master Plan would also rely heavily on donor funding (D005). This situation raises a fundamental concern about sustainability (URT, 2007a; Evans and van Diesen, 2002; O’Brien and Lundgren, 2008).

Government leadership of the MKUKUTA monitoring system has been weak, with limited financial resources committed to it, and a tendency to shift responsibility for implementation between various MDAs. MKUKUTA technical working groups,

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34 The Tanzanian Statistical Master Plan aims to ‘provide strategic directions and appropriate mechanisms for guiding and accelerating the development of sustainable statistical capacity and promote evidence-based policy formulation, planning and decision-making in support of the national, regional and international development agenda in pursuit of better development outcomes.’ It provides a framework for ‘advocating for statistics, assessing and meeting user needs, building capacity at all levels (with added focus on sectors), enhancing data quality, and, for mobilizing and leveraging resources (both national and international)’ (URT, 2011).

35 Van Diesen et al. (2009) note the annual budget for the MKUKUTA monitoring system has been considerable. In 2001–02, the budget was approximately US$1.7 million and rose to US$4.7 million in 2007–08. However, expenditure has been somewhat less than the budget. For instance, in 2007–08, expenditure was only 70% of the budget. While it was expected that the government would over time increase its contribution this has not eventuated and in 2009–10 has only allocated US$200,000.
which support information and analytical processes, are also not functioning. Members of these groups see their role as advisors rather than doers (IMF, 2008). Progress in implementing the MDA-level M&E system has also been slower than expected (World Bank, 2007; Morgan and Baser, 2005; Rønsholt et al., 2003), indicating that the principles underpinning performance improvement and management have ‘yet to be appreciated, internalised and institutionalised’ (Rønsholt et al., 2003: 45). Donors further subsidise the maintenance and development of M&E activities at the MDA and LGA level through various reform programs.

Responsibilities for M&E within MDAs still seem confused. For instance, Interviewee G024 stated that policy and planning units were responsible for the coordination of M&E while other divisions were responsible for M&E in their particular areas of specialisation. In comparison, a review of the MKUKUTA monitoring system in 2010 noted that M&E responsibility rests with the MDA policy and planning units, which are mainly staffed with economists (van Diesen et al., 2010). M&E staff in policy and planning units often do not have specific training in M&E and, even if they do, they tend not to transfer such knowledge and skills to the workplace so that organisational capacity improves (van Diesen et al., 2010). A further limiting factor is that conceptual and analytical skills, even among professionals, tend to be weak in Tanzania, a result of a poor-quality education system that is based around learning by rote (G014, DP025). Typically staff with M&E responsibilities are under pressure because they perform these responsibilities alongside several tasks and often M&E is not their primary job. Some technical staff believe that technical expertise is needed to monitor and evaluate technical issues and therefore do not find M&E staff credible. Productivity is also impacted by staff absences due to illness and participation in capacity development activities and low work output (Techtop and K2, 2007). Organisational leadership, interest in learning and the attitude of public servants affect whether or not knowledge and skills are learned and applied in the workplace (DP013). In light of the quote cited by Kelsall (2008) in the previous
chapter, ‘you pretend to pay me, and I pretend to work for you’, it might be suggested that if public servants are only pretending to work then they may also be pretending to learn. Therefore capacity development efforts may have limited effect.

Competition for limited resources presents challenges for developing M&E capacity (DP009; G021; G022; G023) and may limit opportunities for achieving organisational change. Interviewee G022 illustrated this point with the following example: While attempts were being made to better coordinate M&E, including restructuring some parts of the organisation to achieve this, the territorial behaviour of some staff undermined achievements within the ministry. Some areas of the ministry were seen as better funded than others because they had access to donor funds under reform or sector programs. The less well-resourced areas were those that received government funding only. Given the general scarcity of funds in the ministry, the better-funded areas did ‘not want to share’ (G022) with less well-funded areas for the benefit of the wider organisation. One interviewee (G021) estimated that perhaps only five per cent of her ministry’s budget was allocated for M&E, which she suggested was insufficient.\(^{36}\) It may also be the case in Tanzania, however, that limited resources assigned for M&E are diverted to other activities.

Weak government leadership of an unaffordable system raises broader concerns about how genuinely the government owns its M&E systems and what the real motivations are for implementing M&E reforms. However, after a decade (2000 - 2010) the two components of the government’s M&E are yet to be fully integrated and linkages between remain unclear.

### 8.2.2 Integration and cohesiveness

Within the Government of Tanzania, poor coordination, unclear mandates and responsibilities across different parts of government could be argued to have

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\(^{36}\) In comparison, Owen and Rogers (2006) suggest that between 10—15% of a program’s budget should be allocated to monitoring and evaluation.
negatively affected the adoption of M&E and other systems such as strategic planning and budgeting (World Bank, 2007). Interviewees from donor organisations noted that coordination and communication across government, as well as between government and donors, was a challenge to developing M&E capacity. The low level of trust in Tanzanian society more broadly (DP009; DP012; G018; Hewitt et al., 2002) may also affect the development of connections and coordination. This situation negatively affects the adoption of innovations (Rogers, 2003).

Bedi et al. (2006) highlight that one of the greatest challenges in implementing successful M&E systems is the formal and informal systems, processes and procedures that bring M&E into a coherent connected framework. However, donors have, in part, contributed to the lack of integrated M&E systems by supporting the development of systems without adequately addressing potential links between them. The MKUKUTA and its monitoring systems emerged out of international agreements forged at United Nations conferences, such as the Millennium Development Goals, which is supported through the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The MDA monitoring system was developed since 2000 under the Public Sector Reform Program (PSRP), which is supported by the World Bank and United Kingdom’s Department for International Development. Hence, at the same time as organisational-level performance indicators are being championed by some ministries involved in the reform programs, other ministries are promoting national-level performance indicators (Fölscher, 2008).

Similarly, the MTEF system was developed under the Public Financial Management Reform Program. The lack of integration between different systems can be seen across a number of areas of public sector reforms. For instance, multiple management information systems established across government with various links

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37 Both the PSRP and Public Financial Management Reform programs aimed to improve the efficiency, transparency, accountability responsiveness of the public service. However, whereas the first focused on areas such as strategic planning, human resource management, monitoring and evaluation and records management (URT, 2008) the latter focused on financial related aspects and the two were not always closely aligned.
to strategic planning and budgeting databases, local government planning and financial management systems are, as described by Fölscher (2008), dysfunctional and provide contradictory information. While lessons on the need for integration of different systems are reported by the likes of Fölscher (2008), it seems that they are not necessarily being fully addressed. The implementation of the Tanzanian Statistical Master Plan (TSMP) was seen as a potential source of further incoherence and competition for limited resources. While interviewee D005 believed that donors would not allow the MKUKUTA system to ‘collapse’, she noted that donors were starting to move some of their funds away from this system to the newer TSMP system. Another interviewee (D006) suggested that the TSMP was instigated by a group of people who believed that better information was required. It might also be suggested that these people did not believe the MKUKUTA monitoring system was going to provide the information that they sought. While it was not known whether this group ‘had realised the value of information or felt pressure from donors’ (1006), it raises questions about how long monitoring systems will be supported by donors if they do not work, or if duplicate systems will be established in the event that the earlier initiative did not work.

However, the Government of Tanzania is also partly responsible for this situation. Bedi et al. (2006: 21) suggest that even if donors intended to create a coordinated and integrated system, MDAs also ‘defend their separate monitoring activities because these justify more staff and attract per diems and allotments to cover field expenses, which are an important source of civil service earnings’. Therefore, within an environment of limited resources and low government salaries, attempts to increase coherence and consistency may be undermined by public servants’ behaviour. Another possible explanation is that government may have too readily accepted the reform programs without a sufficient understanding of what it wanted to achieve through them. This ready acceptance may have been influenced by a view that the reforms must be beneficial to Tanzania because similar reforms had already been applied in neighbouring countries, such as Kenya, Uganda and
Zambia (Morgan and Baser, 2005); Tanzania’s general social/cultural practice of ‘accommodation’ (Chaligha et al., 2002); or to maintain relationships with donors who were supporting the introduction of different systems (Morgan and Baser, 2005).

The limited degree to which the two M&E systems are integrated may reflect the lack of a distinct epistemological basis to the government’s M&E approach, a criterion which Leeuw and Furubo (2008) see as important for such systems to function with a degree of permanence. The authors suggest that there ‘should be some agreement among the players involved about what they are actually doing and why they are doing it’ (ibid: 159). The type of knowledge desired from the system, such as what works or does not work in Tanzania, or procedural knowledge, is part of this. Interviewee G023 described the M&E system at the MDA level as partially implemented, highlighting that:

_We don’t have a comprehensive evaluation system ... [we] have just designed some forms. A monitoring and evaluation system is more – give some sort of information, what has been planned, implemented, results, impact. At the moment [the system only outlines we] ... planned this – spent this. Does not go to the extent to ask: is this what I was thinking of doing before? What results have been achieved? What is the impact of the intervention to the target group?_

Similarly, Interviewee G021 commented that their ministry was ‘providing tools for monitoring and evaluation but not doing ... questionnaires are not monitoring, not interviewing, not explanation. But we do analysis and report’.

This epistemological gap is perhaps the reason why one interviewee described a situation where at the local level there were ‘shopping lists’ of data rather than data being collected based on needs (D007, G017). Interviewee D002 also observed that people do not consider how information will be used when developing systems and tools to collect and analyse information. Since public servants do not think ‘this is
our long-term view, what we want to achieve and we need this information’ (DP010), creating a culture of data users was seen to be very difficult. If the knowledge required, and how this knowledge is to be used, was better defined then this may reduce the number of situations where data is collected without a clear understanding of how it will be used to inform decisions about plans, budgets and implementation. Booth (2005) makes the instructive point that evidence of where governments are using information generated by M&E to make better management and policy decisions is a far more compelling sign of government ownership than any espoused statements of support for M&E.

8.2.3 Information linked to decision making

Patton (1998) concludes there is little evidence from the international literature to demonstrate that M&E information is used instrumentally by governments to make decisions. Yet there is still some demand for information and analysis that M&E can deliver. In Tanzania, the strongest demand for information is external to the country from donors whose interests are in demonstrating development results. The existence of this external demand may be seen as a positive factor for increasing the sense of permanence of M&E systems. However, the external demand needs to be balanced otherwise it may undermine internal demand. Currently, there is limited demand for performance information within the Government of Tanzania and more broadly by parliament and civil society (Therkildsen, 2000; Booth, 2005; Evans and van Diesen, 2002). Interviewees commented that ‘nobody is demanding information’ (G014), ‘there is little demand for reports which provide substance’ (D001) and ‘parliament makes some noise but doesn’t do much’ (D005).

A large amount of data for the MKUKUTA monitoring system is collected as an end in itself rather than for the purpose of using the data to create information and knowledge to inform better management and policy decisions. While some MDAs and LGAs have developed outcome-focused plans, they still mainly continue to
monitor and report at an activity level, on inputs and physical implementation. Few evaluations are commissioned either at the MDA/LGA level (ITAD, 2005; Techtop and K2, 2007; Rønsholt et al., 2003; van Diesen et al., 2010) or under the MKUKUTA monitoring system (van Diesen et al., 2010). Where evaluations or reviews are completed there are no repercussions in terms of performance management (DP008). Donors remain the main instigators of evaluations, often in the form of mid-term reviews or end-of-program evaluations that are conducted just for the reform programs (G014; G022). This analysis suggests that the government’s M&Es systems do not meet another of Leeuw and Furubo’s (2008) criteria for permanence. This is the criterion that M&E activities are carried out on regular basis by a significant number of government institutions because they demand the information produced. At the moment in Tanzania, it would seem that there are only a few MDAs and LGAs are producing information and fewer demanding and using the information. Interviewee DP012 described the relationship between demand and use as ‘a chicken and egg situation’ asking, ‘what comes first: information supply or demand for information?’ At the institutional level, she asked how stakeholders could build domestic demand by the public or politicians so that the central government asked if MDAs were delivering on their responsibilities. Currently, donors are trying to trigger demand through supply-side strategies. They are promoting critical inquiry and discussion of government performance by increasing the supply of information and analysis and developing the capacity of non-government organisations to use this information to demand better services. While one interviewee (G014) felt there was an inadequate understanding of how to create or encourage demand, it seems that the issue at least is beginning to be recognised and discussed by donors and government (D002; D006).

Several factors can help explain why the limited connection between information and decision making may exist, including a fragmented policy-making process; information being viewed as having limited value for decision making; and weak transparency. These issues are discussed below.
Policy making and implementation in Tanzania is fragmented and weak. Poor links between information generated and decisions made is a reflection of a broader weakness in government to implement policy. The reality of a fragmented policy-making process conflicts with the rational, linear view on which key reforms are based. The linear view assumes that analysis is undertaken followed by decision made; goals set; policies, programs and projects implemented; and finally monitored and evaluated (Therkildsen, 2000). If a linear policy-making process does not exist, the integration of M&E may be more difficult. In a similar way, the fragmented policy process also means that policy makers do not view implementation or M&E as key concerns and implementers do not view policy making or M&E as their responsibility. Rather, policy makers and implementers have a functional view of their part of the policy-making cycle. These possible beliefs present a further challenge to the rational model of public sector policy and planning proposed under reform programs.

Low transparency of information in Tanzania also contributes to the situation described above. Information tends not to be shared within and between organisations and between the government and parliament, creating information asymmetries across the government system (D001; G014). Weak demand and use is influenced by the value placed on information including whether or not public servants can see a practical need for it (DP010; D007; D002; D006). While there is a perceived loosening of ‘siri kali’ or secret government, freedom of access to information remains a challenge as demonstrated by the very slow progress in enacting freedom of information legislation. This situation is hampered by unclear accountabilities, and hence public servants are uncertain about what information should be made available (DP012; G018). It is possibly also affected by the limited separation of the legislative power of parliament and the bureaucratic power of government, which constrain the demand and use of information (DP009). Two interviewees stated it was expected that reports would be produced to support politicians’ promises to deliver certain benefits, to show implementation was on
track or outcomes were being achieved, even if the data did not support such claims (G023; G021). Interviewees felt that no one pushes to question the report, to verify information or, if outcomes have not been achieved, force people to resign.38 Similarly, another interviewee (G014) described a situation where after analysis was completed at the request of donors, the MDA concerned did not want to share the information because it showed poor performance and highlighted particular factors contributing to the outcomes. The interviewee explained that the government ‘only wants scant information to go to donors’ since it is not confident of its work or the outcomes achieved. Therefore, MDAs hide information that indicates poor results, a process that can be repeated year after year. This implies that public servants are not optimistic that the reforms will realise the results donors expect and that some sort of sanction will be applied to them, either by donors, more senior public servants or politicians.

Rogers (2003) proposes that examining the characteristics of innovations and the contexts into which they are introduced can help us understand better issues to do with adoption. The following section (8.3) examines the characteristics of relative advantage, complexity, trialibility, compatibility and observability in relation to the Government of Tanzania context and expands on some of the issues discussed in this section.

8.3 Monitoring and evaluation as an innovation

Contemporary public sector M&E systems, such as those being implemented in the Government of Tanzania, aim to promote transparency; decision making based on evidence; vertical, horizontal and external accountability; and learning and feedback. To achieve all of these components, the following values are important:

38 Interestingly, one interviewee did not mention mechanisms relating to ministers being held to account through performance management processes.
clarity, specificity, being systematic, making assumptions explicit, and separating statements of fact from interpretations and judgments (Forss, 2002). Activities based on these values may be perceived as still being new in Tanzania, according to Rogers’ (2003) definition of newness: when an individual develops a perspective on an innovation and has adopted or rejected it. While the Government of Tanzania is persisting with the implementation of M&E systems, albeit slowly and largely pushed by donors, a decision on whether the government will fully adopt or reject these systems is still unclear. As interviewee D002 observed, there was not a culture of managing for development results within the government. The follow discussion provides some insights as to why this may be the case.

8.3.1 Relative advantage

The literature review highlighted that donors value M&E as they believe it generates information that can be used by government for a range of purposes. These include to decide future directions (World Bank, 2007); adapt programs to stay on course (Morra-Imas and Rist, 2006); and to help build sound governance with improved transparency, performance and accountability (Mackay, 2006). While these benefits are acknowledged in Tanzania, the primary benefit identified by donors and the government is M&E’s instrumental use, that is, information for decision making (World Bank, 1999, 2007; URT, 2005, 2007). As outlined above, the use of information in such a way is a distant aspiration. Significantly, possible negatives of M&E are not discussed in the World Bank and government documents on Tanzania.

Beliefs about monitoring and evaluation

Most interviewees felt M&E was important for the Government of Tanzania. Given the discussion above, it is not surprising that interviewees from donor organisations, non-government organisations or consultants might hold this view.

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39 The perceived benefits of monitoring and evaluation to public sector management in Tanzania are discussed in further detail in Chapter 9.
The interesting finding was that it is a view that is generally shared by public servant interviewees. Some public servants commented on the:

*Need to learn from past experience (G023)*

*Need for an effective feedback system to make adjustments. If you don’t, you can be in trouble. For instance the US is a good example currently – you could say they have not effectively monitored and therefore failed to capture imminent events. Monitoring is very crucial but at times it is taken for granted. Previously not many of us were aware that monitoring is an important element (G018).*

Interviewees from donor organisations felt M&E was important for the government because:

*It is something that helps [us] see a lot of waste from people’s efforts (D001).*

*They [the Government of Tanzania] need robust data and analytical capacity to make decisions. [In] environments which are more resource constrained information is even more important. In countries that have more resources, the impact of wrong decisions has less impact than when there are limited resources to go around (D004).*

In contrast, one Tanzanian interviewee (DP025) stood out for his position that M&E is not important for the government since the motivation for doing M&E is externally driven to please donor organisations. Rather, the interviewee felt that the government did not really care about the purpose or quality of M&E and ‘just wants to pass, get the box ticked’. Describing governments, donors and consultants as ‘an unholy alliance’, the interviewee also felt the independence of evaluations was questionable since government and donors had an incentive to ‘make things look good’ and consultants want further work.

Consistently, interviewees from all categories believed that public servants saw M&E in negative terms. M&E was equated with auditing (G016, G017). If public
servants provided information on what their organisation was doing they could ‘be in trouble’ (G017) since ‘people don’t understand that it [M&E] can be win-win’ (DP012). As a result public servants are fearful (DP009) and as their awareness increases, they become more uncertain about what will happen in the future. Public servants’ feelings were illustrated by interviewee DP012 who described the local government self-assessment process\(^4\) being viewed by local government officials as an ‘exam’ rather than as a process for reviewing and improving performance. Interestingly, one interviewee (D003) described public servants as being more fearful when evaluations involved independent evaluators – perhaps because independent evaluation is less open to government influence.

Since most public servants have been introduced to M&E through donor-funded programs it is not surprising that they view it as meeting external donor needs. Several interviewees (D005, DP012, G014, G019) commented that public servants saw M&E serving the purposes of donors rather than Tanzanians, that is it is done ‘not for me’ but for someone else (G020). M&E was described as something that was done ‘to Tanzanians’ (DP012) and was ‘like a watchdog’ (G019) to protect donors’ interest in finding out where the money was spent or had been misused (D005). Moreover, M&E was seen as additional work that should be performed by consultants (D005). Public servants were also perceived to pretend to be too busy to work with consultants, asking why they should be involved when there is no career path and if they will not receive additional payment (G014). However, this distinction between the work of consultants and that of public servants seems to extend beyond M&E tasks. For example, interviewee G014 pointed out that he doubted his organisation’s strategic plan would be finalised unless a consultant was contracted to complete the work.

Several factors may influence this perception that M&E is not the responsibility of public servants. One is that M&E is often not included in job descriptions (Techtop

\(^4\) Under the Local Government Reform Program, a process called organisational design and development was undertaken for each local government authority.)
and K2, 2007) although interview DP008 counteracted this conclusion noting that clear job descriptions had been developed. He stressed, though, that this initiative ‘didn’t go anywhere … I don’t know the reasons why not’. Another influence is that the government’s use of consultants to manage reform programs, which are the main source of M&E activities, has reinforced the view that it is not the core responsibility of public servants. A third factor is that public servants are not usually held accountable for undertaking new or different responsibilities, further supporting the perception that M&E is additional. Lastly, the low level of demand for M&E information by senior managers, parliament and civil society adds to the limited incentives public servants have to perform these activities. As discussed earlier, donors’ demand for information is unlikely to influence a change in behaviour. Effective change is more likely to be driven from internal demands.

Perceptions of the relative advantage of adopting an innovation are closely related to its compatibility with the norms and values of current political, social and cultural systems. An innovation perceived as consistent with the values of the existing social system has a higher likelihood of adoption and rapid diffusion (Rogers, 2003; Tetlock, 1992; Gelfand et al., 2004). The discussion below looks at the compatibility of M&E within the broad Tanzanian social and cultural context and the particular context of the Tanzanian public service. Some issues, such as transparency of information, have been highlighted earlier in this chapter.

8.3.2 Compatibility

There are few signs that the Tanzanian Government’s PSRP has considered the compatibility of M&E, and the public sector reforms more generally, with existing social, political and cultural systems (see documents by the World Bank (1999, 2008) or the government (URT, 2004, 2005, 2007, 2008)). Rather, the issue of compatibility was more likely to have been highlighted in academic articles. For

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41 Many of the consultants recruited have been career public servants who have taken leave without pay to be engaged as consultants on fixed term agreements
instance, Caulfield (2002) describes the potential disconnection between the culture of the centralised powerful bureaucracy of the Tanzanian state with that of the reforms, which are informed by a ‘liberal market type doctrine of decentralised fragmented bureaucracy’ (Caulfield, 2002: 210). The tensions that may be created due to this disconnection and its impact on the effectiveness of reforms is also noted (Therkildsen, 2000). The World Bank (2008) implicitly acknowledged compatibility issues when it noted that in phase 1 of the PSRP some MDAs were already implementing their own performance improvements and were reluctant to change their approach and adopt the PSM driven model as it ‘did not fit well with MDA expectations’ (World Bank, 2008: 12). However, MDAs expectations were not explained and therefore it is difficult to determine what the specific compatibility issues were.

The following discussion on compatibility is examined from the perspective of the two key purposes of M&E – accountability and learning. Interviewees were asked how they believed public servants understood accountability and learning.

**Understanding of accountability**

Generally, interviewees felt there was a good understanding of accountability among public servants, but that accountability to the public, the public service and to parliament was not practised within the government. Rather, accountability was upwards in government, to ‘your boss’ (D003; G014). Interviewee comments included:

*People don’t like to go and talk to people, [it is a] violation of ethics. If a subordinate talks to a person’s boss, it is a violation of ethics (G014).*

*You don’t speak; you don’t do unless the boss has demanded (D003).*

*People don’t question (DP011).*

Interviewee DP008 stressed that for accountability to exist within the public service, ‘someone would have to make a serious decision then there would be
conflict among colleagues. People would prefer to sidestep’. Rather, the approach that is taken is: ‘I cannot hold them to account, but I may be able to bend the rules to minimise the damage they cause’. This supports Kelsall’s (2008) point, outlined in the previous chapter, that Tanzanians are unwilling to sanction non-performance. In comparison, interviewee 1021 felt that some people understand their responsibilities citing an example where a taskforce was established to investigate the low quality of education outcomes in 2007.42

Reflecting on accountability at an institutional level, interviewee D006 stressed it was important not to assume the government’s first priority was to improve the welfare of its citizens. The alternative proposition put forward by the interviewee was that the government’s first priority was more likely to be to stay in power. In terms of accountability, the two priorities may be aligned, but not necessarily so. The interviewee suggested that if there was a balance between accountability and staying in power in Tanzania, then donors and development assistance would not be necessary. Interviewees D002 and D007 felt there was limited democratic pressure to hold the government to account given that for a long time the government did not have to be accountable to an electorate under a one-party state (D002; D007).

Several interviewees commented on the hierarchical and bureaucratic culture of the public service, describing the public service culture and wider Tanzanian culture respectively as:

- hard to break [since] if you speak out etc., then you are seen as an upstart ... upstaging the boss/supervisors and then there are strong sanctions if you try and do something differently (DP025); and
- respectful of authority, even if you think that authority is stealing from you (D002).

42 No information was provided as to whether the investigation resulted in any sanctions.
Similarly, interviewee G021 likened the public service culture to that of the parent–child relationship where children are not supposed to question their parents. Therefore, the hierarchical characteristics exist more broadly in the national culture and are not limited to the public service. The difficulty in changing culture was recognised by several interviewees. For instance, interviewees commented:

*The traditional kind of management is that managers know everything. They don’t know how to change, or how to cope or manage change (G014).*

*People are doing the same thing that they were doing years ago (G017).*

*Behavioural change is a gradual process that goes hand in hand with level of development and education (G020).*

In making a decision to change, public servants ask what is in it for them, since change creates winners and losers. If public servants felt they would lose too much they resisted change, with repercussions for organisational structure, roles and responsibilities (G024). As noted by Hyden and Mmuya (2008), cited in Chapter 7, capacity for development includes willingness and ability to change. At an individual level, it is perhaps useful to consider willingness and ability to change separately, although they are of course interlinked. Individuals may be willing or open to change but may not have the ability to change, as this often requires assimilation of new knowledge, skills and resources. Conversely, if individuals have the required knowledge, skills and resources but are not willing, then change will not take place. Therefore, in the context of the public service in Tanzania there may be more ‘laggards’ – traditionalists with unstable financial situations – than ‘innovators’, those who are more comfortable with new technology and uncertainty (Rogers, 2003).

Interviewees describe the dominant accountability relationship in the Government of Tanzania as a simple, hierarchical one of subordinates being accountable to superiors (Gelfand et al., 2004). While the reality is clearly more multidimensional and complex than this – Lawson and Rakner (2005) for instance caution that trying
to understand local accountability in Tanzania is ‘like nailing jelly to a wall’ – it has been argued earlier that the government still exercises authority from a centralised, hierarchical structure. M&E that aims to extend accountability beyond the government to encompass citizens, parliament and donors is clearly at odds with the way the Tanzanian Government works. Not surprisingly, public servants may feel conflict and tension trying to reconcile dominant norms of government operation with newer accountability structures and mechanisms that are slowly emerging.

Hofstede’s categorisation of Tanzanians as a more collectivist culture, which gives primacy to the goals and needs of the group over the individual (Hofstede, 1980; 1991), suggests another disjunction. M&E is often perceived to be more individually focused particularly when it is linked, as it is in the minds of several interviewees, with individual performance assessments. In an individualistically oriented culture, public servants might have less to lose by revealing information that is negative compared with a collectivist culture where revealing such information might threaten people with whom a public servant is socially enmeshed and obligated outside the workplace. In the latter situation, the public servant is conflicted and may be more likely to operate in the interests of the social group than the interests of the organisation.

Understanding of learning

Many interviewees felt that learning was a relatively new concept for public servants and that, as such, it may affect why lessons learned from reform programs are few. Interviewee D002 suggested that previously there was no expectation on public servants to learn so there was no frame of reference to discuss learning. However, he felt this situation was changing partly because, as another interviewee (G014) suggested, of the emphasis given by donors to learning on projects and programs. Despite this perceived change, interviewee G018 expressed concern that there were not enough lessons being systematically learned from implementing the
reform programs, which partly reflected the view that learning was something that happened automatically. Interviewee DP013 was sceptical about public servants’ interest in learning, arguing that public servants were at work to satisfy the requirements to be paid rather than to learn. Interviewee G022 also noted that while public servants understand they are being paid to come to work it is questionable about how much work they will, or are expected to, do.

Thus learning, similar to accountability, would seem to largely be an outcome desired by donors rather than the Government of Tanzania or public servants. Interviewee G014 commented that ‘learning organisations are not public institutions in Tanzania’, while interviewee D003 narrowly equated learning with training. However, interviewee DP025 suggested that learning could occur in two situations. The first situation is ‘if there is curious/enlightened leadership’ (which he felt was absent in Tanzania); the second situation is ‘when government was compelled to learn … through public pressure – this is the hard way of learning’. While this view purports public demand will influence learning in the public service, opinions on this matter were mixed. Interviewee G014 suggested public demand was limited, commenting that the ‘general public tend to give up, they push a bit then give up. Very few of the public are knowledgeable about what should be in place’. Links were made by some interviewees between limited accountability and low levels of learning. At a lower level, the translation of learning from a classroom or workshop situation to the workplace was viewed as suffering because there was ‘no accountability’ to put it into practice. As one public servant (G014) noted, short courses can provide exposure to change, but the leadership of an organisation needs to support trainees when they return to the workplace to realise change.

At a local government level, interviewee DP013 suggested that one of the reasons for limited learning was that there was limited space for learning due to there being many demands on people’s time. As a result, things continued to operate in a mechanical way. Citing her experience at national-level government, interview G023 supported this belief stating:
Learning – maybe people understand but it is at a low level. We are doing things as routine, repeating the same things; we don’t want to learn from past experiences. The question is – are we learning? We are not creative/innovative – no new ideas because we don’t want to learn. [We are] bogged down in regulations and policy.

However, one positive example of learning was highlighted in the documents reviewed. PO-PSM, the MDA managing the PSRP, found that creating space for learning enabled staff to learn new knowledge and skills and have time to practise them. This space, it was explained, helped stimulate change within the organisation (World Bank, 2008).

Carlsson and Engel (2002) note that mutual respect, being open to critical feedback, willingness to change, and understanding others’ perspectives are necessary for learning. These conditions are more likely to exist in non-bureaucratic organisations that support open communication and risk taking (Senge, 1990). Such organisational conditions do not exist in the Government of Tanzania. Beyond the public service, Tanzania’s political and societal habit of accommodation described earlier (Chaligha et al., 2002; Therkildsen, 2000) might also conflict with the open and critical generation and examination of information, which is the aim of M&E. Tanzanians, according to Kelsall (2008) and Chaligha et al. (2002), rarely question or express opinions and remain largely uncritical citizens.

However, the constraints described above may also be found in developed countries, although to a lesser degree. Donors’ ability to learn, and the challenges they face, are in certain respects similar to that of the Government of Tanzania. Cornwall et al. (2004), cited in Chapter 5, referred to how some donors’ organisational culture promoted competition and independence over teamwork and learning and gave importance to short-term priorities rather than longer-term learning. Interviewees also questioned the donors’ and public’s ability to learn. Interviewee DP025 likened donor staff to four-year-olds, referring to the average
length of time staff are posted to Tanzania and hence the length of time they have to learn about the country. Interviewee D004 highlights the challenge of working with donor officials who have limited understanding of Tanzania, describing a donor meeting where there were ‘many new faces so [we were] starting discussions again. In this context, you could ask how serious [are] donors committed to developing monitoring and evaluation capacity’.

8.3.3 Complexity

The complexity and comprehensiveness of the M&E systems being introduced to the government were raised by two interviewees. One (G015) emphasised that ‘it was difficult to do it all’ while another (D001) described the first PSRP as ‘ambitious’ in how it tried to introduce a complicated tool such as performance management to a public sector all at once when it was characterised by low base salaries and distorted incentive structures, such as allowances for attending training.

M&E requires new systems, knowledge and skills. Schick (2003: 10) points to the ‘endless arguing over what is an output and an outcome; whether a particular measure is an end outcome or an intermediate outcome; whether goals, objectives and targets mean the same things or are different’ in the performance management literature. These types of arguments may help to make M&E inaccessible to public servants and deter them from investing time and effort to improve their knowledge and skills, particularly if M&E is seen to have little relative advantage.43 In essence, many innovations are being introduced to the government concurrently and if two linked complex innovations are introduced this may further increase, or decrease, the rate of adoption of one or both of these innovations. The lack of integration of the government’s two M&E systems may also increase the perceived complexity of M&E.

43 The complexity may be increased if capacity development is to be monitored and evaluated since, as Morgan (2006) notes, capacity development lacks an accepted and tested theory, which may decrease people’s willingness to buy in to the concept.
However, some interviewees described ‘monitoring as easy while evaluation was hard’ (D003) or ‘too technical’ (G015), although this assessment does not seem to fit with the experience of the limited extent to which monitoring is being practised in Tanzania. Referring to the ministry where he worked, one public servant (G014) stated that directors ‘know’ and ‘appreciate’ M&E yet they do not ‘do it’. This situation was supported by interviewee G017. These perspectives imply that lack of knowledge about monitoring, at least, may not necessarily be the primary or key barrier to adoption. However, interviewee (G023) suggested that ‘If we understood M&E we would be doing it. Perhaps MDAs understand the importance of it but maybe they lack resources and skills on how to do it’. The depth of knowledge about monitoring may therefore be an influencing factor but so too is the depth to which M&E is valued. Interviewee G017 also felt it was possible to have greater influence where the geographical scope was smaller, for example in Zanzibar rather than on the mainland of Tanzania.

In this regard, it seems that Munduate and Bennebroek Gravenhorst’s (2003) distinction between public compliance and private acceptance of change is important to consider. As outlined in Chapter 3, public compliance to change may occur if there is surveillance or coercion. Yet neither is necessary if a person internalises the change as a result of feeling that the new beliefs and actions are correct, valid and desirable. Since public servants see M&E as a relative disadvantage, they are unlikely to develop capacity in it unless there is surveillance and coercion. This suggests that Kettl’s (2003) ‘make managers manage’ approach would provide the most realistic theory of change to achieve an increase in government monitoring and evaluation capacity.

8.3.4 Trialibility

The trial of an innovation allows adopters to experiment with an idea before they have to commit themselves fully to it. The ease at which an innovation can be
trialled affects the rate of adoption (Rogers, 2003; Boesen and Therkildsen, 2004; Kelsall, 2008).

The first phase of the PSRP was intended to be implemented incrementally in a few organisations before being expanded to other organisations. Whereas the original design outlined a process of piloting strategic planning and performance management across three MDAs, interviewee D001 noted the government decided to introduce the new processes to 10 MDAs before finally extending the changes to all MDAs. The reason for this rapid scaling up was that the government saw the amended approach as more ‘equitable’, an important social value in Tanzania dating back to Nyerere’s socialist post-independence regime. However, the concept of equality is somewhat contradictory when considered next to the description of the government as a hierarchical bureaucracy. It may be that organisational characteristics, such as resource availability and leadership, also affected the openness to trialling new ways of working. While not explicitly being promoted as trials, interviewee D002 noted that PSRP phase 2 is weighted towards supporting some MDAs where leadership has shown more support for reform.

Therkildsen (2000) also suggests that the pressure to reform, and the government’s accommodation of pressure from donors, may have influenced the limited use of small-scale trials to learn something about what works and why or to adapt innovations before being rolled out more fully. However, M&E could be seen as a package of innovations and therefore it could be possible to trial some components and not others. This may, in effect, be happening in Tanzania even though it was not necessarily the plan. The way in which M&E has been implemented suggests that monitoring has been separated from evaluation, such as the case with the MKUKUTA monitoring system, and monitoring is being trialled more than evaluation. However, the instigators of the monitoring trials are donors since they are the demanders of information and the principal funders of information production and analysis. Similarly, one donor interviewee (D002) suggested that the few evaluations being conducted were building knowledge for the donors rather
than the country. The fact that monitoring and/or evaluation are not being trialled by Tanzanians may negatively influence how rapidly Tanzanians adopt it.

In the same way that donors may act as surrogate accountability holders (Rubenstein, 2007), they may also act as surrogate holders of pilots. Similar to Rubenstein’s (2007) concerns that surrogates may not be authorised to act on behalf of principals or they may apply different standards and sanctions, donors as surrogate pilot holders may pilot innovations that are not considered by Tanzanians to be important.

8.3.5 Observability

Lastly, if an individual can observe an innovation and the results of its adoption by others, the likelihood of adoption increases (Rogers, 2003). M&E as an innovation is limited by the lack of observable evidence that M&E is used in an instrumental way for improved decision making and management, greater learning or improved policy or program performance (Sanderson, 2000; van Thiel and Leeuw, 2002).

However, some aspects of the government’s M&E systems could be considered more observable than others. For instance, databases have a physical and technological element to them that is observable. Similarly, reports produced from M&E information are tangible objects. These physical products may be why some interviewees described M&E being understood as reporting. Other aspects of M&E, such as accountability and learning, may be less tangible and more difficult to observe. Frink and Klimonski (2004) suggest that accountability is a state of mind derived from a state of affairs. M&E could also be perceived as a state of mind derived from a state of affairs. However, as interviewee DP012 notes, there is a chicken and egg situation. Does accountability and learning exist because there is a M&E system? Or do M&E systems exist because accountability and learning are desired?
8.4 Summary

The aim of this chapter was to understand better how context may have influenced the current state of the government’s M&E systems and capacity development efforts. The government’s progress in institutionalising two M&E systems has been slow and produced mixed outcomes. A number of notable hurdles have been highlighted, many of which are social, political and cultural rather than technical. Interviewees outlined advantages of M&E but did not believe that the majority of public servants saw advantages. While the government has signed up to a range of reforms, genuine ownership for M&E remains weak: the government has not clarified what information it wants and why; it has not strengthened, in practical terms, the links between the MKUKUTA and MDA systems; and the government’s demand and use for information is negligible. The principles on which the government’s M&E systems are founded do not seem to be strongly held principles underpinning the way the government in Tanzania works. M&E promotes transparency of information and vertical and horizontal accountability. Yet the government may be struggling to move beyond siri kali,\(^44\) and accountability to the public and parliament remains weak. M&E is based on the premise that better decisions can be made with information, and that learning what works and does not are valuable traits. Yet in the Government of Tanzania, information seems to be valued little; rather, it is perceived in negative terms and even feared. Learning how development might be better implemented does not seem to be a primary aim; the stronger driver of change for the government is staying in power. The intangible and complex terms and concepts of M&E appear to have affected its adoption. The more tangible aspects, such as reports and databases, are seen to be the elements that are more easily understood by public servants.

\(^{44}\text{Secret government}\)
This discussion has highlighted the importance of considering how context may influence monitoring and evaluation capacity development and how a lack of ‘fit’ between context and reforms may hinder the achievement of outcomes.

The following chapter (Chapter 9) uses data from the document analysis to examine how program designers, implementers and funders thought that monitoring and evaluation capacity would contribute to good public sector management. A belief that one will contribute to the other is driving efforts to develop M&E capacity. This discussion then lays a foundation for examining how program designers, implementers and funders thought M&E capacity development would be achieved, which is the subject of Chapter 10.
CHAPTER 9: DATA STORY 3 – MONITORING AND EVALUATION AND GOOD PUBLIC MANAGEMENT

Chapter 7 described the public sector context in Tanzania and Chapter 8 the current state of the Tanzanian Government’s M&E systems. In the discussion in Chapter 8 it is argued that outcomes of capacity development efforts can, in part, be understood by examining M&E as an innovation and the context where the innovation is being introduced. This chapter focuses on the actual practice of M&E in public sector management. Firstly, it examines how program funders, designers and implementers (as espoused in a selection of program documents from the Public Sector Reform Program (PSRP)) believed the operationalisation of M&E in ministries, departments and agencies (MDA) would contribute to good public management. These beliefs underpin the justification for efforts to develop M&E capacity. Secondly, the discussion examines two components of the government’s performance management system to understand what the government did to stimulate change (the implementation theory) and how it believed this would lead to change (the programmatic theory). This discussion reveals assumptions about how change would occur, the desired mechanisms that would be triggered so new behaviours would result and how context was taken into account. Confusing, partial and imprecise theories of change emerge. The mechanisms are summarised in Section 9.3 and include those that the program expected to trigger to achieve the desired outcomes. A number of other mechanisms are then identified, which it is argued, may better explain the actual outcomes achieved. Therefore, this chapter highlights, in particular, the mechanisms component of Pawson and Tilley’s (1997) context-mechanisms-outcomes framework.

45 The emerging theories seem equally applicable to the theories of change underlying the MKUKUTA monitoring system (see Chapter 8).
9.1 Emerging theory of change: Public Sector Reform Program

As outlined in the previous chapter, the development of MDA-level M&E capacity has been a focus of the Public Sector Reform Program (PSRP). While M&E capacity has also been developed in other programs, this chapter has focused on the efforts of the PSRP.

The original, high-level development objective of phase 1 of the PSRP was in line with the new public management approach outlined in Chapter 3. The objective was to ‘improve accountability, transparency and resource management for service delivery in the public service’ (World Bank, 2008: 3). The aim was to create ‘a new culture in public management practices ... and accountability for results will be the norm’ (World Bank, 1999: 45) so that the public service would be:

- more efficient, more accountable, better ‘governed’, more transparent and responsive, more meritocratic, more just and fair, more ethical and less corrupt (URT, 2008: 5);

and public servants would:

- serve customers with efficiency, effectiveness and a high standard of accountability, responsibility, courtesy and integrity (URT, 2007: 3).

In Pawson and Tilley’s (1997) context—mechanism—outcome model these behaviours form the ‘regular behaviours’ to be desired of public servants on the expectation that they will ultimately lead to improved service delivery.

Phase 1 thus presented a linear, almost mechanical, approach to change. The logic seems to be that a different bureaucratic rationality could be created by changing structures and systems, which in turn could alter accountabilities and incentives (World Bank, 2008). Changing attitudes and organisational cultures were seen to be of secondary importance and to be addressed only in the second phase of the program (Morgan and Baser, 2007). In the third phase, it was planned that MDAs
would learn the new systems and processes and adapt them to suit their own needs and priorities. Confidence in this linear theory of change appears stronger in the 1999 World Bank program design document than in the 2008 completion report when the World Bank commented:

In practice, MDA management support, new patterns of incentives for MDA staff, greater efforts to increase MDA demand, PO-PSM facilitation and importantly, the space for MDA staff to assimilate, practice and learn, all of these were required to help induce the necessary changes (World Bank, 2008: 22).

The PSRP included the implementation of a range of initiatives to achieve the outcomes around improved service delivery noted above. The program’s implementation theory consisted of implementation of a performance management system, which included strategic planning, M&E, a staff performance appraisal system, and client service charters. Each of these aspects of the performance management system was expected to contribute to the desired outcomes in different ways. The following discussion examines the emerging theories of change in relation to strategic planning, M&E and client service charters. These components were chosen because of their close ties to the MDA M&E system and, from a practical aspect, more detail is provided on them in documents analysed, allowing emerging theories to be more easily identified. Unfortunately, few theories of change directly relating to the MDA M&E system were found. This gap perhaps again highlights the weakness in the epistemological basis of the government’s approach to M&E noted in the previous chapter.

9.2 Emerging theory of change: performance management system

The introduction of a performance management system in all MDAs was expected to ‘re-professionalize the public service, improve its results orientation and make MDAs more accountable’ (World Bank, 2008: 12). Therefore, it is clearly linked to the overall outcomes of the PSRP. Kiragu (2005: 20) outlines the following assumptions:
MDAs will be held accountable for the implementation of their plans within budget through beneficiary surveys on the quality of service delivery and self-assessments by senior management teams. Citizens’ Charters define and publicise minimum service standards for each MDA. Every staff [member] will be held accountable for achieving their individual performance agreements, starting with the Permanent Secretary downwards.

9.2.1 Emerging implementation theories

The original PSRP implementation theory included strengthening the President’s Office-Public Sector Management’s leadership and management capacity to manage change and introduce components of the performance management system into MDAs (World Bank, 1999). As the Government of Tanzania (URT, 2008: ix) notes, ‘PO-PSM decided which reforms would be implemented, when, and by whom. PO-PSM managed most aspects of financial management and procurement’. The flow-on effect of this implementation theory was that MDAs were unable to connect their reform interventions, sector development plans and service delivery improvements (URT, 2008). While the earlier civil service reform program was managed by the Ministry of Finance, management accountability for PSRP phase 1 was given to the PO-PSM because, given that it was part of the President’s office, it was believed PO-PSM could provide the strategic management required, including of human resources (World Bank, 2008).

In phase 2, the intended role of PO-PSM changed. Instead of directing MDAs to implement reforms, its role became to act more as a facilitator responding to the MDAs’ demands for reform. While some reform components would continue to be supplied and driven by PO-PSM, MDAs were given responsibility for selecting reform components from a menu of reforms. This change to program implementation implies a change in the understanding of programmatic theories or how causative mechanisms were thought to work. In phase 1, the assumption seems to have been that if new systems and processes were supplied, then MDAs
would use them and service delivery would improve. In phase 2, the assumption changed to that if MDAs were given responsibility for choosing their own reforms then they would be motivated to implement new systems and processes and service delivery would consequently improve. However, the continuation of some supply-driven reforms in phase 2 confuses this theory of change.\footnote{This theory was also replicated in some interviewees’ comments. For instance, one public servant (I024) explained that the push strategy did not work for reforms and as such ‘M&E selection by MDAs is more voluntary’ under phase 2. Yet they then contradicted the earlier reform lessons by asserting that ‘in the next financial year, funds will be allocated by central Ministries to take care those MDAs that do not select the M&E from PSRP menu’.} It seems that some reform components such as leadership development, human resource plans and management information systems were considered to be too important to risk MDAs deciding not to implement them. By giving MDAs the freedom to choose some reform components, the assumption seems to be that MDAs will willingly also implement the supply-driven reforms. Another assumption was that systems and processes needed to be customised to the needs of each MDA (World Bank, 2007). This assumption reflects a change in the programmatic theory by acknowledging that systems need to be adapted to increase the chances that innovations will be adopted (Rogers, 2003). Some of the lessons learned in phase 1 supported the new approach in phase 2. In phase 1 some MDAs were already implementing their own performance improvements and were reluctant to change their approach and adopt the PO-PSM-driven model (World Bank, 2008). Inadvertently, phase 1 of PSRP seems to have stymied these reform efforts by pushing a standardised approach to the implementation of particular systems and processes, which resulted in resistance to change.

9.2.2 Emerging programmatic theories of change: Strategic planning and monitoring and evaluation

The inclusion of strategic planning and M&E as a way to improve MDAs’ outcome focus and accountability appears to be linked to the new institutional economics theory, premised on the notion that individuals are rational and make strategic
choices to achieve outcomes (Leftwich, 2007; Bossuyt, 2001). Strategic planning and its M&E was expected, firstly, to assist public sector managers in Tanzania to better manage limited public resources and, secondly, to ensure MDAs were held accountable for the implementation of their plans (Kiragu, 2005). Supporting strategic planning, M&E was to be a:

vehicle for learning and improving in addition to being an accountability means. The M&E system will provide appropriate checks and balances between the MDAs and civil society. In addition, to reinforce the M&E mechanisms, a Presidential Management Information System will be put in place (World Bank, 1999: 24).

The M&E component of the performance management system was also intended to produce performance reports, which would increase the public's access to information (URT, 2008).

There is a limited amount of information on the program's possible implementation theory in the documents analysed. Much of the programmatic theory about how the program was expected to bring about change, that is, the causal mechanisms of the capacity development strategies used, remains implicit or imprecise. However, a number of assumptions appear to have been made in the documents. These are:

- MDAs would develop strategic plans that were related to available budget envelopes. These plans would be based on a needs assessment and identification of the areas that were likely to produce the greatest return, or impact, on investment;
- Once MDAs had plans and funds, implementation would take place according to the schedule and budget;
- Although unclear, it seems logical to assume that MDAs were then expected to monitor and evaluate progress and outcomes and use this information to learn what was working and adapt plans as necessary;
• MDAs would also provide performance information to others, such as the Ministry of Finance, so they could be held accountable for results;
• These plans and reports would then be made accessible to the public. If the public had access to performance information it could hold MDAs accountable;
• Equally, if the President had information, it could be assumed that he was also expected to hold MDAs accountable;
• If plans were developed and implemented, and MDAs were held accountable, then organisational performance, including service delivery, would improve.

Largely, it appears that these propositions did not always eventuate as expected and therefore the capacity development strategies used (training, task-focused workshops, a performance incentive fund, and tools such as databases and manuals) were generally not effective in bringing about change. In practice, the MDAs implemented the new strategic planning methodology and tools with ‘varying speeds and levels of enthusiasm’ (World Bank, 2008: 12). MDAs have limited strategic planning capacity (URT, 2005), plans developed did not set new directions (URT, 2007b) and were not outcomes focused (ITAD, 2005). Performance information was not collected in a systematic way or shared with stakeholders as public servants believed that others did not have a right to know (ITAD, 2005), suggesting capacity development strategies were not effective in influencing behaviours related to transparency of information. While reporting remained sporadic and largely activity based there was also limited demand for performance reports (ITAD, 2005; Techtop and K2, 2007), again raising doubts about the veracity of the assumption that performance information would be demanded or used. The Ministry of Finance focused on expenditure reporting with little interest in performance reporting (ITAD, 2005) and reports do not specify what outputs were produced, rather ‘they beat around the bush’ and only comment on the amount of

47 Of the 34 MDAs, three had annual performance reports on their websites compared to the original target of 75% of MDAs.
money spent (Go17). Poor performance, including divergence from plans, was not sanctioned (URT, 2008) and even where information on the reforms was available to the public, the public did not hold the government to account (URT, 2007b). Planning based on needs assessments did not result in prioritised plans. For instance, in phase 2 when MDAs were able to select their own interventions, 45% of MDAs chose to implement further strategic planning interventions and 23% selected M&E improvements despite there still being a notable gap in performance\(^{48}\) (URT, 2008).

Therefore, while the performance management system was understood and objectives generally accepted by MDAs (URT, 2008) and public servants improved their knowledge and skills through participation in training workshops, process consulting and participatory activities (World Bank, 2007), this appears to have been insufficient to achieve the desired change. Overall, the government (URT, 2008) concluded there was no evidence to suggest that the components of the performance management systems were leading to improved decision making, prioritisation or accountability.

Little explanation is provided by the government as to why the assumptions outlined above did not lead to the desired changes and what other factors may have influenced the outcomes that resulted. However, the World Bank (2008) makes several observations. One is that PO-PSM’s adoption of M&E depended on whether it was accepted as a management tool, which did not happen. Another was that the existing lack of accountability, which the performance management system aimed to improve, also served to undermine the introduction of that system (URT, 2008). A final observation by the World Bank (2007) was that the environment was not an enabling one for achieving reforms. However, no

\(^{48}\) Of the 33 reform components assessed, strategic planning was ranked 14th and monitoring and evaluation 17th, using an impact-to-gap scale whereby the higher the ranking the greater the expected impact if the current gap was addressed. Yet on the list of MDAs’ choice of interventions, strategic planning was ranked as the 25th most popular and monitoring and evaluation the 21st most popular. Therefore, MDAs chose interventions relating to strategic planning and monitoring and evaluation over interventions in other areas that were expected to have a higher impact.
suggestions are made for how the implementation theory could be adapted to address the environment.

In reviewing the process for MDAs selecting their own reform components in phase 2, the government came up with insights that help explain why the above theory of change did not have the intended effect. The first insight was that MDAs’ identification of key organisational performance issues did not necessarily lead to prioritised plans (URT, 2008a). New performance issues tended not to be implemented if they contradicted previous management decisions and were supported by powerful, dominant individuals. The second insight was the approach of some MDAs to select reforms to ensure the available funding was distributed equally across departments rather than prioritise funding according to greatest need (URT, 2008a). Therefore, public servants made decisions on the basis of a different rationality to that on which the program theory had assumed they would operate (World Bank, 2008).

Several key elements of context identified in Chapter 8 that could have been taken into account in designing the PSRP. These include:

- The government’s fragmented policy-making process (Therkildsen, 2000);
- The low demand for information (Booth, 2005; Evans and van Diesen, 2002);
- The low transparency of information (D001; G014) and siri kali49 (DP012);
- That western concepts of accountability not able to be easily applied in Tanzania (Lawson and Rakner, 2005);
- The generally poor resource environment in Tanzania (Therkildsen, 2000; Lawson and Rakner, 2005).

Similarly, Weiss’ (2000) assertion that the effectiveness of incentive strategies, such as the performance incentive fund, are likely to be negatively affected if the institutional or organisational environment does not support change or encourage

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new ways of working seems to be relevant to understanding the outcomes described above.

9.2.3 Emerging programmatic theories of change: client service charters

It is possible to see some theories of accountability underpinning the discussions on client service charters, which were developed internally by MDAs to establish customer service standards. Some MDAs produced standards that were broad while other MDAs produced more specific standards. For example, public servants may have been expected to respond ‘promptly’ or to ‘process claims within seven days of receipt’. Public information campaigns, including official launches, press releases, and printing and dissemination of the charters, were also conducted to educate the public of their existence (URT, 2004).

Karigu (2005) notes the charters aimed to strengthen demand at the institutional level. The rationale was that the charters would contribute to public servants becoming customer focused, resulting in improved service delivery as organisations came under internal pressure to meet service delivery targets. The charters would be underpinned by M&E systems to monitor achievement of the standards (Karigu, 2005; URT, 2004). In a review of the client service charters, the government (URT, 2004: iii) noted that effective charters rely on ‘an attitude of governance where accountability and communication with clients is put at the forefront’.

In practice, MDAs have shown little ownership of the charters. During phase 1, management did not view the charters as a priority and MDAs did not monitor changes in client service. Some performance standards were weak in that the standard was set at the existing level of performance, partly as a result of MDAs not understanding what their current level of performance was. Monitoring changes in service was viewed as complicated and MDAs did not have systems and processes in place to undertake monitoring or to respond if performance did not reach the standards. The public remained largely unaware of its rights concerning service standards and was not encouraged to hold the government to account. There were
few improvements in the timeliness of service delivery over a four-year period after the charters were implemented (URT, 2004; World Bank, 2008). In 2008, when MDAs had the opportunity to select their own reforms, 23 MDAs reviewed their client service charters and complaints handling processes. The assessment showed that the need for improvements in each area were almost the same, yet only 13 MDAs chose to implement solutions to address issues with client service charters.

While the possible theories underpinning client service charters are only implicit in the documents reviewed, the development and implementation of client service charters seem to be based on the following assumptions:

- If MDAs were asked to set performance standards, they would set them higher than current levels of performance;
- Once performance standards were clearly articulated, public servants would feel obligated to try to meet them;
- MDAs would be motivated to monitor their performance against the standards;
- As performance was monitored, MDAs would be open to share this performance information with their clients;
- If clients were made aware of the standards of performance and knew that standards had not been met, they would complain to the MDA;
- If MDAs found their performance was not meeting the required standards, either through monitoring their own performance or through client complaints, they would be motivated by internal pressure to implement initiatives to improve performance.

Largely, these assumptions did not operate as intended. Therefore the two capacity development strategies of developing the charters and public awareness campaigns were ineffective in bringing about change. The incomplete introduction of client service charters does not appear to have changed public servants’ understanding of who they are accountable to, in this case their clients, and for what. The
development of standards appears to have been a process internal to the MDA and therefore cannot be considered a social and cultural construction between MDAs and their clients, as per Tetlock’s (1992) and Bovens’s (2005) descriptions of standards. Additionally, some of the standards set were not specific enough to allow clients, or even MDA managers, to determine if they had been reached. Even if MDAs had been willing to monitor and report on performance it appears that, at least, some did not have the capacity to do so. Likewise, MDAs often did not have the capacity to deal with clients over complaints or design and implement improvements. Sanctions, one of the three elements of accountability along with standards and information, are also missing from the pieces of theory found in the documents reviewed. It is not apparent from the documents who was holding the MDAs to account and how the MDAs would be held to account. It can be assumed from the actual outcomes described above that sanctions were not imposed on MDAs if they did not meet performance standards or, if sanctions were applied, they were not sufficient to change the behaviour of the MDAs.

In reflecting on Bossuyt’s (2001) approaches to institutional development, cited in Chapter 3, it seems that client charters are linked to the governance approach that is concerned with accountability, transparency, predictability and participation. However, the approach taken to client charters under PSRP seems to be missing key elements of an institutional development approach, including developing capacities in bargaining, mediation and consensus building. Therefore, the development of client service charters in isolation would seem to have little chance of creating an environment where stakeholders demand performance.

The government’s review of client service charters (URT, 2004) contains little description or analysis of the context in which the charters were introduced. It is also difficult to ascertain whether context was considered in other PSRP-related documents on client service charters. Key contextual issues that would seem to be worthy of consideration include:
• Conflict between concepts such as customer service, autonomy to make decisions and the norms of a centralised powerful bureaucracy (Caulfield, 2002; Lindemann and Putzel, 2008);

• Difficulty in applying the western concept of accountability to the different context of Tanzania (Lawson and Rakner, 2005);

• General unwillingness of Tanzanian public servants to let go of control (Hewitt et al., 2002) when this is required if the public is to be given influence over service delivery performance;

• The Tanzanian public’s general unwillingness and lack of experience in voicing independent opinions (Kelsall, 2008; Chaligha et al., 2002).

9.3 Possible mechanisms

The theories of change relating to the implementation of strategic planning, M&E and client service charters are largely implicit and present only partial and confusing pictures of how program designers and implementers perceive how change will occur. However, it seems that a number of mechanisms were expected to be triggered so that public servants would behave in a new way that would lead to the desired outcomes (Pawson and Tilley, 1997; Leeuw, 2003). These espoused mechanisms are summarised in Box 2.

Box 2: Espoused mechanisms

• The ‘let’s be rational’ mechanism: public sector managers assess their available resources and capacity and develop a strategic plan to increase their performance over the next period. They are rationally motivated to secure as many available resources as possible to implement their plans. This mechanism is also related to numbers 2 and 3 below.
The ‘public good’ mechanism: a) public sector managers want to ensure that quality services are delivered and therefore they want to learn what their current levels of performance are and how that affects the lives of Tanzanians; that is, for the public good. Armed with this information, policies and programs can be continuously improved to achieve better performance; b) public sector managers might want to reassure Tanzanians they are getting the services they are entitled to and therefore public sector managers use monitoring and evaluation information to show the public that performance standards are being met.

• The ‘organisational good’ mechanism: public servants want to ensure that their organisation is performing well and therefore they are motivated to improve their knowledge and skills to achieve this end.

• The ‘please the customer’ mechanism: public servants want to ensure customers are satisfied with the services delivered so they publish performance standards and their performance against them. Public servants are also responsive to complaints.

• The ‘avoid complaints’ mechanism: related to the ‘please the customer’ mechanism, public sector managers want to avoid public complaints about services and therefore they monitor performance so they can know if there are problems and address them accordingly before someone complains.

• The ‘avoid sanctions’ mechanism: public sector managers want to avoid possible sanctions for non-performance, so they monitor performance and take actions to mitigate the risk of being found to be non-performing.

• The ‘public pressure’ mechanism: the public may use available information to monitor the government’s performance and demand improvements if needed.

• The ‘I am better than you’ mechanism: public sector leaders want to be better than their contemporaries and so they compare their performance against them in order to prove to their customers that they are better.

• The ‘election/re-election’ mechanism: the President and politicians want to get elected/re-elected so they want to monitor their policies or programs to ensure they are achieving results for their constituents. If results are not being delivered,
However, a number of other mechanisms also seem to exist (Box 3) and these may more accurately reflect the mechanisms operating than those noted above. These draw on data presented to date (that is, the document analysis discussed in this chapter, the secondary data in Chapter 7, and with consideration of the literature covered in Chapters 3 and 5).

It is noted, however, that because the mechanisms are drawn from data provided by a small number of interviewees, they should be regarded as possibilities rather than absolute. Some of these possible mechanisms are drawn from data from multiple sources, that is from the literature review, secondary data and comments made by public servants, staff from donor organisations and development practitioners. In other cases, possible mechanisms are drawn from data from a more limited range of sources, that is only interviewees. Additionally, some mechanisms, such as the ‘I survive at work’, reflect the insights of one category of interviewee more than other categories of interviewees. None of these possible mechanisms were sighted significantly more than others that enable a prioritisation of mechanisms to be developed.

- The ‘political competition’ mechanism: The President and politicians want to demonstrate that their competitors’ policies and programs are not achieving results for their constituents.
- The ‘donor pressure’ mechanism: public servants (and politicians) want to ensure that they maintain adequate levels of donor funding for the government/ their organisation, so they are motivated to demonstrate outcomes, progress and challenges.

Politicians hold the public service accountable and demand improved performance.

- The ‘political competition’ mechanism: The President and politicians want to demonstrate that their competitors’ policies and programs are not achieving results for their constituents.
- The ‘donor pressure’ mechanism: public servants (and politicians) want to ensure that they maintain adequate levels of donor funding for the government/ their organisation, so they are motivated to demonstrate outcomes, progress and challenges.
Box 3: Other mechanisms

- The **alternative ‘let’s be rational’ mechanism**: public servants want to secure as many resources as possible in a limited resource environment so that they can use them to maintain and strengthen their security system and relationships. More resources may contribute to the power and influence of an organisation, division or individual (World Bank 2008; DP09; G021; G022; G023).

The **‘what’s in it for me’ mechanism**: public servants may be motivated to learn new knowledge and skills to help them secure another position, with increased remuneration, outside the public service or as a consultant to the public service. This mechanism may also arise in relation to resources such as computers where public servants are motivated by non-work benefits i.e. access to email. Similarly, if public servants perceived no personal benefits they are not motivated (as may happen when public servants believe M&E is not their responsibility) (D005; DP012; G014; G019; G020; G021).

- The **‘extended family / network good’ mechanism**: a) public sector managers want to ensure their main social network or ‘security system’ benefits so that relationship with it is maintained and strengthened; b) public sector managers might want to avoid collecting, analysing and reporting monitoring and evaluation information if it might damage relationships and ultimately decrease their personal social security (D003; DP008: DP011; G014; G021; Chabal, 2009; Lawson and Rakner, 2005).

- The **‘please the boss’ mechanism**: public servants want to ensure bosses are satisfied so they do not seek to highlight poor performance that may reflect negatively on their boss. Public servants may also determine that pleasing bosses by doing this may result in rewards such as bosses not insisting on higher levels of productivity (which may allow the individual to spend time on other non-work related activities) or nomination for workshops (which result in extra income) (DP025; G014; G021; G023; Kelsall, 2008).
This articulation of other mechanisms highlights more clearly how and why the principles of M&E, and also the broader public sector reforms, may not fit easily in the current Tanzanian public sector context and why barriers to the adoption of innovations may exist. For instance, M&E may be resisted and even feared by Tanzanian public servants because it is seen as a tool to highlight individual performance, particularly poor performance, the consequences of which could have damaging consequences such as creating tensions in an individual’s relationship with family or network members. Similarly, M&E also emphasises accountability to the public, yet this turns the hierarchical patron-client types of accountability relationships upside down which may also have negative consequences for an individual’s social security systems. Tanzania is a country in transition and one where it is difficult to determine the rules and norms that are guiding people’s actions. The inconsistency between loose and tight rules and norms, as discussed in Chapter 7, may create a public service in flux whereby the low alignment of the

- The ‘I survive at work’ mechanism: related to the ‘please the boss’ mechanism, public sector managers want to avoid complaints from bosses and therefore operate within a limited scope of functions doing only what they are told to do. This may be influenced by situations where standards of performance are unknown or unclear so public servants err on the side of caution (D002; D006; D007; DP010; DP012; Go18; Chaligha et al, 2003).

- The ‘stay in line’ mechanism: related to the above two additional mechanisms, public servants may stay ‘in line’ and not challenge those that are above them in the hierarchy (DP003; DP011; D002; G017; Chabal, 2009; Kelsall, 2008).

- The ‘I do nothing’ mechanism: uncertainty in a changing environment may make public servants fearful so rather than risking the possibility of acting in a way that might be new but could be seen by other as wrong, the tendency is to do nothing (D003; DP09; G017).
informal and formal rules results in actions that sometimes comply with the formal rules, and at other times, the informal rules. This situation may also make public servants fearful, motivating them to adopt the safest option of doing nothing (the ‘I do nothing’ mechanism).

The mechanisms identified may be able to be explained using social theories. For instance, theories of intrinsic motivation may underpin public servants’ behaviour to maintain extended family / networks since this is a more reliable safety-net than relying on others or the government. In comparison, social theories concerning extrinsic motivation may underpin other mechanisms, for example the ‘avoid sanctions’ mechanism whereby public servants are motivated by external forces, in this case bosses who may apply sanctions. The ‘I survive at work’ and alternative ‘let’s be rational’ mechanisms may be guided by social theories such as Maslow’s hierarchy of needs whereby certain needs, in this case financial, have to be secured before public servants can be concerned with other mechanisms such as ‘organisational good’, ‘public good’ or ‘please the customer’.

9.4 Summary

There is little discussion on the context for reform and how particular approaches to the implementation of the reform program are expected to achieve success in the Government of Tanzania and the broader Tanzanian context. In summary, the key assumptions underpinning the components of the PSRP reviewed are that information would be provided and used willingly by the public sector and public, the public service desired to provide the best public services possible under the constraints of a limited resource envelope, and the public service would want to please the public and respond to any concerns about performance.

These assumptions do not seem to have taken into account the fragmented policy making process, the low transparency of and demand for information, low accountability to the public and the centralised hierarchical public service. The characteristics of M&E as an innovation and the incompatibility of these with the
Tanzanian context seem to have been underestimated. This analysis suggests that although Chapter 4 highlighted a growing interest in context and tools such as political economy analysis, the level of interest is weaker than some academics suggest; that even where there is interest, donors, development practitioners and public servants find it difficult to take context into account; or that discussions on how to take context into account have been mainly undertaken at an academic level and have not yet filtered through to the practical design and implementation of development programs. The implication for development practice is significant, since it would seem likely that some of the strategies to bring about change may not have been attempted if context was placed more squarely in the centre stage.

The following chapter expands on the discussion presented here to examine emerging theories of change from the perspective of capacity development strategies.
The purpose of this chapter is to understand better what types of capacity development strategies are used and how they are expected to stimulate change. Building on the discussion in Chapter 9, this chapter examines the capacity development strategies being used to develop public sector, including monitoring and evaluation (M&E) capacity, and compares the types of strategies cited in key Public Sector Reform Program (PSRP) documents and by interviewees. The chapter secondly examines the emerging mechanisms and outcomes of the key capacity development strategies (including training; developing organisational systems, processes and tools; consultants as technical assistance). Therefore the focus is primarily on two of the three components of the context-mechanisms-outcomes framework although desired and actual outcomes are considered in light of the context described in Chapter 7. A number of mechanisms underpinning change efforts are discovered. Some of these are the same as those mechanisms identified in Chapter 9 while others are additional (see section 10.5). Where relevant, the discussion also makes reference to the emerging theories outlined in the preceding chapters.

50 These documents were three that were included in the document analysis: World Bank’s (1999b) Project Appraisal Document for the PSRP; the Tanzanian Government’s Medium Term Strategy for the second phase of this program (URT, 2007b); and a consultancy report that presents the findings of an assessment of the government’s M&E capacity (Techtop and K2, 2007). The Techtop and K2 report was selected because it was the only document specifically examining M&E capacity whereas the other two documents allowed for a comparison to be made between the planned strategies for phase 1 and 2 of the PSRP.
10.1 Types of capacity development strategies used

Boesen and Therkildsen’s (2004) model, outlined in Chapter 3, provides a framework for examining the capacity development strategies being used to bring about change in the Tanzanian public sector.

10.1.1 Document analysis: capacity development strategies used

The World Bank Project Appraisal Document (1999b) outlines a number of strategies that are categorised according to Boesen and Therkildsen’s framework (2004) in Table 9.

Table 9: Categorisation of capacity development strategies (World Bank, 1999)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predominantly functional approach</th>
<th>Predominantly political approach</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Internal elements</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Engage staff in structural changes</td>
<td>• Facilitate managers to harness opportunities arising from decentralisation and institutional pluralism developments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Reinforce structural changes through redefined roles with management processes</td>
<td>• Line managers will have greater autonomy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Abolish common cadre approach</td>
<td>• Restore merit principles and practices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• On-the-job training for managers in strategic planning</td>
<td>•</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Social pacts, service delivery surveys and benchmark</td>
<td>•</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>External elements</strong></td>
<td>• Political leadership in ministries sensitised to their role</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Performance budgeting</td>
<td>• Findings from service delivery surveys and benchmarking exercises reported to the leadership of the public service and stakeholders and action taken as necessary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Financial incentives</td>
<td>•</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is not always clear into which category the World Bank strategies may fall since they are not discussed in any depth or clearly articulated. For instance, the World Bank (1999a: 2) notes the PSRP will support reforms ‘by facilitating public service managers to harness the opportunities arising from the decentralization and
institutional pluralism developments’. It is unclear what this actually means although it may be related to Kettl’s (1997) ‘let managers manage’ approach. Likewise, financial incentives are noted as a strategy, but there is no explanation of how they would be applied and for whom, whether they were intended for individuals or organisations or both, and whether they would be provided by those internal to the organisation or by external sources.

In introducing client surveys and benchmarking, the World Bank (1999b) identifies elements that fall into each of the quadrants of Boesen and Therkildsen’s (2004) model but are closely interrelated. For instance, in the internal – predominantly functional quadrant, organisations are supposed to establish systems to carry out client surveys and benchmarking and share the information with external parties. The findings are intended to be used, the bank asserts, by stakeholders (who are undefined) and the leadership of the public service to take action putting pressure on the internal political dynamics, which will subsequently result in changes to the internal functional elements. Stakeholders in this instance could be interpreted as the public and media. Therefore, there is a clear link, or theory, between two quadrants of the model.

An assessment of the government’s M&E system proposed recommendations for how to improve capacity (Techtop and K2, 2007). The strategies recommended were:

- provide training workshops in data analysis, computer skills and project management;
- create a career path for monitoring and evaluating professionals in the public sector;
- recruit specialist M&E staff;
- use trained staff to do M&E;
- conduct awareness-raising workshops for managers;
• strengthen databases;
• develop a common monitoring system across ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs);
• change organisational structures; and
• complete strategic plans.

These strategies clearly fall within the predominantly functional – internal category whereby the focus is on capacity to do the job. The consultants’ analysis was narrower than that undertaken by the World Bank (1999b) eight years earlier.

The range of strategies outlined in the Government of Tanzania’s Medium Term Strategy for PSRP (phase 2) is broader than either of the first two documents. Many of these strategies were also applied in phase 1, some more successfully than others, although they were not specifically outlined in the World Bank Project Appraisal Document (1999b). Of the 28 strategies found in the Medium Term Strategy, approximately 50% fall within the internal – predominantly functional category. In 2007, there is a much heavier emphasis on the external – predominantly functional component and the accountability relationships with oversight bodies and the public. Additional strategies, not mentioned in the earlier World Bank document, include:

• strengthening oversight and compliance organisations;
• developing executive agency performance monitoring systems and an accountability framework; and
• establishing mechanisms for MDAs to inform citizens of their rights and of service performance and to improve feedback loops between the organisation and citizens and clients.

The earlier World Bank (1999) document appears to adhere more to Kettl’s (1997) ‘let managers manage’ approach whereas the 2007 Government of Tanzania strategy emphasises the ‘make managers manage’ approach (Table 10).
Table 10: Categorisation of capacity development strategies (URT, 2007b)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predominantly functional approach</th>
<th>Predominantly political approach</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Internal elements</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Do more business process re-engineering</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Revise client service charters</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Develop good practice tools</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Ethics awareness training</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Reform policy and regularity processes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Most reforms tailored for each MDA including M&amp;E processes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Information, education and communication</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Contract out more services</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Complaints handling process established</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Do another round of strategic plans</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Individual performance audit systems established</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Human resources compliance systems established</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Roll-out individual performance management system to all MDAs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Necessary pre-conditions (not stated) in place to change behaviour</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Create stronger incentives</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Improve use of sanctions and rewards in MDAs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Develop management standards</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Leadership development beyond training</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• President’s Office – Public Sector Management should not supply reforms (MDAs to lead their own reforms)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>External elements</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Link changes with expenditure reviews</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Strengthen Government of Tanzania oversight and compliance organisations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Develop framework for executive agency performance monitoring</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Develop accountability framework</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Accountability relationships held more directly to MDAs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• MDAs inform citizens of their rights and of service performance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Create and enhance channels for feedback from citizens and clients</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Empower civil society to access information and statistics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Increase pressure on public service to reform – non-government organisations to publicly assess the government’s performance/demand-driven accountability</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The increased focus on accountability in the Medium Term Strategy of the PSRP phase 2 is also found on the political side of the model. Strategies mentioned in the external – predominantly political quadrant are largely the same as those found in the World Bank document and relate to the public and stakeholders holding the government to account. However, there are a significant number of new strategies intended to change the internal political dynamics of MDAs, including establishing management standards, conducting leadership development beyond training, and letting MDA leaders lead their organisation’s reform agenda.

While the Medium Term Strategy (URT, 2007b) shows a more equal distribution of strategies across the four quadrants, the document does not present a theory of change along such lines as: ‘if MDAs provide information, the public will use it to put pressure on the organisation’s leaders and they will then be influenced to improve the internal functioning of the organisation’. Likewise, it is unclear how the demand for information is expected to put political pressure on MDA leaders and if the leaders will respond by improving the internal functioning of the organisation. An analysis of context is also largely absent from the Medium Term Strategy (URT, 2007b). Moreover, many capacity development strategies used in the first phase are to be used again in the second, although it is not explained why they are expected to be more successful on the second application.

In the three documents, the strategies listed are generally unspecific and frequently it is unclear why particular strategies are chosen, how they are thought to influence change and when they will be used with specific organisations or people. A comparison between the World Bank and government documents shows that the planned strategies changed somewhat over the eight-year period that separates the documents, with an increasing number of strategies falling within the two external quadrants (see Tables 8 and 9). This reflects a much greater emphasis in the government documents on accountability and a broadening of the types of strategies that aim to address accountability capacity.
Interestingly, the government identified a broader range of strategies than the consultants who looked specifically at M&E capacity development. If Boesen et al.’s (2004) argument that change requires a range of strategies to be pursued across all four quadrants is accepted, then Techtop and K2’s (2007) theory of change, which does not include strategies to address external and political dimensions of change, does not provide an effective approach. It is surprising that Techtop and K2’s report does not mention issues of context and politics on reform and capacity development as a complex multidimensional process, given that interest in these areas and recognition of their influence is growing. However, Techtop and K2’s findings do support arguments, highlighted earlier, that capacity development strategies largely address technical issues.

10.1.2 Strategies mentioned by interviewees

In total, 25 interviewees mentioned 15 different strategies. Table 11 lists the types of strategies and the number of times they were mentioned according to interviewee type.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Donor staff</th>
<th>Development Practitioners</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conducting training†</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Setting up/supporting university qualifications</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Providing technical assistance†</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing systems, processes, instruments and tools</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restructuring organisations, including establishment of M&amp;E units</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Providing equipment</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding surveys</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocating M&amp;E</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supporting change champions/agents</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Providing financial incentives, i.e. performance assessment framework</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conducting MDA staff and stakeholder meetings</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supporting professional organisations and networks</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supporting civil society, NGOs, media and parliament</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinating work between MDAs and across government</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Providing information and analysis</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>25</strong></td>
<td><strong>12</strong></td>
<td><strong>28</strong></td>
<td><strong>65</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Training includes academic study, short courses, workshops and on-the-job training.

2 Technical assistance, in this chapter, refers to consultants who may be used in a capacity development role or to complete particular tasks such as developing a policy. Technical assistance includes long- and short-term contracts with individuals and consultancy companies.

The most frequently cited strategies were training, and the development of systems, processes and tools to support M&E systems. Tools included client service charters, job descriptions, surveys, forms, assessments, management information systems and strategic plans. Within Boesen and Therkildsen’s (2004) model these strategies are categorised as internal – predominantly functional. Table 12 shows the categorisation of all strategies mentioned by interviewees.
Table 12: Overall capacity development strategies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Predominantly functional approach</th>
<th>Predominantly political approach</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Internal elements</strong></td>
<td>Training; organisational restructures; systems; processes, tools, equipment; technical assistance; funding survey production. Total = 43</td>
<td>Champions; performance assessment framework; advocacy; supporting networks / professional organisations. Total = 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>External elements</strong></td>
<td>Coordination through the Harmonisation Taskforce. Total =2</td>
<td>Supporting NGOs, media, parliament, civil society; providing information and analysis; staff and stakeholder meetings; developing or supporting university qualifications. Total =13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Internal – predominantly functional strategies were the most frequently cited (43/65) types of capacity development strategies across all categories of interviewees. A further 20% of strategies mentioned were categorised as external – predominantly political interventions. The most infrequent strategies mentioned were internal – predominantly political and external – predominantly functional interventions.

Government of Tanzania public servants were much more likely to pinpoint internal – predominantly functional strategies, although this was the most frequently cited category for all types of interviewees. Table 13 shows the different types of strategies mentioned according to the category of interviewee; that is, whether they were government, development practitioners, or staff from donor organisations. Based on the types of challenges noted by interviewees, the challenges listed in Table 13 were categorised as predominantly functional and predominantly political. Predominantly functional challenges included organisational structures (internal), systems and processes (internal), resources including budgets and equipment (internal), management and staff skills (internal),
legislation and policy (external), and coordination and communication across government and between government and donors (external). Predominantly political challenges included culture and attitude (internal), demand for and use of information (internal and external), and access to information (external).

Table 13: Capacity development strategies cited by interviewee type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Donor staff</th>
<th>Development Practitioners</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Internal – functional</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal – political</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External – functional</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External – political</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After internal – predominantly functional strategies, staff from donor organisations and development practitioners noted external – predominantly political strategies most frequently. It is perhaps not surprising that development practitioners, who included interviewees from NGOs, noted strategies that were external to the public service since these are more likely to relate to their own work, such as working with civil society to hold the government to account. The most prominent strategy targeting institutional change is donors’ efforts to support NGOs, the media, parliament and civil society, which particularly focuses on trying to bring about change in the formal and informal rules concerning accountability and transparency.

Most Government interviewees seemed to have a limited understanding of capacity development as it relates to institutional, organisational and individual change. These interviewees focused largely on strategies to develop individual skills and knowledge, such as training.⁵¹ They appeared to find it difficult to identify other

⁵¹ Hauck and Bana (2009) made a similar conclusion in a review of national technical assistance. They noted that most interviewees understood capacity development as the ‘the
strategies when asked directly although they often referred to other strategies during the course of the interviews. A few of the Tanzanian interviewees (largely those who work as consultants, public servants who have worked with consultants on the public sector reform programs, or people working in the non-government arena) had a broader understanding of capacity development. A comparison of the strategies above with possible strategies for developing M&E capacity (outlined in Annex B) shows that the Government of Tanzania has already tried to implement a substantial number of those available, with varying degrees of effort and success. However, a number do not seem to have been tried and these are marked with an asterix in the annex.

10.2 Challenges to developing monitoring and evaluation capacity

Examining perceptions about challenges to M&E capacity development assisted to reveal how people thought about barriers to change and how the use of particular strategies related to addressing particular barriers.

Interviewees cited a raft of challenges to developing M&E capacity across the government. One was the complexity and comprehensiveness of the M&E systems being introduced to the government. Two interviewees commented ‘it was difficult to do it all’ (G015) and ‘ambitious’ (D001) since M&E is a complex instrument introduced in an environment of low salaries and distorted incentive regimes, such as the number of allowances available to public servants (D001). Of the 59 challenges cited by interviewees, the most frequently mentioned was the individual skills of managers and staff, and secondly the demand, use and usefulness of information. Table 14 outlines the challenges cited by interviewee category.

---

enhancement of the capacity of individuals or teams which are part of the regular staff of an organisation. Capacity is then seen as the ability of staff to execute activities on their own once the time-bound provision of advice had ended. Capacity development activities can encompass training, individual counselling, advice provided to individuals or teams, or short-term technical inputs’ (Hauck and Bana 2009: 27).
Table 14: Challenges to developing monitoring and evaluation capacity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of challenges</th>
<th>Donor staff</th>
<th>Development Practitioners</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organisational structures</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislation and policy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Systems and processes, including human resources and management</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management and staff capacity (skills and knowledge)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordination and communication across government and between government and donors¹</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources including budgets and equipment</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demand, use, usefulness of information</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to information</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture and attitudes</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political resistance /interference</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>16</strong></td>
<td><strong>17</strong></td>
<td><strong>26</strong></td>
<td><strong>59</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ Included in this category is the short-term cycle of donor staff.

Internal predominantly—functional challenges were mentioned the most frequently. However, interviewees from the government were more likely to mention these types of challenges than either staff from donor organisations or development practitioners. Staff from donor organisations were the only interviewees to highlight external predominantly—functional challenges and overall mentioned functional challenges more than political ones. Development practitioners were more likely to note external predominantly—political challenges
followed by internal predominantly—functional ones. Table 15 and Figure 1 summarise this analysis of challenges.

**Table 15: Challenges cited by interviewee type**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Donor Staff</th>
<th>Development Practitioners</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Internal – Functional</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal – Political</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External – Functional</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External - Political</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>16</strong></td>
<td><strong>17</strong></td>
<td><strong>26</strong></td>
<td><strong>59</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 1: Challenges by internal/external and functional/political categories**

10.3 Comparing Challenges and Strategies

Interviewees mentioned proportionally fewer predominantly-political strategies than predominantly-political challenges. Figures 2 and 3 present the data from Tables 12 and 14 pictorially allowing for an easy comparison between the two pieces
of information. All interviewees, but particularly public servants, tended to emphasise internal predominantly—functional strategies suggesting that while political problems might be recognised functional solutions are used to address them. This interpretation is similar to that of other research cited in the literature review (such as Cammack, 2009) and the view of some interviewees who noted that the reform programs applied technical issues first, leaving the issue of changing mindsets till later and technical solutions were being thrown at political and institutional issues (DP012; DP025).

Figure 2: Capacity development challenges cited by interviewee category

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predominantly Functional Approach</th>
<th>Predominantly Political Approach</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>internal</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D31</td>
<td>D31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP41</td>
<td>DP12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G69</td>
<td>G11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>external</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D25</td>
<td>D12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP47</td>
<td>G20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The three types of interviewees are represented by different circles. The larger the circle the more frequently the challenge or strategy was mentioned. The blue ‘D’ circle refers to responses from staff from donor organisations; the green ‘DP’ circle refers to development practitioners; and the orange ‘G’ refers to Government of Tanzania public servants. The figures in each circle show the number of times different development challenges and strategies were mentioned by each of the three types of interviewees. The sizes of the circles are proportionate to the number of times the
A number of factors could explain this situation including:

- Staff from donor organisations, Government of Tanzania public servants and development practitioners may be guided by single-loop learning or thinking rather than examining problems and interventions more deeply;

- People may lack knowledge of the range of strategies available and circumstances when they may be effective and/or skills to address political challenges and/or willingness to work on challenges that are complex, sensitive and potentially risky;
• Staff from donor organisations and international development practitioners may find it difficult to understand the context, particularly the informal norms, and its potential influence on change and change processes. Similarly, public servants may be unaware of the nuances of the social, economic, political and cultural context they operate within and how it affects change and capacity development interventions;

• Staff from donor organisations, and to some extent international development practitioners may be hesitant or unwilling to acknowledge and discuss the influence of political challenges due to: fears of being labelled colonialists; organisational mandates that are apolitical; and concerns that highlighting these issues will raise questions about why certain interventions are being supported. Public servants may be reluctant to address political challenges because of they fear sanctions from political leaders and more senior public servants.

Responses may also reflect where different people think they can influence change the most. For instance, staff from donor organisations may feel that it is difficult to influence internal predominantly political challenges and it is easier to support the media, civil society and parliamentarians to address external predominantly political challenges. Some responses may reflect professional interests and areas of work. For instance, in relation to monitoring and evaluation capacity development, NGOs largely work in the external predominantly-political realm trying to strengthen civil society participation and democracy as part of the institutional accountability system.

10.4 Emerging theories of change

Pawson and Tilley (1997) outline three components to theories of change – context, mechanisms and outcomes. This section considers each of these as they relate to the most commonly referenced capacity development strategies. The data collection processes sought to identify what strategies work, or do not work, or how they work in the context of the Tanzanian public service. The document
analysis provided few insights into the effectiveness of the strategies used, although the World Bank noted there was a need for a:

more comprehensive approach for effective and sustainable capacity building

... Capacity building requires a number of systemic and institutional changes to improve basic competencies, incentives and work environment of the public servants (1999b: 10).

The World Bank (1999b) raises the issue of lack of capacity numerous times, yet it is surprisingly unspecific about the capacities that are required. Rather, capacity gaps are defined in broad terms such as management, leadership, program management, policy making, M&E and implementation.

Few clear theories of change could be found for how different strategies are expected to contribute to the realisation of these capacities. However, since the diversity of strategies increased between 1999 and 2007 it may be assumed that the importance of more nuanced and diverse approaches to capacity development had been recognised. The lack of information and analysis on the effectiveness of capacity development strategies in the documents reviewed is not particularly unusual given the limited reference to context in the broader literature. Similarly, explanations offered by interviewees lacked depth when asked what strategies were successful, or not, and why. Rather than responding directly to these sets of questions, interviewees tended to mention the challenges in developing M&E capacity described above. It was unclear why the question was sidestepped: perhaps people did not know, did not want to say they did not know, or because it may raise further questions about why less successful strategies were still being pursued.

The way in which challenges to developing M&E capacity were talked about at such a generic level does not facilitate learning about what works and why. Two public servants commented that the Government of Tanzania has not ‘done any serious evaluation of the capacity we are developing’ (G020) and ‘The M&E of M&E
[interventions] is not very clear’ (G018). While interviewees were uncertain about whose responsibility it was to monitor and evaluate the development of M&E capacity, several possibilities were suggested such as oversight bodies of the National Audit Office, the President’s Office – Public Sector Management (PO–PSM), and outsourcing to research institutions.

Regardless of the limitations noted above, some interviewees provided their perceptions about the development of M&E capacities and the effectiveness of the strategies used. The general impression provided by interviewees is that progress is slow. Interviewees described progress as:

- not very fast (D002)
- inching forward (D004)
- not seeing much improvement (D005)
- painfully slow (DP008)

*Sustainability is not firm because the framework is weak. At higher level there is little demand for reports which provide substance (D001).*

However, lack of progress was not necessarily a consistent feature across the public service. As interviewee G018 noted, there was greater capacity in areas of government that had been receiving development assistance for some time and where donors demanded information, or reports, on progress. By comparison, in areas where development assistance was limited, there was less demand and subsequently less capacity. However, it was also suggested by other interviewees that while greater levels of M&E were occurring on projects and programs, it was project and program staff who were doing it rather than public servants (G014; G022), meaning that sustainable internal capacity may not be developing. This supports comments, highlighted in Chapter 8, where some interviewees felt that M&E was seen as consultants’ work rather than the responsibility of public servants.
It also supports the discussion in Section 10.3.3, below, which highlights that technical assistance is largely used to complete tasks rather than build capacity.

The following sections examine some of the emerging theories of change for key strategies mentioned.

10.4.1 Emerging theories of change: training

Under phase 1 of the PSRP, short-term and on-the-job training was used extensively\(^{52}\) to support the ‘installation’ of a range of systems including strategic planning, operational planning, M&E, and performance appraisals. M&E training took place in Tanzania, Kenya, the United Kingdom and Canada and was delivered by MDAs to their own staff, by PO–PSM to MDA staff in line with its role as the facilitator of the Public Sector Reform Program, or by external training providers contracted by MDAs (I008; G023).

Within PO–PSM, training aimed to develop program management skills as well as PO–PSM’s capacity to develop the capacity of others. The World Bank (1999b: 16) noted:

> Capacity gaps in CSD\(^{53}\) will be filled through short-term training, with an emphasis on on-the-job-training and contract employment of both local and international experts ... Through properly targeted training, CSD will develop sustainable capacity for strategic leadership and management of the reform program in the medium- to long-term.

Possible theories of change about training are not very clear, although in line with the discussion in the previous chapter it appears that a linear change process was expected. Through attending training workshops, public servants were expected to

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\(^{52}\) Under phase 1 over 7,000 public servants received training (URT, 2008). This is perhaps an insignificant number compared to the entire public service of over 250,000, yet the figure of 7,000 does not include the number of public servants trained under the other major reform programs, sector programs or development projects.

\(^{53}\) CSD refers to the Civil Service Department, which was renamed to become the President’s Office – Public Service Management (PO–PSM).
learn new knowledge and skills that they would then use to complete work tasks more effectively.\textsuperscript{54} Therefore, a change in individual capacity was assumed to lead to greater organisational capacity.

The government’s conclusions about training outcomes are somewhat mixed as revealed in a 2007 impact assessment of four training programs, conducted under the PSRP. A negative was the weak process for selection of participants. Almost half the people interviewed for the impact assessment noted that information from training needs analysis or the performance appraisal system had not been used to guide selection of participants and that age limits for participation had not been established. On the positive side, the assessment found that over 70\% of interviewees could correctly remember the areas trained. More than 80\% of trainees interviewed gave evidence of applying the new knowledge and skills to their work and 64\% of supervisors indicated new knowledge and skills were being applied (URT, 2008). However, at the same time, an assessment by the government concluded that the return on training and upgrading human resources in the form of improved job and institutional performance could not be determined and that M&E of training activities needed improvement (URT, 2007b).

The views of most interviewees reflected those of the government’s report (URT, 2007b) and not the more positive findings in the impact assessment (Techtop and K2, 2007). The majority interviewed felt training was not very effective in building capacity, being described as a ‘waste of time’ because workshops were not practical and did not deliver outputs (DP008); had ‘zero’ affect (DP008); and ‘for most training participants you can’t see any difference’ (D005). Therefore the linear change process from training to learning to organisational performance, described above, does not appear to have unfolded as intended on a regular basis. The

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\textsuperscript{54} For instance, different training workshops have focused on raising public servants’ awareness of the importance of data and the systems; the performance management system including its purpose and function; statistical literacy has focused on statistical analysis (how to calculate and interpret data); local and national planning processes and data; understanding what is monitoring and evaluation and assisting public servants to develop indicators for tracking the implementation of their outputs and objectives (I020, I024).
following two vignettes provide further insights into how realistic these assumptions may be and how effective training as a capacity development strategy may be.

Interviewee G021 noted that training was successful because the topic of the training (i.e. database management, internet and email) was seen to be of personal benefit to the participants. However, she also highlighted that in some circumstances even when the training was felt to be personally beneficial by trainees they gave the equipment, such as computers that were also supplied as part of the capacity development strategy, to other staff members, indicating the trainees did not value the training enough. Alternatively, equipment was sometimes taken by managers and this suggested that even though the managers let employees go on training, they did not value the addition of new knowledge, skills or equipment.

Another example is provided by interviewee G023, who described her experience in training public servants from MDAs to deliver training within their own organisation. It was assumed that MDAs would then have internal knowledge and skills to facilitate organisational processes, such as planning, and the quality and timeliness of processes would therefore improve. This approach seems to have an on-the-job training element to it since workshops were intended to generate a real organisational output, such as a strategic plan. However, it differs from on-the-job training because the training was still conducted in a workshop setting. The interviewee was also doubtful as to whether the trained trainers had actually facilitated workshops within their MDA since there was low management commitment to change and distrust of staff. Consequently, few opportunities were provided to trainers for them to demonstrate their skills. The lack of trust seemed in part to be influenced by the fact that the trainers were middle-level staff and were not considered credible by the would-be senior-level staff participants. Credibility issues arose because the trainers were more junior than the participants. Additionally, the interviewee thought that middle-level trainers were not confident
enough to facilitate discussions with, and potentially challenge, senior managers in their own organisations. To address some of these issues, trainers were taken to other MDAs to facilitate workshops. Since the trainer was not from that organisation, and was not tied into the organisational culture and hierarchical relationships, the trainers were given an opportunity by participants to facilitate workshops and, as such, were more confident and competent (Go23).

The first vignette seems to imply that trainees may be more motivated to learn when there are personal benefits rather than work-related benefits; that some tasks are not valued by participants and therefore equipment related to doing the task is passed on to others; or even if participants value the tasks and want the equipment to do tasks, managers may not value the task and may commandeer the equipment. This story might also suggest that trainees do not see M&E as their job, a belief mentioned by several interviewees and discussed in Chapter 8. That these situations arise also implies that public sector managers do not manage in a way to ensure new knowledge and skills are applied in the workplace, which in turn raises questions about the value given to M&E as a work function and the value given to accountability. The second vignette highlights contextual issues such as hierarchical organisational cultures and the roles particular people are expected to fulfil within the organisational hierarchy. As noted in Chapter 8, junior staff are not expected to speak unless spoken to (G014; D003; DP025). While there were few examples of successful training, interviewee Go17 felt there were greater benefits to be realised from on-the-job training. He commented ‘when we meet people in workshops they don’t understand everything; on-the-job training is practical’.

The following factors were also seen by interviewees as contributing to the ineffectiveness of M&E training:

- The generic nature of M&E training being delivered to public servants (DP008), which one interviewee described as shallow (Go23). Targeted training that related more directly to public servants’ job tasks, such as survey design, was
seen as perhaps a more useful approach since there could be more immediate application (DP008);

- The low educational levels of public servants;
- Staff turnover (G020) where one interviewee (G015) commented, ‘today we train; tomorrow people transfer, retire or resign’;
- When a notable number of participants in externally run courses were Tanzanian public servants. This was seen to limit the opportunity to influences the participants’ mind-sets (DP008);
- The low base level of public servants’ remuneration means that public servants are motivated to seek ways to supplement their income through means such as allowances\(^{55}\) and therefore are more interested in the location of the training or going to the field. Consequently, location is a greater motivator than the content of either training or the daily work tasks such as analysis, which is done at the home office (DP008; D005).

The above factors raise several issues about how training is thought to contribute to increased organisational performance. Issues include the value given to M&E; trainee selection decisions (i.e. those who are about to retire or be transferred or who have the capacity to learn); the suitability of the training to the capacity levels of trainees; whether workshops are designed as one-off events or part of an integrated learning strategy; incentive to learn and perverse incentives around allowances; and accountability for performance.

While the World Bank (1999) and government (URT, 2007b) present a linear path from a workshop to workplace it seems that the change process could be better described as a complex and interactive process. This may also highlight that mechanisms related to public and organisational good noted in the previous

---

\(^{55}\) As noted earlier in this thesis, sitting allowances are paid to public servants for attending meetings, conferences and training workshops, and per diems paid if public servants travel away from their home base for such events or for fieldwork.
chapter may not be triggered by training. However, this complexity and ineffective strategies were not necessarily recognised by interviewees. For instance, interviewee G015 noted her ministry had used training yet this strategy had not been successful. When asked what strategies the ministry intended to use in the future following this experience, the interviewee responded that they would do more training. The concept of changing the strategy to develop capacity if past experience was not successful did not seem to have been considered. This situation may also be tied to limited understanding of how capacity may develop and options for developing capacity.

10.4.2 Emerging theories of change: developing systems, processes, tools

The second most commonly mentioned strategy was the development of systems, processes, instruments and tools. This included the M&E processes and guidelines linked to MDA planning and budgeting cycles as well as management information systems for monitoring the MKUKUTA (the National Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy). Neither the documents analysed nor interviewees provide many insights into how the development of systems, processes and tools are expected to result in improved M&E. However, it can be assumed from discussions highlighted already in this thesis that public servants were expected to use the systems to record and report information and to follow the guidelines for completing strategic plans, M&E and reporting. Public servants are supposed to fill in the correct forms and submit reports at stipulated timeframes and according to a particular format. Management information systems are expected to make these processes more efficient and effective. Therefore, if public servants have the tools to do the job, they will do the job.

A number of challenges to this theory of change have already been highlighted in Chapters 8 and 9 and earlier in this chapter. In summary, public servants are not regularly using the systems, processes and tools that have been put in place. The presence of systems, processes and tools does not automatically lead to their use.
nor does individual knowledge and skills automatically lead to use of systems, processes and tools. Interviewee G024 noted that some databases were ‘generally not accepted or well received in MDAs. Most MDAs stopped using it immediately after installation’ and concluded that the ‘technology-based approach did not work’.

The lack of use was not necessarily seen as related to the inappropriateness or quality of the system or the process, although there were some concerns about quality; rather, other factors that could be described as people-related were seen as key. For instance, while the planning and reporting system (PlanRep), developed to support local government planning and reporting processes, was described as a ‘good instrument’ (DP013) the competition between different government organisations who had developed different systems was seen to undermine their effectiveness. Management information systems developed by more powerful MDAs were seen to take precedence over systems developed by less powerful MDAs (DP013). This issue was also raised in Chapter 8 in the discussion about the level of permanence of the current Government of Tanzania’s M&E systems.

Some interviewees also felt that management information systems had limited use since the data collected were largely ‘hardware’, such as the number of schools and teachers’ houses. Separate data, for example pass rates and teacher–pupil ratios, were not linked, hence the information was seen as being of little use (1012). This situation may also reflect the shopping lists of data that are collected as a result of the lack of epistemological perspective described in Chapter 8.

10.4.3 Emerging theories of change: consultants as technical assistance

Consultants were often used to develop the M&E systems, processes and tools referred to by interviewees and described in documents. In 1999, the World Bank (1999b) suggested that national and international consultants (technical assistance) would be recruited for: coordination, M&E, implementation studies, feasibility studies, procurement and contract management and the implementation of the
performance improvement model. Consultants were recruited as long-term assistance (e.g. working on one- or two-year contracts, working in the PO-PSM to complete tasks such as the development of guidelines, delivery of training and completion of progress reports) or short-term assistance to complete assessments, such as the planning and M&E assessments completed by Techtop and K2 (2007) and ITAD (2005).

Over the life of PSRP, some minor adaptations have been made to how consultants have been used presumably to improve effectiveness. For instance, interviewee (G023) noted that in the early stages of phase 1, short-term consultants worked with their ministry to develop systems and processes, yet when the consultants finished work, the ministry found that the knowledge and skills were also gone and it was not able to use the systems. As a consequence, the MDA changed its approach and contracted a long-term consultant to work with the ministry, although some challenges remained since public servants found it difficult to understand the consultant (G023). Despite this experience, the use of short-term consultants seems to be more prevalent on PSRP than long-term consultants.

In 2005 Morgan and Baser (2007) examined the capacity development approach of the PSRP and concluded that this was largely based on a theory of development performance (theory P) and as such consultants are used in the manner highlighted by interviewees and the World Bank. This contrasts to what Morgan and Baser call a theory of developing organisational capacity (theory C). Under theory P, consultants are used to complete tasks, or rather focus on producing products for change. Capacity development uses a direct rather than an indirect approach as outlined in Chapter 2 (Morgan and Baser, 2007). In comparison, technical assistance under theory C focuses on the process and facilitation of change so that others predominantly produce the products for change (Morgan and Baser, 2007). Table 16 outlines the differences between the two theories.
Table 16: Approaches to public sector reform in Tanzania

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aspects</th>
<th>Theory P</th>
<th>Theory C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Purpose</td>
<td>Maximising performance in terms of development results</td>
<td>Developing capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approach to capacity</td>
<td>Seen as a secondary means to support of performance ends</td>
<td>Seen as an end in itself</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>Top-down</td>
<td>Participatory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main focus</td>
<td>Structure and systems</td>
<td>Individual and collective skills, culture and mindset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning</td>
<td>Systematic and directed and solution-driven</td>
<td>Emergent and more incremental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Application</td>
<td>Standardised and uniform</td>
<td>Responsive and varied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation</td>
<td>Incentives lead</td>
<td>Incentives lag</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emphasis on learning and</td>
<td>Modest</td>
<td>Critical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>experiment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>Focuses on performance</td>
<td>Focuses on capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of consultants</td>
<td>Intensive and focused on task achievement</td>
<td>Less intensive and focused on process and facilitation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Morgan and Baser (2007: 20)

Since Morgan and Baser’s (2007) study there seems to be little change in the domination of the theory P approach. For instance, a review of PSRP progress reports in 2008 shows that technical assistance still appears to be task focused and employed to complete studies such as to improve central policy coordination, review management information systems, and establish a leadership development centre (URT, 2008a).

The World Bank (1999b and 2008) seems to assume that if consultants are used to produce products, thereby functioning in a way that substitutes a lack of capacity rather than developing capacity, MDAs will understand, accept and use them. No review of the effectiveness of consultants has been completed (Hauck and Bana, 2009) and little information is available in the World Bank documents (1999b, 2008) on how consultants were expected to influence change. However, from the information available it seems that consultants were expected to be change agents.
influencing public servants with their technical expertise. Yet it is difficult to more fully theorise about the theory of change underpinning the use of consultants in Tanzania and whether this was grounded in any of the theories of change outlined in Chapter 2. For instance, it is unclear if consultants were expected to disseminate new ideas slowly with the assumption that these would become common knowledge overtime or if they were supposed to bring about change more directly. It is also uncertain if consultants’ technical expertise was recognised and respected by their target audience and whether or not this respect was related to the value given to the innovation they were associated with introducing. Therefore, it is not possible to determine if the ‘logic of attraction’ and ‘public acceptance’ was operating as opposed to the ‘logic of replacement’ and ‘public compliance’.

While no explanations were found as to why theory P might be dominant, several possibilities may exist. Theory P may be the consequence of the focus on short term results, where getting the job done is more important than the process of developing capacity. Alternatively, it may be a continuation of the traditional approach to public sector reform and capacity development. However, the approach also appears to have influenced public servants’ perceptions that M&E is the responsibility of consultants.

10.4.4 Emerging theories of change: other strategies

Two other factors identified by many interviewees as influencing the development of M&E capacity were leadership and the performance assessment framework. These are discussed briefly below.

Leadership

Several interviewees highlighted the importance of leadership for M&E capacity development. Two examples are provided below.

a) Interviewee G021 felt that whether someone took leadership of M&E activities was dependent on whether they had a personal interest in it. Citing the
experience with her manager, her perception was that if senior public sector managers were interested in information, knowledge and research then they tended to be highly supportive of M&E.

b) Interviewee D001 suggested that having capable individuals to champion and take a leadership role over M&E was the key factor, noting that this was what was helping PO-PSM to develop monitoring and capacity in other MDAs. Similarly, the government’s harmonisation taskforce, consisting of representatives from key agencies, was seen as taking leadership by developing common guidelines for planning, budgeting, monitoring and reporting to overcome the multiple, conflicting systems in use across government. For interviewee D002 the fact the taskforce was ‘government inspired’ and led gave it a greater chance of influencing change, including by managing the competitive relationships between the MDAs. The experience, however, has been that implementation of the common guidelines has been slow challenging assumptions: either government leadership was not real or such leadership does not necessarily increase the chances of change.

The first example seems to align with the description of a champion (Rogers, 2003) who supports new ideas and overcomes apathy or resistance to change and whose effectiveness may depend on their status as a champion and whether or not M&E is seen as a high risk or expensive innovation.

It appears that members of the harmonisation taskforce were expected to act as opinion leaders, influencing others beliefs and practices through their technical capabilities and social and communication networks.56 Since opinion leaders mirror the opinions in the broader context (Rogers, 2003) and Tanzanian public servants are predominantly risk adverse (as argued in Chapter 7), the influence of the opinion leaders is more likely to be ‘slow and steady’ as opposed to transformational. This may account for the slow implementation of the new harmonised guidelines.

56 This role differs from that of champions described above and of change agents, which were similar to how consultants may be used.
Neither of these examples seems to be based on theories of change concerning public compliance or a ‘logic of replacement’ where leaders show people what to do and ensure they do it. Rather the theory of change seems more aligned with the ‘logic of attraction’ and public acceptance where leaders show others how to do something and people change because they are attracted to and value the change (Munduate and Bennebroek Gravenhorst, 2003). While there is a compliance element to the ‘logic of attraction’ theory—that is, leaders make sense of the change and assure their followers that compliance with the change is beneficial to them—this does not appear in the examples provided by interviewees. Given the slow progress in developing monitoring and evaluation capacity and the barriers to change discussed in Chapter 8, it could also be proposed that in Tanzania opinion leaders do not want to change and so are taking the option to keep things the same and assure public servants that the status quo is beneficial for them. If this is true, it might also be proposed that benefits, such as training allowances, which are intended to motivate people to change are actually used to ensure that things stay the same.

It is interesting that a possible mechanism related to the ‘logic of attraction’ or public acceptance arises here when accountability and compliance seems to have been a key theme running through other mechanisms.

The performance assessment framework

The performance assessment framework is part of an agreement between the Government of Tanzania and 14 donors that provide general budget support. It sets several annual performance targets across agreed areas. The government is required to achieve all targets before donors will deliver the full amount of budget support they have committed. If targets are not reached, donors are entitled to withhold part of their contribution to budget support. Therefore, the performance assessment framework seeks to act as a financial incentive for the government to achieve reform outcomes. Interviewees were generally sceptical about the
potential for the general budget support performance assessment framework to influence change.

Some interviewees described the framework in negative terms. Interviewee D004 described the action of withholding funding as ‘symbolism’; interviewee D002 felt the framework had not been a very effective incentive; and interviewee D006 attributed the development and measurement of performance indicators under the framework as contributing to a ‘deterioration of dialogue’ characterised by ‘lost substance’ in the relationship between donors and the government. Describing results-based management as ‘an insult to the process of development’, interviewee D006 also noted that assessing performance against the indicators was not always easy and different donors did not always have the same understanding of performance. The success of the framework as an incentive was questioned by one interviewee (D004) in noting that while donors would change their approach to address poor progress against target areas, the government did not necessarily make a corresponding change.

The effectiveness, therefore, of this financial incentive may be impacted negatively by a number of factors. This includes: an institutional environment that does not seem to support change (Weiss, 2000); whether public servants perceive donors as legitimate account holders (Rubenstein, 2007); public servants’ experience in being held to account through formal rules and rewards and sanctions; whether donors and the government has a consistent understanding of the purpose and use of the framework; and the meaningfulness of the sanction (if budget support is important to the government then decreasing budget support is a meaningful sanction). Effectiveness may also be influenced by whether the government believes that sanctions will be applied if targets are not met. These perceptions may be guided by the government’s understanding of international development agendas and debates (such as pressure to increase the amount of development assistance
globally) and donor policies and practices, including whether or not donors have applied sanctions before.\textsuperscript{57}

10.5 Additional mechanisms

A number of additional mechanisms have been brought to the surface during this chapter. Some of these mechanisms are the same as those outlined in Chapter 9. This includes the ‘organisational good’ mechanism that seems to underpin the espoused theory of change for training and the ‘let’s be rational’ mechanism that seems to underscore the use of performance incentive funds and frameworks. However, several additional mechanisms are also highlighted and are summarised in Box 4.

Box 4: Additional mechanisms

- The ‘follow the expert’ mechanism: public servants will follow the advice and emulate the performance of consultants.
- The ‘follow the rules’ mechanism: public servants will follow the rules if they are written down either because they believe it is right to follow them or because they are made to comply.
- The ‘mine is better than yours’ mechanism: public servants prefer those systems, processes and tools that have been developed by their own organisation than other organisations. Trust and status may be two related factors behind this mechanism. Donors may operate in similar ways.
- The ‘follow the leader’ mechanism: public servants are influenced by charismatic individuals and those whose opinions they value.

\textsuperscript{57} This is similar to Frink and Klimoski’s (2004) argument that proposes that M&E systems will contribute to improving accountability by how they are used not merely because they exist. The same sentiment seems to apply to other accountability tools.
10.6 Summary

A key finding of this chapter is that discussions on capacity development – what it means, how capacity is thought to develop and how particular strategies are expected to contribute to change – have been limited in Tanzania. However, it is possible to reveal some partial theories of change for key capacity development strategies emerge from the document analysis and interview data. Most of the theories of change that seem to underpin the key strategies follow an uncomplicated linear model of change. The majority of strategies cited in the documents analysed and by interviewees fell into the internal-predominantly functional category focusing on changing organisational structures, systems, processes and individual knowledge and skills with the aim of getting the job done. However, some changes in the types of strategies used over the last ten years (1999 – 2009) are noticeable. For instance, the second phase of the PSRP has seen a marked increase in the diversity of types of strategies planned, particularly external predominantly-political strategies relating to changing accountability relationships in Tanzania. While there appears to be a growing awareness of the political challenges to M&E capacity development, the majority of strategies cited by

- The ‘logic of attraction’ mechanism: public servants are attracted to the change as it fits with their values and beliefs.
- The ‘don’t dabble in the political’ mechanism: public servants, consultants and staff from donor organisations may be hesitant to address political issues due to fears of being labelled colonialists, organisational mandates and policies, or lack of knowledge about how to address political challenges.
- The ‘no, you won’t’ mechanism: even though formal accountability or performance systems and agreements exist, public servants (the account giver) do not believe sanctions will be applied because they have not been applied in the past.
interviewees were technical suggesting that the historical situation of addressing political problems with technical solutions may not have changed substantially.

Few evaluations of M&E capacity development interventions have been undertaken limiting the depth of knowledge about what strategies may work in what circumstances. Based on the document analysis and interviews, the theories of change underpinning key capacity development strategies (training, technical assistance, developing systems and processes) suggest a linear change process was expected. Similar to findings in the previous chapter, there is little discussion of context and how context may influence change processes, guide the use of particular strategies and influence their effectiveness in achieving the desired changes. The result appears to series of blueprint solutions being used and outcomes that were less than those desired.

This chapter is the final part of the data story. Different types or pieces of theories have been discussed in the data story chapters. The next, and final, chapter returns to the research questions, starting assertion and assumptions outlined in Chapter 6 and is an opportunity to sit key conclusions from Chapters 7-10 side-by-side to move towards the identifying the implications of the overall findings, interpretations and conclusions of this research.
CHAPTER 11: CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

In Chapter 1, the topic of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) capacity development was introduced against the back-drop of increasing pressure to demonstrate that development assistance is producing results. Twenty years ago this pressure was on international donor agencies from developed countries. Today the pressure is on both donors and developing country governments. International agreements, such as the Paris Declaration, determine that developing countries are to be more responsible and empowered to manage the design, implementation and M&E of the development assistance they receive. With this change in role comes greater pressure to be accountable and demonstrate results. As a consequence, donors have added M&E capacity to the long list of other capacities that the developing country governments are expected to rapidly acquire. As some commentators have observed: ‘donors want a lot, and they want it fast’ (Holvoet and Renard, 2006: 77). However, as this thesis has shown, capacity development is a messy and complex endeavour that often takes longer and achieves less than expected.

The purpose of this chapter is to pull together the different pieces and types of theories that have been identified and discussed in the data story chapters so that the implications for M&E capacity development in the Government of Tanzania can be highlighted and conclusions drawn. This chapter, firstly, draws conclusions addressing the research questions, the starting assertion and assumptions and which are outlined at the beginning of each section. Following this discussion, consideration is given to the practical implications of this research for what government and donors might do to further improve M&E capacity development. The intention is make practical suggestions that are relevant, in particular, for public sector M&E capacity development in Tanzania. However, the suggestions also have relevance for other public sector reform efforts in Tanzania and other developing countries. This research adds to the case study literature available on public sector
reform in Tanzania and more specifically on theories of change relating to capacity development. Secondly, the chapter revisits the theoretical basis of this thesis and reflects on the process of theorising about theories of change of M&E capacity development in the Tanzanian public service.

11.1 Returning to the research questions

Since 2000, progress in developing public sector M&E capacity is considered to have been slow, although there are reported pockets of greater capacity where demand (from donors) for M&E is higher, organisational leaders and staff are interested in M&E, and individual public servants see benefits in learning new M&E knowledge and skills (such as those who want to apply for consultancy jobs). However, few evaluations of capacity development interventions have been undertaken, which in itself, may be a significant indication that neither the government nor donors place as much importance to M&E capacity development as they claim. Currently, the sustainability of the Government’s M&E systems are threatened by: the high reliance on donor funds to keep them operational; the limited demand for and use of M&E information for decision making by parliamentarians, public service managers and citizens; and the still-weak links between the different data collection, analysis and reporting systems (including the MKUKUTA and MDA M&E systems). While high donor demand for M&E information is placing pressure on the limited capacity of the government, genuine commitment by the government to M&E still appears weak (Chapter 8). This imbalance potentially contributes to creating a situation of dysfunctional accountability characterised by proceduralism, politics of scandal and scapegoating.

These issues are addressed in relation to each of the research questions, assumptions and assertion made at the beginning of the research.
11.1.1 **Question 1: What theories of change underpin the Government of Tanzania’s and donors’ efforts to develop monitoring and evaluation capacity?**

No clear theory of change specific to developing M&E capacity could be revealed from the data analysed in this thesis. However, partial theories of change emerged in relation to: (1) how M&E would contribute to public sector management (Chapter 9); and (2) how particular strategies would contribute to increased M&E capacity (Chapter 10). These are discussed below.

**Monitoring and evaluation and good public management**

The partial theory of change (outcomes) espoused in World Bank (1999, 2007, 2008) and government (URT, 2007b) documents analysed (see Chapter 9) was that M&E is expected to contribute to improved public sector management by generating information on whether performance levels, against pre-determined standards, have been achieved. This information is expected to be used by public sector managers to improve policies, programs and operations. Within the public service, managers were expected to use the performance information to determine if rewards or sanctions should be applied, while outside the public service, parliamentarians and the public were expected to do the same in relation to the public service. The idea of strengthening vertical and horizontal accountability over a period of time was a key theme running through the emerging espoused theory about M&E’s contribution to good public sector management. In comparison, theories of change linking M&E to learning were infrequent, suggesting that more general ideas about organisational learning and learning organisations have not been introduced or taken hold in the Tanzanian public sector.

The analysis identified several theories for institutional development, that, although they may have been introduced at different times, exist concurrently thus creating a confusion of theories of change. For instance, the introduction of client service charters reflects the thinking of the ‘let managers manage’ approach from new
public management in the 1980s. The emphasis, and inclusion, of incentives corresponds with the rational choice theories underpinning the new institutional economics focus of the 1990s. The increased emphasis on accountability since 2000 matches the increasing trend towards rationalisation and measurement in public sector management as well as the ‘make managers manage’ approach. The more holistic, political economy approaches of the last few years exhibit the influence of the governance and systemic approaches in which the influence of politics, power and the context of development is seen as paramount. These emerging theories sometimes contradict each other as demonstrated by the incompatibility of ‘let managers manage’ – in which more trust is placed in public sector managers – and ‘make managers manage’ – where a less trusting, more cynical view is taken. Thus, the existence of concurrent theories may interfere with each other and result in the outcomes of neither being achieved (see Chapter 9).

The mechanisms that emerged through the document analysis (see Chapter 9), with consideration of the Government of Tanzania context (Chapter 7), might be considered part of the espoused theories of change and were based, in one way or another, on assumptions that change will be triggered by individuals’ motivation to use M&E systems. For instance, public servants will be motivated to use M&E systems to increase their own access to resources; to ensure that the public receives government services; and to ensure their organisation performs to the standards expected (and better than similar organisations) so that customers are satisfied, complaints avoided and they are personally rewarded and not sanctioned. Also, politicians are assumed to be motivated by wanting to be elected or re-elected by demonstrating to the voting public that they are performing well. It is assumed that both politicians and public servants have an interest in maintaining development assistance and will therefore be eager to demonstrate development outcomes. However, data from interviews (Chapter 8), other parts of the document analysis and secondary data (Chapter 7) shows that largely these mechanisms did not exist before M&E was introduced and did not develop through the capacity
development strategies used. There appears to be a naivety in how M&E capacity was expected to develop.

A number of other mechanisms also emerged (from both the secondary and interviewee data) that may have more significant affects (positive and negative) on M&E capacity development than those noted above. These also seem to be based on change being triggered through motivation. The data suggest that public servants might be motivated by mechanisms such as securing resources to maintain and strengthen their extended family and other networks (as these provide a form of social safety net) (Chapter 7); personal non-work benefits (e.g. access to email, low pressure for productive work outputs) (Chapter 7 and 9); and by avoiding behaviours that may potentially damage relationships and decrease their personal social security (e.g. sharing information that highlights poor performance, only doing what the boss says to do, not challenging or questioning the views of people higher up in the hierarchy, and doing nothing) (Chapter 8, Sections 8.3.1-2). Social theories relating to motivation may help to explain some of these mechanisms (UNDP, 2006). For example, theories of intrinsic motivation may underpin public servants’ behaviour to maintain extended family/networks. In comparison, social theories concerning extrinsic motivation may underpin mechanisms such as the motivation for public servants to keep their bosses satisfied and avoid sanctions. Motivation to secure a certain standard of living may be guided by social theories such as Maslow’s (1943) hierarchy of needs whereby certain needs, in this case financial, have to be secured before public servants are likely to be influenced by other mechanisms concerning organisational performance or customer satisfaction.

At times the mechanisms identified through the document analysis and the other mechanisms were congruent but at other times they were contradictory. For instance, a mechanism that emerged through the document analysis was that public servants would be intrinsically motivated to keep customers happy. This mechanism is based on the assumption that public servants would see this as the right thing to do (See Section 9.3). However, an additional mechanism suggests that
public servants may be more motivated to keep their family, extended networks and bosses happy. But can public servants meet the demands of both groups all the time? The findings suggest that who a public servant values more will guide who they try to satisfy first, but may also depend on the circumstances and how the individual concerned rationalises risks and benefits.

Strategies for developing monitoring and evaluation capacity

The document analysis in Chapter 10 suggested that particular capacity development strategies were expected to activate different mechanisms in different ways. For instance:

- Training was expected to generate new knowledge and skills in public servants, which they would then apply to improve organisational performance (Section 10.4.1).

- Consultants (technical assistance) were expected to develop systems, processes and organisational tools that public servants were then expected to use, applying their new knowledge and skills in order to achieve the objective of improved organisational performance (Section 10.4.2-3).

- Increasing the available financial and physical resources was expected to enable public servants to apply their new knowledge and skills to use the new systems, processes and tools (Section 10.4.2).

- Tying donor funding to performance was expected to motivate public sector organisations and individuals to achieve the performance standards set (Section 10.4.4).

- Government-led task forces were expected to increase the government ownership of reforms and influence public servants to adopt new systems, processes and tools (Section 10.4.4).

A number of additional mechanisms relating to the types of capacity development strategies used were also identified from the document analysis and interviews...
It seems that the World Bank (1999) expected that public servants would trust and value the technical expertise of consultants and subsequently follow and use the guidance, systems, processes and tools that consultants developed (regardless of whether or not the consultants worked in the public servants’ own organisation); and be influenced by champions or charismatic leaders whose opinions they valued. Further, it appears that some public servants were expected to be attracted to M&E by charismatic leaders, other opinion leaders and consultants supporting or developing such systems.

The emerging theories of change, and in particular the types of capacity development strategies used, suggest that the overarching theory of development is based on continuous, transactional, task-focused change; that is, small changes are assumed to accumulate and eventually what was once considered new ideas or practices will become common.\(^{58}\) The emerging theories of change (the contribution of M&E to public sector management and the strategies for developing M&E capacity) were largely linear and based on simple cause and effect logics. Interview, secondary and document analysis data highlighted a complex public sector environment and change processes that were significantly more complicated than the straight-forward process presented. Therefore, it seems that changes have been smaller and less accumulative than expected.

**Implementation theories**

Some implementation theories also revealed during the research, but some were contradictory and confused. For example, a key implementation theory used in phase 1 of the Public Sector Reform Program was that the President’s Office – Public Service Management (PO-PSM) would direct the reforms in other ministries, departments or agencies (MDAs) (Section 9.2.1). However, in phase 2 MDAs were given autonomy to decide some of the reforms they would implement but the responsibility for pushing other particularly important reforms remained with PO-

\(^{58}\) The Public Sector Reform Program’s three-phase implementation approach spread over 15 years is an example of a continuous, transactional task-focused approach to change.
PSM. The phase 2 strategy was a contradictory combination of the ‘let managers manage’ approach, underpinned by social theories concerning empowerment and autonomy for MDAs, as well as the ‘make managers manage’ approach with PO-PSM responsible for driving key reforms.

**Evaluation theories**

The evaluation aspect of M&E does not feature prominently in the M&E systems the government is developing. Again, the evaluation theories that could be brought to the surface were incomplete. For instance only the first two stages of Wholey's (2004) four stages of evaluation could be identified: performance monitoring for measuring performance against baselines; and rapid-feedback evaluations. The latter uses easy-to-obtain information for evaluations, which is evident in the approach taken in the mid-term reviews and end-of-program evaluations of public sector reform programs. These program evaluations also demonstrate Scriven's (1998) concepts of formative and summative evaluations, as they ask questions on the ‘what’ and ‘how’ as well as make judgements on worth and value. They do not ask ‘why’. The last two stages of Wholey’s four stages—evaluability assessments and intensive evaluations—are absent from the government system. From the analysis, it seems likely that the presence of these evaluation theories (formative and summative evaluations, performance monitoring and rapid-feedback evaluations) is not due to a conscious decision about what knowledge the government wanted, how it was going to use that knowledge and consideration of its own capacity. Rather, it was proposed in Chapter 8 that the government’s M&E systems lack a clear epistemological perspective, a situation to which different donor agendas and approaches may have contributed, and therefore the presence of these evaluation theories seems almost accidental.

Table 17 summarises the dominant emerging theories of change discussed above.
Table 17: Summary of dominant emerging theories of change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theory</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M&amp;E contributes to good public management, in particular public sector</td>
<td>M&amp;E contributes to good public management, in particular public sector accountability, by improving information and clarifying standards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>accountability, by improving information and clarifying standards.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanctions will be applied if poor performance is found.</td>
<td>Sanctions will be applied if poor performance is found.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public sector managers will improve organisational performance if they</td>
<td>Public sector managers will improve organisational performance if they are given autonomy.</td>
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<tr>
<td>are given autonomy.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public sector managers will improve organisational performance if</td>
<td>Public sector managers will improve organisational performance if controls are put in place.</td>
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<tr>
<td>controls are put in place.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public servants will be motivated by the increased availability of</td>
<td>Public servants will be motivated by the increased availability of organisational resources; a desire to improve individual and organisational</td>
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<tr>
<td>organisational resources; a desire to improve individual and</td>
<td>performance; obtaining access to resources; keeping the public happy; avoiding complaints from the public and/or bosses; and maintaining and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>organisational performance; obtaining access to resources; keeping</td>
<td>building relationships within the workplace and with extended family members.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the public happy; avoiding complaints from the public and/or bosses;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and maintaining and building relationships within the workplace and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>with extended family members.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politicians will be motivated by a desire to perform, avoiding</td>
<td>Politicians will be motivated by a desire to perform, avoiding complaints from the public and desire to maintain development assistance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>complaints from the public and desire to maintain development assistance.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training will improve individual knowledge and skills and subsequently</td>
<td>Training will improve individual knowledge and skills and subsequently organisational performance will improve.</td>
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<td>organisational performance will improve.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Systems, tools and procedures will be used by public servants.</td>
<td>Systems, tools and procedures will be used by public servants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance monitoring and targets will motivate public servants and</td>
<td>Performance monitoring and targets will motivate public servants and public sector organisations to improve their performance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>public sector organisations to improve their performance.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tying resources to performance targets will motivate public servants</td>
<td>Tying resources to performance targets will motivate public servants and public sector organisations to strive harder.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and public sector organisations to strive harder.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government-led initiatives will be more successful than donor-led</td>
<td>Government-led initiatives will be more successful than donor-led initiatives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>initiatives.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical assistance would be trusted and valued and hence be able to</td>
<td>Technical assistance would be trusted and valued and hence be able to influence public servants.</td>
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<tr>
<td>influence public servants.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuous, transactional task-focused changes that accumulate over</td>
<td>Continuous, transactional task-focused changes that accumulate over time will be successful.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>time will be successful.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
The theories of change that appear most strongly are those that relate to public sector and accountability, that is the use of standards and sanctions as factors to motivate public servants and public servants relationship with the public. Theories of change concerning training as a capacity development strategy were also a strong theme.

11.1.2 Question 2: What strategies are used to develop monitoring and evaluation capacity and how effective are they?

A wide range of strategies have been used to try to develop different types of public sector M&E capacity. Most strategies focus on improving the functional capacity of organisations and public servants to ensure public sector organisations ‘get the job done’. Functional capacity development strategies include the provision of financial, physical (equipment, buildings, technology) and human resources (consultants); individual knowledge and skills training; restructuring organisations; and developing organisational systems and processes. Individual training workshops and the development of guidelines and tools were strategies most often cited by interviewees (Section 10.1.2).

The types of strategies planned or used between 2000 and 2010 have diversified possibly as understandings of change processes have evolved (Section 10.1.1). For instance, the increasing importance given by donors to the accountability relationship of government to its citizens has influenced them to give more support to civil society organisations that are based outside the public sector but place pressure on it. Public servants tended to associate capacity development narrowly with individual knowledge and skills acquisition. This perception was reinforced by the government’s focus on strategies to improve knowledge and skills. However, the strategies used may also reflect single-loop thinking; lack of knowledge of change processes and/or capacity development strategies; lack of understanding of the context and how it influences capacity development; unwillingness or inability to address political challenges; where particular people think they can exert
influence and be successful; the focus of an individuals’ work area; and incentives such as allowances for attending workshops that may encourage the use of this type of strategy (Chapter 10).

The effectiveness of different capacity development strategies is largely unknown since little M&E of capacity development interventions has been undertaken. However, some M&E capacity has developed (see Section 11.1.1 Research Question 1) that suggests that some strategies have been effective. For example, a training impact assessment found that some supervisors indicated trainees had applied new knowledge and skills (URT, 2008). However, other information sources (interviews and URT, 2007b) counteracted this finding (Section 10.4.1). Another important finding was that the updating of the planning, budgeting and M&E guidelines by a group of senior public servants (the Harmonisation Taskforce) did not lead to a marked increase in their use (Section 10.4.4). Also, systems, processes and tools have been developed although use is sporadic and has not necessarily led to changed practices, such as sharing more performance information with the public (see Chapter 8 and Section 10.4.2).

11.1.3 Question 3: What issues affect the development of monitoring and evaluation capacity in the Government of Tanzania?

The analysis confirmed the assumption at the start of this thesis that theories of change at all levels were likely to be implicit, confused and contradictory. Overall, context and triggers of change (that is, the mechanisms) were mentioned sparingly in the documents analysed. Therefore, information concerning two-thirds of the components of theories of change was largely absent. Few links were made between context and outcomes (desired and actual); context and capacity development strategies; and capacity development strategies, mechanisms and outcomes (desired and actual). Desired outcomes were normally expressed in program design documents, while some actual outcomes were articulated in program progress reports. Desired outcomes were primarily expressed in the most
general of terms as M&E capacity rather than specific types of M&E capacity. Documents contained implicit theories of change that were linear and founded on mechanisms that seem to be more likely to occur in western developed countries. Overall, interviewees presented a more nuanced picture of change processes, although one that still seemed grounded in western theories of change. Although some interviewees explained various complexities of the Tanzanian context, few articulated more complete theories that might be considered grounded in the Tanzanian setting (See Section 8.3). The weak articulation of theories of change hinders the development of discussions about what may work in what circumstances.

The importance of context and understanding how local factors influence change are key aspects of neo-patrimonial theories of development, as outlined in Chapter 4. But numerous authors (including Morgan, 1997, 2006; Kelsall, 2006; Cammack, 2007; Hyden, 2008; Preskill, 2008; Patton, 2009; Chabal, 2009) from a variety of disciplines endorse this position and, particularly since the 1990s, have critiqued the lack of analysis of context in development. The analysis in this thesis also found that in the design and implementation of M&E capacity development efforts the attention given to context has been superficial. Moreover, the espoused partial theories of change identified in the documents analysed would seem to have more relevance to western developed country contexts than those in Africa. Understanding the contemporary African context is a challenging task in itself. For example, one theorist sees it as involving a complex interplay between ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ norms, values and beliefs that are often ‘intersecting and, to some extent, interfering with each other’ (Chabal, 2009: 68) (see Chapter 7). The conclusion then is that M&E capacity development efforts may be based on flawed assumptions that reduces the chances of success.

The limited understanding of context in the espoused theories of change leads to an inadequate understanding of the drivers and barriers to change. The gap in understanding includes the extent to which M&E may be considered by public
servants to be a relative advantage to them (Section 8.3.1) or compatible with existing systems, processes and practices (Section 8.3.2). For instance, M&E entails transparency, specificity, and making assumptions explicit, whereas in the Tanzanian public service formal rules are not as important in determining behaviour as the informal, which are opaque and ambiguous. Other barriers to M&E include whether it is viewed as simple or complex and if there are opportunities to trial and/or observe M&E (Section 8.3.4). Such limited consideration of context appears to facilitate the development of interventions based on simple, linear theories of change, with unrealistic desired outcomes, and ineffective capacity development strategies, resulting in outcomes not achieved.

Outcomes for M&E capacity development were found to be not clearly linked to context or mechanisms for triggering change. In some ways, this finding resonates with current critiques of the ‘missing middle’ in results-based management approaches to M&E in international development. The critique is that the middle dimension of the results chain, explaining how outputs move to outcomes, is often absent. The lack of attention to the middle is interpreted as demonstrating a lack of interest in and commitment to, understanding why and how outcomes occur (Jackson, 1998; Ackoff, 1989; Owen, 2004; Booth and Lucas, 2001a, 2001b). As has been argued throughout this thesis, the theory of change approach provides a model for understanding and learning about the critical middle dimension and how change is triggered.

The existence of monitoring and evaluation systems will not, on their own, contribute to improved accountability (Frink and Klimoski, 2004). Rather how people perceive the use of M&E will be critical. Currently, few public sector managers use the government’s M&E systems to monitor performance, or to make decisions about policies and programs or rewards or sanctions. Frequently, performance information is not shared. Outside the public service, demand for and use of information on the government’s performance remains weak and sanctions, such as those that might be applied through electoral processes, appear to be
applied infrequently or inconsistently. Therefore, it would seem that public servants do not believe that M&E is important to their managers, parliament or the public, which in turn suggests that M&E will make only a limited contribution to improving public sector accountability (See Section 8.3.2).

With limited internal demand for performance information, public servants perceive the main purpose of M&E is to satisfy donors. Moreover, they tend to see evaluation as an exercise undertaken by independent, external evaluators who use summative methods to assess the worth or value of a policy, program or organisation. Hence M&E seems to be narrowly viewed as serving purposes of accountability more for external donors than for internal Tanzanian stakeholders.59 This might help explain why public servants tend to view M&E negatively and have not shown much interest in developing M&E capacity.

11.1.4 Question 4: How might governments, donors and development practitioners improve their efforts to develop M&E capacity?

This research has highlighted a range of issues that need to be addressed if greater M&E capacity is to develop in the Government of Tanzania. A different approach is needed. The current state of M&E systems is not the result of the actions of one group but rather the actions of many stakeholders. There are drivers against change, notably the behaviour of some donors, developing country governments and development practitioners. Change in behaviour will most likely be led by a few innovators with the capacity and willingness to try something new. Therefore, a new approach requires different actions from many. As Einstein60 said: ‘There is nothing that is more certain sign of insanity than to do the same thing over and over and expect the results to be different’. However, there are no easy solutions that will satisfy all parties. A number of suggestions are outlined below and are grouped, approximately, by the type of actor. Some suggestions (for example, the

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60 www.wisdomquotes.com
government to determine priorities for M&E capacity development; and donors to be more realistic with their demands in low capacity environments) require that concurrent actions are undertaken by different actors to stimulate change. However, donor organisations may have greater capacity to change, than the Government of Tanzania. This is because change often requires assimilation of new knowledge, skills and resources and donors appear to have these. Additionally, the organisational characteristics of donor organisations may contribute to innovation. For instance, donor organisations are often interconnected and are diverse in terms of their knowledge, expertise and breadth of occupational specialisation.

**Donor organisations**

Sensitivities around addressing political challenges, along with structural limitations such as organisational mandates and policies, may mean that donor organisations are in a difficult position – while they are increasing their understanding of the context and its influence on change, they are limited to primarily supporting predominantly-functional or external predominantly-political strategies, and yet are still expected to meet the expectations of transformational outcomes set through years of not adequately considering context and overpromising on results. Identifying which donor organisations display the characteristics of innovative organisations could spotlight those that might be more willing and able to practically apply contextual analysis during the design and implementation of development programs. This analysis, based on interviews with staff from donor organisations and public servants, and review of secondary data, might best be completed by an external consultant or researcher and the findings presented to both donors and the government. Such a study could be funded by the donor organisations themselves or the government.

This thesis provides a foundation for further work on the theory of change approach. So far, it has been useful in deepening the understanding of M&E capacity development in the Tanzanian Government. Yet more open and critical
thinking and discussions will be necessary to build on and deepen the emerging theories of change (espoused and additional theories-in-use) revealed in this research, and to develop a renewed, more integrated approach to developing M&E capacity. However, as is clear from the analysis of contextual factors in this thesis, such discussions will be difficult. One approach could be to bring together a few staff from more innovative donor organisations and MDAs and other development practitioners who already have an established level of trust to trial more open critical thinking, and using this approach to develop capacity development strategies supported by regular evaluative thinking with the aim of learning more about how change occurs. This process could be led by the government or donor organisations. It is based on the assumptions that: (1) greater interconnectedness and discussion contributes to learning and innovation (Rogers, 2003; Johnson and Thomas, 2007; Rogers, 2008), (2) identifying and working with individuals, or champions, for doing things differently may influence others including opinion leaders (Rogers, 2003; Munduate and Bennebroek Gravenhorst, 2003); and (3) it may be more effective to target those organisations with greater willingness and capacity for change rather than attempting government-wide interventions.

Donors also have to change their expectations, adjusting them to a level that takes into account the low-capacity environment and many social, political and cultural barriers to adopting M&E. Donors cannot have it all and cannot have it fast. However, any changes to focus on fewer outcomes to be achieved more slowly over a more realistic timeframe may challenge the current orthodoxy of short term results and increasing levels of development assistance. The focus on outcomes (and particularly short-term outcomes) in Tanzania is very strong and interest in development processes seems to have been devalued. As Owen (2004: 5) notes the focus has been on ‘show us the profits, don’t worry about how you got there’. If learning more about how to trigger change is an aim then there needs to be a re-balancing of interest in outcomes and processes. Unrealistic outcomes and too much pressure on public sectors with limited capacity to produce results entrenches
dysfunctional behaviours by donors and public servants (Boven, 2005). Likewise, the transformational changes that are currently desired either need to be matched with transformational strategies or downgraded to transactional change (OPM, 2006; Munduate and Bennebroek Gravenhorst, 2003). At a time when donor organisations in Tanzania are reviewing the quality, and effectiveness, of their relationship with the government it seems pertinent to look at the factors that influence trust and to implement strategies to strengthen partnerships. Such an analysis may be considered to be in the spirit of the Paris Declaration that aimed to strengthen mutual accountability and ownership.

**Government of Tanzania**

As responsibility for designing, implementing and monitoring and evaluating capacity development interventions is increasingly put in the hands of government, it relies more and more on government having good understanding of context and change processes and having the capacity to respond to change. Rather than implementing programs across the breadth of the public service, it may be more effective to identify those areas where there are more innovative organisations and individuals and work with these people to create or leverage opportunities for change. This is an opportunity to implement Booth’s (2009) recommendation that future political economy studies could examine actors’ logics and choices to identify opportunities for change. Such a study would consider specific individuals rather than broad or generalised groups of people. It is also perhaps more realistic to implement public sector reforms as trials, as is suggested by Rogers (2003) diffusion of innovation model. This allows people to learn more about the innovation and to test it before they buy into it more fully. It also presents an opportunity for the innovation to be adapted during the trial to more readily fit the context.

The findings from this study suggest that the Tanzanian Government needs to decide to what extent M&E capacity development is a priority amongst all the public sector capacity needs, and if it is a priority, how, where and when change can
be supported. Priority may be given to developing capacity only in relation to certain sectors or interventions. For example, the Reform Coordination Unit, under the leadership of the Chief Secretary and acting as a champion for change, could work with donors to identify M&E capacity development interventions being implemented at national and local levels of government; identify which ones are achieving greater results; agree on criteria for priorities and apply these to current interventions; and then develop a plan for refocusing efforts as necessary.

A new approach to learning in the public sector is also necessary to support. Firstly, ending the perverse incentives created by granting allowances for attending training workshops, as many donors in Tanzania are now currently demanding, is an essential first step. Such a move is difficult and, as such, it may be realistic to expect that performance may worsen before it gets better, given the entrenched practices surrounding allowances. While this action may seem risky to government and donors, so too is not doing anything. Secondly, an approach different to one that predominantly relies on workshops is necessary. This initiative needs to be developed to complement the shift away from workshops and allowances. Learning strategies that are more holistic, integrated and build on each other to allow workplace practice and opportunities for deepening and expanding learning is an alternative that seems worthwhile trying. Workshops, without allowances, may be part of this new approach but are also more balanced with other learning approaches. The government would benefit from developing a discussion paper to increase public sector managers’ knowledge and guide changes in practice. This paper could outline the advantages and disadvantages of key approaches, when they might be used, and identify and develop case study examples for how different strategies have been used in the government together with the factors influencing their success. Facilitated discussions could be held with key MDAs to deepen public servants understanding. Further, each major reform program could review their approach to learning, how and why particular approaches have worked (or otherwise) and to outline any adaptations that could be implemented. This is also
takes into account Silberman’s (2006) research that highlights discussion and practice by doing are more effective learning mediums. This could also been seen as a trial to test the lessons concerning adult learning from predominantly developed countries in a developing country context. If solid evaluation systems are built into processes from the start of the trial they might contribute to adapting interventions to increase their compatibility with the Government of Tanzania context.

**Development practitioners**

Development practitioners may also need to change the way that they behave, from doing tasks for the government to developing the capacity of the public servants to do it themselves. This means that consultants would act as facilitators of change processes, placing greater emphasis on ‘soft’, rather than ‘hard technical’, skills. Such a shift in orientation to consultancy requires development practitioners to acknowledge that they are also learners and some may need to improve their facilitation processes. However, it is acknowledged that this stance may be challenging to individuals who consider and sell themselves as experts. Development practitioners may also find it difficult to do things differently if donors and the government do not change what they are demanding. However, they are positioned to play an educative role in this process and push the boundaries of both donor organisations and the government.

### 11.2 Returning to the assumptions and original assertion

To conclude this thesis the original assertion and assumptions presented in the introduction are revisited to determine if they were borne out. Table 18 presents the assumptions and findings against them and Table 19 does the same for the assertion.
**Table 18: Returning to the assumptions**

1. It would be possible to identify some, although not all, theories of change underpinning M&E capacity development interventions in the Government of Tanzania. This assumption, that theories are often implicit, confusing and missing, is based on the literature on theories of change discussed in Chapter 2.

   **Finding:** This was strongly found to be the case (see discussions in Chapters 9 and 10).

2. Some of the people funding or implementing capacity development interventions would have at least a partial awareness, opinion or view of what works and why. These ideas may not be explicitly stated as a theory of change and may not necessarily specify social theories. It was expected that the depth of an interviewee's awareness, opinion or view of what works and why might be influenced by the extent to which they were involved in the design and implementation of the strategy and their knowledge of change processes and capacity development.

   **Finding:** This was found to be the case (see Section 10.1.2).

3. Some of the people implementing capacity development interventions would be able to identify which strategies were more successful and why. As with the assumption above, it was expected that the depth of an interviewee’s response might depend on the extent to which they were involved in the implementation and M&E of the capacity development intervention and knowledge of change processes and capacity development. It was expected that some interviewees might identify particular contextual factors that influenced success. It was also assumed that M&E capacity development interventions would be monitored and evaluated and reports to donors or by donors would outline some success factors.

   **Finding:** This was found to be only partially true. Few successful strategies were clearly identified. Some interviewees identified cultural factors influencing success (see Section 10.2). Largely, M&E capacity development interventions were not monitored and evaluated.

4. The choice of capacity development strategies would not be guided significantly by the context where the intervention was being implemented. The literature review emphasises that context remains only a weak consideration in the design and implementation of capacity development strategies.

   **Finding:** This assumption proved to be true (see discussion in Section 10.3).

5. It was possible to develop some potential additional theories of change than those espoused in documents and by interviewees.

   **Finding:** This was found to be true (see Sections 9.3 and 10.5).
Table 19: Returning to the original assertion

1. If theories of change are articulated, then alternative and more successful M&E capacity development strategies and interventions may be designed. These may in turn increase the effectiveness of capacity development interventions and ultimately achieve better development outcomes.

Finding: Articulating emerging theories of change highlighted several important factors that may affect the selection of capacity development strategies. These included the assumptions and biases on which the current capacity development interventions seem to be based; the limited consideration of the context in which the capacity development is taking place and how this may effect change; the difference in the values and norms of M&E compared to those that are dominant in the Government of Tanzania; inconsistency in the emerging theories of change that may lead to situations where one intervention negates the effects of another; that different stakeholders may have different theories of change and tensions may arise where these differences are not discussed; overambitious outcomes due to lack of consideration of context and change processes including the triggers for change and ability of different stakeholders to influence change.

The articulation of theories of change has helped identify why particular strategies may not be effective and some that may be more effective.

11.3 Pieces of change or change in pieces?

In Chapter 2, the theory of change approach was discussed including Pawson and Tilley’s (1997) framework, which consists of the key interrelated concepts of context, mechanisms and outcomes. The literature review showed that the theories of change underpinning social programs, such as those that are the subject of this thesis, are often absent, implicit, confused or partial. Thus, bringing to the surface pieces of theories is difficult. To assist in this endeavour, this thesis drew on two theoretical frameworks. These were Boesen and Therkildsen’s (2004) internal and external and functional and political categories of capacity development (Chapter 3); and Rogers’ (2003) concept of the diffusion of innovation (Chapter 4). Given the importance of context to the theories of change approach, these two frameworks were supplemented by Hofstede’s work on cultural characteristics (Chapter 4).
In seeking to identify theories of change, the focus of the analysis was on two areas: 1) theories of how M&E is expected to contribute to good public management in Tanzania, which also provides the justification for the efforts and funds expended on M&E capacity development; and 2) theories about how particular capacity development strategies lead to public sector M&E capacity. No complete theories of change, that clearly articulated all three components of context-mechanisms-outcome framework, could be revealed in this study. However, by piecing together the partial, confused and implicit components of the theories, the research has drawn out several emerging theories of change. Some of these can be defined as espoused theories, or what people say, while others are theories-in-use, or what people do (Arygris and Schön, 1978). At times what people say and what people do are the same while at other times they are contrasting and sometimes contradict each other. Thus the analysis concludes that the picture of M&E capacity development in the Government of Tanzania is more complex than that represented in either the document analysis or interviews.

The process of reviewing the secondary data and the data from document analysis and interviews in search for pieces of theories that may have substantive significance has been challenging. The constant back and forwards inductive process and constant checking of how my own assumptions, biases and values may be influencing the data collection and analysis has been both trying and rewarding. Greater understanding and meaning has sometimes resulted from seemingly random events that have nothing to do with M&E capacity development. For instance, when Tanzanian drivers create three lanes when there is only a one lane road and cause a traffic jam so no one can move forward or backward. Where is the patience that is supposed to characterise Tanzanians? Where are the collectivistic cultural characteristics when individual drivers are trying to move one position forward but create a jam that neither benefits them or everyone else? These events have been illuminating and highlight the value of taking a more holistic view of
change and context. In this regard, I have benefited from living in Dar es Salaam prior to and during the data collection and analysis and write-up phases.

Schlechty and Noblit (1982 cited in Patton, 2003) suggest that qualitative analysis is about making the obvious obvious, making the obvious dubious and making the hidden obvious. This research has highlighted the obvious. It has also highlighted how some of the obvious may be dubious and, depending on the individual and their evaluative thinking about M&E capacity development, has made some of the hidden obvious. In some ways, I feel a sense of incompleteness with this thesis and the topic of M&E capacity development, perhaps highlighting the limitation of our ability to ‘work out’ programs (Stufflebeam, 2004; Scriven, 1998); the limitations of theory of change approaches (Pawson and Tilley, 1997; Sanderson, 2002); difficulties with the concept of capacity development that while conceptually valuable, is harder to ground in terms of its practical application to development programs; and my own intrinsic motivations to want to understand more so that I can better facilitate sustainable change. However, I also feel a sense of satisfaction with trying to learn more and feel that ultimately this research has been a useful endeavour in that it adds knowledge to M&E capacity development in Tanzania and provides a foundation for further exploration, dialogue and theorising about how change occurs in the Tanzanian public service.

The aim of this thesis was to understand how monitoring and evaluation capacity might be developed in developing country public sector environments. This is a broader question that has been explored through examining the plurality of a particular case, that is, the Government of Tanzania. This aim is clearly based on the premise that it is valuable to develop M&E capacity. It is also based on an assumption that pressure to demonstrate development outcomes will continue. No definitive new theory of change has been developed as a result of this thesis. The complexity of the concept of capacity development makes such a task difficult. In reality, it seems that only smaller and more specific theories of change may be able to be developed for specific areas of M&E capacity in the Government of Tanzania.
The other mechanisms outlined in this thesis are known, as the discussion in Chapter 7 highlights, but they do not appear to be addressed in the capacity development strategies being used. This thesis makes explicit the espoused mechanisms that need to be present for the reform programs to be successful. However, the actual outcomes indicate that the other mechanisms are still frequently guiding behaviours within the public service. Therefore, capacity development strategies, to date, have not yet managed to trigger sufficiently different mechanisms so that regular behaviours change and the desired outcomes are achieved. The articulation of context and espoused mechanisms clearly highlights the gap between the other mechanisms and the espoused mechanisms.

The overarching research question was: How does monitoring and evaluation capacity develop in developing country public sector environments? The answer must be “with uncertainty and unpredictability”. The overwhelming conclusion of this thesis is that to develop capacity in M&E in any developing country, development actors need to improve their understanding of contexts and the change processes within these contexts. Only from this starting point can outcomes be developed that are realistic and more achievable. This thesis also concludes that the justification for undertaking M&E capacity development outlined in World Bank and government documents weakens when the Tanzanian public sector contexts (Chapter 7), international lessons learned about capacity development (Chapter 4), and research into M&E’s instrumental use (Chapter 5) are taken into consideration. This is because if theories of change had been articulated, and context and mechanisms had received greater consideration, public sector M&E might be viewed as a radical innovation in Tanzania with a high degree of risk, and cost, in achieving the desired outcomes.

More broadly, the conclusion has major implications given the levels of development assistance to Tanzania and beyond. This conclusion also highlights the need for re-examining the application of political economy analysis, to identify those actors who are willing to step beyond concerns about the contestability of
the analysis, political correctness and Western guilt to place discussions into the public domain for discussion and debate so that innovations can be identified and trialled. The dominance of Western-driven pre-conceived models of what a public service should look like, what they should do and how they should do it needs to be reconsidered urgently. The notions of best practice and one or a few models to be applied to developing countries is outdated. There is no clear pathway to achieve change and reduce poverty. Rather good practice, depending on the context and circumstances and many possible models, needs to be the framework guiding development assistance.
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In terms of individual monitoring and evaluation capacities, Preskill (2007) distinguishes between knowledge, behaviours and values. These are outlined in Box 5.

**Box 5: Individual monitoring and evaluation capacities**

**Knowledge – people understand:**
- That evaluation involves purposeful, planned, and systematic activities.
- Evaluation terms and concepts.
- The relationship between research and evaluation.
- How evaluation processes and findings can contribute to decision making.
- The strengths and weaknesses of different evaluation approaches.
- The strengths and weaknesses of different data collection methods.
- How to apply basic statistical analyses to quantitative data.
- How to apply basic content and thematic analyses to qualitative data.
- How politics can affect evaluation processes and findings.
- The importance of using culturally appropriate and responsive evaluation approaches and methods.
- What constitutes ethical evaluation practice.
- That various stakeholders may have differing opinions, experiences, and perspectives about an evaluand.
- The relationship between a program’s goals, objectives, activities, and expected outcomes.
- What knowledge, skills, and experiences to look for when hiring an evaluator.

**Skills (behaviours) – people are able to:**
- Develop a program logic model.
- Develop key evaluation questions.
- Write an evaluation plan.
- Design data collection instruments.
- Choose appropriate and relevant data collection methods.
- Collect credible and reliable data.
- Analyse quantitative data.
- Analyse qualitative data.
- Interpret results and draw conclusions.
- Develop an evaluation budget.
- Communicate and report evaluation processes and findings using a variety of strategies.
- Use the Program Evaluation Standards and/or the Professional Association Guiding Principles for Evaluators.
- Teach others about evaluation.
- Develop an evaluation strategic plan.
- Manage the evaluation process.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Values – people believe that:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Evaluation yields useful information.</td>
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<td>• Evaluation can be a positive experience.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Evaluation should be part of a program's design process.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Evaluation contributes to a program's success.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Evaluation adds value to the organisation.</td>
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<td>• Evaluation is an important part of their work.</td>
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<td>• Evaluation is worth the time and money.</td>
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ANNEX B: MONITORING AND EVALUATION CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES

The following list of different strategies has been compiled from Preskill (2007), Preskill and Boyle (2008), Mackay (2006), Boesen and Therkildsen (2004) and categorised according to Boesen and Therkildsen’s (2004) model of functional–political/internal–external strategies. Strategies marked with an asterisk do not appear, from the documents analysed and from interviews, to have been used in Tanzania.

B.1 Predominantly functional–internal interventions

These interventions focus on strengthening formal organisational structures, systems and skills. Interventions include:

1. Assessing internal task-and-work systems – technology, procedures, task flows, information and feedback structures, skills composition and human resource management
2. Establishing processes for knowledge management of evaluation findings, e.g. providing executive summaries that target key audiences can reduce cost of accessing and digesting findings
3. Enacting laws, decrees and regulations mandating M&E
4. Developing and implementing formal requirements for planning, conducting and reporting M&E activities and findings. This process has frequently involved the concepts of business process re-engineering and total quality management
5. Establishing performance exception reporting systems*
6. Establishing organisational systems to publish information about all program objectives, outputs and service quality
7. Setting challenging but realistic performance targets
8. Performance targets as part of managers’ performance appraisals
9. Conducting awareness-raising workshops or seminars to:
   a. demystify M&E
   b. provide comfort about its do-ability
   c. explain what’s in it for participants
   d. use actual examples of influential M&E to demonstrate its utility and cost effectiveness*
   e. explain to service managers and staff how M&E can help them better deliver services to their clients
   f. explain to data providers how their data are being used and the importance of providing accurate and timely data*
   g. increase understanding of evaluation standards and principles
10. Piloting rapid evaluations and impact evaluations to demonstrate their usefulness*
11. Conducting conferences or seminars on good practice M&E systems
12. Providing models of good practice evaluation planning, M&E techniques, evaluation reporting
13. Establishing twinning relationships and arrangements between M&E organisations or units across organisations or countries*
14. Involving people in evaluation processes in either design or implementation of an evaluation*
15. Establishing internship or apprenticeship programs so that M&E novices can participate in a formal program that provides practical evaluation experience*
16. Providing training on evaluation knowledge and skills such as developing program logics, designing data-collection instruments, analysing quantitative data, using evaluation findings when making decisions
17. Providing training on ‘soft’ skills such as improving communication and styles, human relations and leadership styles*
18. Providing technical assistance to provide training, mentoring, coaching, advising; act as help desk; develop manuals and other resource materials; provide free training; comment on terms of reference; draft evaluation reports
19. Providing and/or developing written material on evaluation findings and processes
20. Establishing communities of practice or e-networks: sharing evaluation experiences, practices, information and readings among members who have common interests and needs (also called learning circles) – can help showcase good practice examples, help encourage quality standards, demonstrate feasibility*
21. Facilitating discussions with staff on M&E using a range of facilitation techniques such as appreciative inquiry, which uses an assets-based, collaborative approach that focuses on strengths within an organisation
22. Establishing technology mechanisms so online sources such as websites and/or e-learning programs on and about evaluation are available to staff
23. Establishing mentoring and/or coaching relationships with an evaluation expert who provides individual technical and professional support*
24. Establishing processes for meetings to allocate time and space to discuss evaluation activities specifically for the purpose of learning from and about evaluation. This could include ‘how are we doing’ team meetings to clarify objectives, review team performance, and identify ways to improve*

B.2 Predominantly political–internal interventions

These interventions seek to change internal dynamics by supporting reformers, changing internal competitive pressures, providing performance-based benefits to key staff. They include:

1. Establishing awards and prizes for good or best practice M&E
2. Creating a collegiate approach to M&E between ministries (to avoid rivalry and control of information)*
3. Providing budgetary incentives to ministries and agencies for high-performing programs or complying with M&E requirements
4. Withholding funding from ministries and agencies that fail to conduct M&E*
5. Providing budgetary incentives to ministries and agencies to improve performance
6. Providing sufficient funding to ministries and agencies to undertake M&E*
7. Delegating greater management autonomy to programs performing well
8. Establishing performance contracts or performance pay for civil servants (rewards and penalties for performance)*
9. Comparing performance across jurisdictions
10. Penalising non-compliance with evaluation recommendations
11. Frequently repeating messages of support at meetings with ministry section heads, other staff
12. Establishing M&E experience as a criterion for recruitment and promotion
13. Promoting performers and reformers
14. Firing non-performers
15. Supporting sanctions against rent seeking
16. Establishing merit-based senior-level recruitment to ensure recruits are not only from one region, ethnic group or political party
17. Developing government vision statements on public sector reform and national plans that highlight the merits of M&E
18. Establishing action-learning approaches*
19. Establishing learning contracts*

**B.3 Predominantly functional–external interventions**

These interventions focus on strengthening the capacity of organisations to deal with ‘functional’ external actors i.e. supervisory agencies. Interventions include:
1. Protecting certain functions by establishing autonomous agencies, protected from political influence and exempt from the average poor salary of the public service
2. Implementing output-based budgeting
3. Changing the resource envelope
4. Introducing supervisory agencies
5. Conducting external performance audits that focus on monitoring the quality and quantity of outputs
6. Offering training, coaching and mentoring to develop ‘soft’ organisational skills such as communication, human relations, negotiation, managing conflict, and leadership*

B.4 Predominantly political–external interventions

Political–external interventions seek to change external pressures or support, and build or maintain external stakeholders. These types of interventions include:

1. Building coalitions of external stakeholders strong enough to impose change*
2. Establishing output- or outcome-based performance triggers in donor loans or assistance
3. Holding presidential town hall meetings with citizens to showcase good and bad government performance
4. Involving civil society in M&E of government performance
5. Establishing accountability mechanisms such as citizen report cards
6. Providing ministerial feedback on quality of policy advice*
7. Highlighting adverse M&E information in reports to parliament or congress and disseminating widely*
8. Highlighting poor-quality evaluation planning, data systems, performance indicators, M&E techniques, M&E reporting (by central agency, audit ministry or similar)
9. Public endorsement of M&E by presidents or high-level officials
10. Support for government M&E from multilateral and bilateral donors to governments – highlights and endorses M&E
11. Establishing professional evaluation associations
12. Training journalists on investigative journalism
13. Training politicians and providing support to advocacy and lobby groups
14. Enacting broader laws, decrees and regulations regarding freedom of and access to information
The 15 documents used in the document analysis were:


ANNEX D: FRAMEWORK FOR DOCUMENT ANALYSIS

For Pawson and Tilley (1997), context refers to the geographical and organisational location as well as the norms, values and interrelationships between people and organisations existing in these locations. Mechanisms are the choices and capacities that lead to regular behavioural patterns. Lastly, outcomes are defined as the results of a program, whether they are intended or not. Programs, they argue, present opportunities that people, who operate within contexts, can choose to take. The resulting outcomes will depend on how the mechanisms are acted out in practice in a particular context. Figure 4 shows that in one context (C1) a particular mechanism (M1) leads to particular regular behaviours (R1) but in another context (C2) a different mechanism (M2) influences a different set of regular behaviours (R2).

Figure 4: Pawson and Tilley’s (1997: 76) context, mechanism and outcome framework

Capacity development strategies are implemented to trigger a different mechanism, for changing the capacity of, or the choices made by, individuals, organisations and institutions. If mechanisms are triggered then it is assumed that the desired regular behaviours will result. If the desired behaviour occurs on a regular basis, then outcomes, such as improved public sector service delivery, are expected to be achieved. The achievement of such outcomes in turn is expected to enable longer-term outcomes, such as better development for the citizens of Tanzania.
Theories of change exist at numerous points in the Pawson and Tilley framework as illustrated in Diagram 1. The first theory of change is about how and why particular capacity development strategies were chosen in the given context. The second theory of change is about how and why particular strategies are expected to contribute to the desired capacities and choices in the given context. The third theory of change is about how and why the new capacities and choices are expected to contribute to the new regular behaviours in the given context. Lastly, there is also a theory of change about how the new regular behaviours are expected to lead to outcomes.

**Figure 5: Possible theories of change (adapted from Pawson and Tilley, 1997)**

Figure 5 is a simplified view of reality, presenting contexts, choices, capacities and behaviours as static rather than constantly changing, as is the case in practice.
ESRF GEN/ED/V11

To whom it may concern

I would like to introduce Ms. Donna Loveridge to your organization. Ms. Loveridge is a research fellow at the Economic and Social Research Foundation and is undertaking a study: Evaluation Capacity Development: What is happening in the Government of Tanzania? Ms. Loveridge’s study has been approved by COSTECH (No. 2008-157-ER-2008-85) and is valid from 16th June 2008 to 15th June 2009.

The broad aims of the research project are to determine the different approaches being used to develop evaluation capacity in the Government of Tanzania and to learn what approaches may work. Key research questions are:

- What are the difficulties in developing evaluation capacity in the Government of Tanzania?
- What ECD models are being applied in Tanzania and how effective are these different in developing evaluation capacity?
- How can recent ECD experience be used to better develop Government of Tanzania evaluation capacity?

Ms. Loveridge is enrolled in a Doctor of Education degree at The University of Melbourne, Australia. She has already undertaken a comprehensive literature review of evaluation capacity development and developed a sound methodology for conducting the study.

Ms. Loveridge is expected to have a public seminar on her findings during the quarter of 2009 and will ensure that you are all invited to attend and contribute in enriching her report.

Yours Sincerely,

Dr. H. Bobela Lanogelo

Executive Director

All correspondences should be addressed to the Executive Director.
ANNEX F: RESEARCH APPROVAL FROM MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND VOCATIONAL TRAINING

THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA
MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND VOCATIONAL TRAINING

Cable: "ELMU" DAR ES SALAAM
Teles: 41742 Elimu Tz.
Telephone: 2121287, 2110146
Fax: 2127763

In reply please quote:
Ref. ED/EP/ERC/VOL II/38

Date: 22nd, Dec 2008

TO: Heads:
Emis,
Monitoring and Evaluation, and
Policy Analysis Units
Department of Policy and Planning MoEVT

Dear Sir/Madam,

Re: Research Clearance for Ms Donna Loveridge:

The above-mentioned is a research fellow at the Economic and Social Research Foundation (ESRF). She is conducting a study on “Evaluation Capacity Development: What is happening in the Government of Tanzania?”

To be able to complete his study, she will need to collect data and necessary information from your office. In line with the above information you are being requested to provide the above researcher with needed assistance that will enable her to complete his research study successfully.

The period by which this permission has been granted is from 13th Jan to 13th Feb 2009.

By copy of this letter, the Researcher is required to submit a copy of the report (or part of) to the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Education and Vocational Training for documentation and reference.

Yours truly,
Ms Paulina J. Mkoma
For Permanent Secretary
Dear

You are invited to participate in the research project listed below, which is being conducted by Ms Donna Loveridge (Doctorate of Education) and Dr Pam St Leger (supervisor) in the Centre of Program Evaluation, Faculty of Education at The University of Melbourne. Your name has been referred to me as someone who has been involved in evaluation capacity development activities within the Government of Tanzania.

**Project: Developing Evaluation Capacity in the Government of Tanzania**

This project will be part of Ms. Loveridge’s doctoral thesis, and has been approved by Tanzania Commission for Science and Technology (COSTECH) and the Human Research Ethics Committee at Melbourne University.

The broad aims of this research project are to determine the different approaches being used to develop evaluation capacity in the Government of Tanzania and to learn what approaches may work. Key research questions are:

1. What are the difficulties in developing evaluation capacity in the Government of Tanzania?
2. What ECD models are being applied in Tanzania and how effective are these different in developing evaluation capacity?
3. How can recent ECD experience be used to better develop Government of Tanzania evaluation capacity?
What will you be asked to do?

If you agree to participate:
1. We would ask you to participate in an individual semi-structured interview, approximately one hour in length focussing your understanding of evaluation capacity development, the approaches being used in the Government of Tanzania and their successes or otherwise..

With your permission, the individual interview may be audio-recorded so that we can ensure that we can capture key themes arising from the discussion. A transcript will not be made. However, a summary of the key points that emerge from the interview will be returned to you to check it accurately reflects your perspective.

How will my confidentiality be protected?

We intend to protect your anonymity and the confidentiality of your responses to the fullest possible extent, within the limits of the law. Your name and contact details will be kept in a separate, password-protected computer file from any data (information) that you supply. This will only be able to be linked to your responses by the researchers, for example, in order to know who to send your interview summary to for checking. In the final report, any information you provide will be assigned a numerical code and a role classification (e.g. Advisor 1). We will remove any references to personal information that might allow someone to guess your identity. The data will be kept securely in on Ms Loveridge’s home computer, which is password protected, and in a lockable filing cabinet in her home office during the research period. It will then in the Centre for Program Evaluation, Faculty of Education at Melbourne University for five years from the date of publication, before being destroyed. Only Ms Loveridge and Dr St Leger will have access to the documents held.
How will I receive feedback?
Once the thesis arising from this research has been completed, a summary or full report of the findings will be available to you on request. It is likely that the results of this study will be presented at academic conferences and publications.

Do I have to participate in this project?
No. Participation in this study is completely voluntary. If you wish to withdraw at any stage, or to withdraw any unprocessed data you have supplied, you are free to do so without explanation or prejudice.

Where can I obtain further information?
If you require any further information, or have any concerns, please do not hesitate to contact either of the researchers on the numbers given below. Should you have any concerns about the conduct of the project, you are welcome to contact the Executive Officer, Human Research Ethics, The University of Melbourne, on ph: +61 3 8344 2073, or fax: +61 3 9347 6739.

How do I agree to participate?
If you would like to participate in this project, please indicate that you have read and understood this information by signing the accompanying consent form. Please return the consent form in the envelope provided. The researchers will then contact you to arrange a convenient time for you to complete the interview.

Yours faithfully,

Donna Loveridge
Doctoral Student
Doctor of Education
Centre of Program Evaluation
Department of Education, Policy and Management
Melbourne University
Melbourne
AUSTRALIA
Email: donna.loveridge@gmail.com
Phone: +255 (0)78 2587221

Dr Pam St Leger
Research Supervisor
Centre of Program Evaluation
Department of Education, Policy and Management University
Melbourne
AUSTRALIA
Email: pksl@unimelb.edu.au
Phone: +61 3 8344 6086
Consent Form

Development practitioners

Developing Evaluation Capacity in the Government of Tanzania

1. I consent to participate in the project named above, the particulars of which including details of individual interviews have been explained to me. A written copy of the information has been given to me to keep.

2. I authorise the researcher to use my responses in the individual interview.

3. I acknowledge that:
   a. the possible effects of the individual interview, e.g. confidentiality, have been explained to me to my satisfaction;
   b. I have been informed that I am free to withdraw from the project at any time without explanation or prejudice and to withdraw any unprocessed data previously supplied;
   c. the project is for the purpose of a doctoral thesis;
   d. I have been informed that the confidentiality of the information I provide will be safeguarded subject to any legal requirements;

4. I understand that:
   a. the individual interviews may be audio-taped;
   b. a summary of the key points that emerge from your interview will be returned to you to check it accurately reflects your perspective;
   c. participants will be referred to by a numerical code in any publications arising from the research;
   d. the sample group is small and it may be possible for some respondents to be identified;
   e. participation or non-participation in the research will have no consequences.
5. I consent/do not consent *(please cross out one)* to individual interviews being audio recorded.

Signed: __________________________________________

Name: __________________________________________

Date: __________________________________________
Dear

You are invited to participate in the research project listed below, which is being conducted by Ms Donna Loveridge (Doctorate of Education) and Dr Pam St Leger (supervisor) in the Centre of Program Evaluation, Department Faculty of Education at The University of Melbourne. Your name has been referred to me by a mutual contact as someone who has been involved in evaluation capacity development activities within the Government of Tanzania.

**Project: Developing Evaluation Capacity in the Government of Tanzania**

This project will be part of Ms Loveridge’s doctoral thesis, and has been approved by Tanzania Commission for Science and Technology (COSTECH) and the Human Research Ethics Committee at Melbourne University.

The broad aims of this research project are to determine the different approaches being used to develop evaluation capacity in the Government of Tanzania and to learn what approaches may work. Key research questions are:

4. What are the difficulties in developing evaluation capacity in the Government of Tanzania?

5. What ECD models are being applied in Tanzania and how effective are these different in developing evaluation capacity?

6. How can recent ECD experience be used to better develop Government of Tanzania evaluation capacity?
What will you be asked to do?

If you agree to participate:

We would ask you to participate in a semi-structured individual interview. The interview will focus your understanding of evaluation capacity development, how your organisation is supporting evaluation capacity development and the lessons learned from this experience.

With your permission, the interview may be audio-recorded so that we can ensure that we can capture key themes arising from the discussion. A transcript will not be made. However, a summary of the key points that emerge from your interview will be returned to you to check it accurately reflects your perspective. We estimate that the time commitment required of you would be no longer than one hour.

How will my confidentiality be protected?

We intend to protect your anonymity and the confidentiality of your responses to the fullest possible extent, within the limits of the law. Your name and contact details will be kept in a separate, password-protected computer file from any data (information) that you supply. This will only be able to be linked to your responses by the researchers, for example, in order to return your interview summary to you for checking accuracy of our interpretation of the information you provide.

We intend to protect your anonymity and the confidentiality of your responses to the fullest possible extent, within the limits of the law. Your name and contact details will be kept in a separate, password-protected computer file from any data (information) that you supply. This will only be able to be linked to your responses by the researchers, for example, in order to know who to send your interview summary to for checking. In the final report, any information you provide will be assigned a numerical code and a role classification (e.g. Advisor 1). We will remove any references to personal information that might allow someone to guess your identity. The data will be kept securely in on Ms Loveridge’s home computer, which is password protected, and in a lockable filing cabinet in her home office during the
research period. It will then in the Centre for Program Evaluation, Faculty of Education at Melbourne University for five years from the date of publication, before being destroyed. Only Ms Loveridge and Dr St Leger will have access to the documents held.

How will I receive feedback?
Once the thesis arising from this research has been completed, a summary or a full report of the findings will be available to you on request. It is likely that the results of this study will also be presented at academic conferences and publications.

Do I have to participate in this project?
No. Participation in this study is completely voluntary. If you wish to withdraw at any stage, or to withdraw any unprocessed data you have supplied, you are free to do so without explanation or prejudice.

Where can I obtain further information?
If you require any further information, or have any concerns, please do not hesitate to contact either of the researchers on the numbers given below. Should you have any concerns about the conduct of the project, you are welcome to contact the Executive Officer, Human Research Ethics, The University of Melbourne, on ph: + 61 3 8344 2073, or fax: +61 3 9347 6739.

How do I agree to participate?
If you would like to participate in this project, please indicate that you have read and understood this information by signing the accompanying consent form. Please return the consent form in the envelope provided. The researchers will then contact you to arrange a convenient time for you to complete the interview.
Yours faithfully,

Donna Loveridge  
Doctoral Student  
Doctor of Education  
Centre of Program Evaluation  
Department of Education, Policy and Management  
Melbourne University  
Melbourne  
AUSTRALIA  
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Phone: +255 (0)78 2587221

Dr Pam St Leger  
Research Supervisor  
Centre of Program Evaluation  
Department of Education, Policy and Management  
Melbourne  
AUSTRALIA  
Email: pksl@unimelb.edu.au  
Phone: +61 3 8344 6086
Consent Form – Donor Staff

Developing Evaluation Capacity in the Government of Tanzania

1. I consent to participate in the project named above, the particulars of which - including details of individual interviews have been explained to me. A written copy of the information has been given to me to keep.

3. I authorise the researcher to use my responses in the group interview and individual interview.

3. I acknowledge that:
   e. the possible effects of the individual interview, e.g. confidentiality, have been explained to me to my satisfaction;
   f. I have been informed that I am free to withdraw from the project at any time without explanation or prejudice and to withdraw any unprocessed data previously supplied;
   g. the project is for the purpose of a doctoral thesis;
   h. I have been informed that the confidentiality of the information I provide will be safeguarded subject to any legal requirements;

4. I understand that:
   f. the individual interview may be audio-taped;
   g. a summary of the key points that emerge from my interview will be returned to me to check it accurately reflects your perspective;
   h. participants will be referred to by a numerical code in any publications arising from the research;
   i. participation or non-participation in the research will have no consequences.
5. I consent / do not consent (*please cross out one*) to individual interviews being audio recorded.

Signed: __________________________________________

Name: __________________________________________

Date: __________________________________________
Dear

You are invited to participate in the research project listed below, which is being conducted by Ms Donna Loveridge (Doctorate of Education) and Dr Pam St Leger (supervisor) in the Centre of Program Evaluation, Faculty of Education at The University of Melbourne. Your name has been referred to me by a mutual contact as someone who has been involved in evaluation capacity development activities within the Government of Tanzania.

Project: Developing Evaluation Capacity in the Government of Tanzania

This project will be part of Ms. Loveridge's doctoral thesis, and has been approved by Tanzania Commission for Science and Technology (COSTECH) and the Human Research Ethics Committee at Melbourne University.

The broad aims of this research project are to determine the different approaches being used to develop evaluation capacity in the Government of Tanzania and to learn what approaches may work. Key research questions are:

1. What are the difficulties in developing evaluation capacity in the Government of Tanzania?

2. What ECD models are being applied in Tanzania and how effective are these different in developing evaluation capacity?

3. How can recent ECD experience be used to better develop Government of Tanzania evaluation capacity?
What will you be asked to do?

If you agree to participate:

1. We would ask you to participate in an individual interview (approximately one hour in length) focussing on your understanding of evaluation capacity development, the approaches being used in the Government of Tanzania and their successes or otherwise.

2. You may also be invited to participate in a focus group focussing on successful and unsuccessful approaches to developing evaluation capacity development in the Government of Tanzania, the differences that evaluation capacity is making to the Government of Tanzania and how the Government may better develop evaluation capacity in the future.

With your permission, the focus group may be audio-recorded so that we can ensure that we can capture key themes arising from the discussion. A transcript will not be made. However, a summary of the key points that emerge from the interview will be returned to you to check it accurately reflects your perspective. Individual interviews will not be audio recorded.

How will my confidentiality be protected?

We intend to protect your anonymity and the confidentiality of your responses to the fullest possible extent, within the limits of the law. Your name and contact details will be kept in a separate, password-protected computer file from any data (information) that you supply. This will only be able to be linked to your responses by the researchers, for example, in order to know who to send your interview summary to for checking. In the final report, any information you provide will be assigned a numerical code and a role classification (e.g. Advisor 1). We will remove any references to personal information that might allow someone to guess your identity. The data will be kept securely in on Ms Loveridge’s home computer, which is password protected, and in a lockable filing cabinet in her home office during the research period. It will then in the Centre for Program Evaluation, Faculty of
Education at Melbourne University for five years from the date of publication, before being destroyed. Only Ms Loveridge and Dr St Leger will have access to the documents held.

**How will I receive feedback?**

Once the thesis arising from this research has been completed, a summary or a full report of the findings will be available to you on request. It is likely that the results of this study will be presented at academic conferences and publications.

**Do I have to participate in this project?**

No. Participation in this study is completely voluntary. If you wish to withdraw at any stage, or to withdraw any unprocessed data you have supplied, you are free to do so without explanation or prejudice.

**Where can I obtain further information?**

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**How do I agree to participate?**

If you would like to participate in this project, please indicate that you have read and understood this information by signing the accompanying consent form. Please return the consent form in the envelope provided. The researchers will then contact you to arrange a convenient time for you to complete the interview.
Yours faithfully,

Donna Loveridge
Doctoral Student
Doctor of Education
Centre of Program Evaluation
Department of Education, Policy and Management
Melbourne University
Melbourne
AUSTRALIA
Email: donna.loveridge@gmail.com
Phone: +255 (0)78 2587221

Dr Pam St Leger
Research Supervisor
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Department of Education, Policy and Management University
Melbourne
AUSTRALIA
Email: pksl@unimelb.edu.au
Phone: +61 3 8344 6086
1. I consent to participate in the project named above, the particulars of which - including details of individual interviews and focus group have been explained to me. A written copy of the information has been given to me to keep.

4. I authorise the researcher to use my responses in the focus group and individual interview.

3. I acknowledge that:
   i. the possible effects of the focus group and individual interview, e.g. confidentiality, have been explained to me to my satisfaction;
   j. I have been informed that I am free to withdraw from the project at any time without explanation or prejudice and to withdraw any unprocessed data previously supplied;
   k. the project is for the purpose of a doctoral thesis;
   l. I have been informed that the confidentiality of the information I provide will be safeguarded subject to any legal requirements;

4. I understand that:
   j. the focus group may be audio-recorded;
   k. the individual interview will not be audio recorded;
   l. a summary of the key points that emerge from my individual and focus group will be returned to me to check it accurately reflects your perspective;
   m. participants will be referred to by a numerical code in any publications arising from the research;
   n. participation or non-participation in the research will have no consequences.
5. I consent / do not consent (please cross out one) to focus group being audio recorded.

Signed: ______________________________________

Name: ______________________________________

Date: _______________________________________
Dear

You are invited to participate in the research project listed below, which is being conducted by Ms Donna Loveridge (Doctorate of Education) and Dr Pam St Leger (supervisor) in the Centre of Program Evaluation, Faculty of Education at The University of Melbourne. Your name has been referred to me by a mutual contact as someone who has been involved in evaluation capacity development activities within the Government of Tanzania.

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4. What are the difficulties in developing evaluation capacity in the Government of Tanzania?

5. What ECD models are being applied in Tanzania and how effective are these different in developing evaluation capacity?

6. How can recent ECD experience be used to better develop Government of Tanzania evaluation capacity?
What will you be asked to do?

If you agree to participate:

3. We would ask you to participate in a focus group focussing on successful and unsuccessful approaches to developing evaluation capacity development in the Government of Tanzania, the differences that evaluation capacity is making to the Government of Tanzania and how the Government may better develop evaluation capacity in the future.

4. You may also be asked to participate in an individual interview (approximately one hour in length) focussing on your experiences in developing evaluation capacity, that approaches you used and lessons learned.

With your permission, the focus group may be audio-recorded so that we can ensure that we can capture key themes arising from the discussion. A transcript will not be made. However, a summary of the key points that emerge from the interview will be returned to you to check it accurately reflects your perspective. Individual interviews will not be audio recorded.

How will my confidentiality be protected?

We intend to protect your anonymity and the confidentiality of your responses to the fullest possible extent, within the limits of the law. Your name and contact details will be kept in a separate, password-protected computer file from any data (information) that you supply. This will only be able to be linked to your responses by the researchers, for example, in order to know who to send your interview summary to for checking. In the final report, any information you provide will be assigned a numerical code and a role classification (e.g. Advisor 1). We will remove any references to personal information that might allow someone to guess your identity. The data will be kept securely in on Ms Loveridge’s home computer, which is password protected, and in a lockable filing cabinet in her home office during the research period. It will then in the Centre for Program Evaluation, Faculty of
Education at Melbourne University for five years from the date of publication, before being destroyed. Only Ms Loveridge and Dr St Leger will have access to the documents held.

**How will I receive feedback?**

Once the thesis arising from this research has been completed, a summary or a full report of the findings will be available to you on request. It is likely that the results of this study will be presented at academic conferences and publications.

**Do I have to participate in this project?**

No. Participation in this study is completely voluntary. If you wish to withdraw at any stage, or to withdraw any unprocessed data you have supplied, you are free to do so without explanation or prejudice.

**Where can I obtain further information?**

If you require any further information, or have any concerns, please do not hesitate to contact either of the researchers on the numbers given above. Should you have any concerns about the conduct of the project, you are welcome to contact the Executive Officer, Human Research Ethics, The University of Melbourne, on ph: 8344 2073, or fax: 9347 6739.

**How do I agree to participate?**

If you would like to participate in this project, please indicate that you have read and understood this information by signing the accompanying consent form. Please return the consent form in the envelope provided. The researchers will then contact you to arrange a convenient time for you to complete the interview.
Yours faithfully,

Donna Loveridge  
Doctoral Student  
Doctor of Education  
Centre of Program Evaluation  
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Melbourne University  
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Dr Pam St Leger  
Research Supervisor  
Centre of Program Evaluation  
Department of Education, Policy and Management  
University Melbourne  
AUSTRALIA  
Email: pksl@unimelb.edu.au  
Phone: +61 3 8344 6086
Consent Form – GoT Officials (2)
Developing Evaluation Capacity in the Government of Tanzania

1. I consent to participate in the project named above, the particulars of which - including details of individual interviews and focus group have been explained to me. A written copy of the information has been given to me to keep.

5. I authorise the researcher to use my responses in the focus group and individual interview.

3. I acknowledge that:
   m. the possible effects of the focus group and individual interview, e.g. confidentiality, have been explained to me to my satisfaction;
   n. I have been informed that I am free to withdraw from the project at any time without explanation or prejudice and to withdraw any unprocessed data previously supplied;
   o. the project is for the purpose of a doctoral thesis;
   p. I have been informed that the confidentiality of the information I provide will be safeguarded subject to any legal requirements;

4. I understand that:
   o. the focus group may be audio-recorded;
   p. the individual interview will not be audio recorded;
   q. a summary of the key points that emerge from my individual and focus group will be returned to me to check it accurately reflects your perspective;
   r. participants will be referred to by a numerical code in any publications arising from the research;
s. participation or non-participation in the research will have no consequences.

5. I consent / do not consent (please cross out one) to focus group being audio recorded.

Signed: __________________________________________
Name: __________________________________________
Date: __________________________________________
ANNEX H: SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW GUIDE

Interview with: ____________________________
Date of Interview: __________________________

Introduction: Good morning / afternoon

Purpose: This interview is being conducted as part of my research examining the development of M&E capacity in the Government of Tanzania. I am interested in your experience and perspectives.

Process: The interview should take about 1 hour. I will not be tape recording our conversation but I will be taking notes. The information sheet outlines the details of the process including confidentiality and that the interview is voluntary. After the interview is completed I will send you a copy of the key points and if you feel I have missed any important points or misunderstood our discussion please send your comments to me. The purpose of this is so that I record all the details but at the same time be able to carry on an attentive conversation with you.

Do you have any questions? If you agree to this interview, please sign this consent form.

K.1 Questions for Donors

1. What does M&E capacity development mean to you? What is your understanding of: monitoring; evaluation; learning; accountability?

2. Do you believe that M&E capacity development is important for the Government of Tanzania? If so, why? If no, why not?

3. Are you supporting M&E capacity development? If so, how, when, where, who? What are your expectations regarding this support?

4. What evidence do you have about whether or not progress is being made in developing M&E capacity?
Thank you. Outline date that key points will be sent to interviewee

K.2 Questions for Public Servants and Development practitioners

1. What does M&E capacity development mean to you? What is your understanding of: monitoring; evaluation; learning; accountability?

2. Do you believe that M&E capacity development is important for the Government of Tanzania? If so, why? If no, why not?

3. Have you been involved in activities to develop M&E capacity (either as a person developing capacity or as a participant)?

If yes to Q3:

4. What have these activities hoped to achieve?

5. Has your involvement in M&E capacity developed changed your understanding of monitoring and evaluation? If so, how?

6. In your experience, what types of M&E capacity development strategies are most successful in the Government of Tanzania and why?

7. In your experience, M&E capacity development strategies have not been successful in the Government of Tanzania and why?

8. How do you know what works and what does not?

9. What, if any, differences are M&E capacity development activities making to the Government of Tanzania? What evidence is there?

10. How can recent experiences be used to better develop Government of Tanzania M&E capacity development?

Thank you. Outline date that key points will be sent to interviewee
ANNEX I:  AUDITOR’S LETTER OF ATTESTATION

This letter of attestation is in relation to an inquiry audit into the DEd thesis titled *Theories of Change: Monitoring and Evaluation Capacity Development in the Government of Tanzania.*

The purpose of the audit, carried out at the end of the research, is to ascertain and verify the accuracy of the use of interviewee references in the Chapters 8, 9 and 10. The auditor was provided with the final draft of the thesis together with interviewee summary notes completed by the researcher.

The audit involved making random spot checks of interviewee references and quotations in the text of the thesis with the summary notes recorded by the researcher following each interview. Specifically, in the final draft of the thesis the following sections were chosen randomly from Chapters 8, 9 and 10 and references were checked against interview notes:

- 8.2.1 – 2\(^{nd}\) paragraph (2 references)
- 8.3.3 – 1\(^{st}\) paragraph (2 references), 3\(^{rd}\) paragraph (5 references)
- 9.2.2 – final paragraph (3 references)
- 10.2 – 2\(^{nd}\) paragraph (3 references)
- 10.3 – 4\(^{th}\) paragraph (2 references)

In total 17 citations were checked and found to be accurate. However, at times words had been adjusted grammatically to fit into arguments or with the sentences into which quotations were inserted.
As auditor, I testify that the interviewee references in the text that I have checked are true and accurate.

_______________________________________ Date: 13\textsuperscript{th} August 2010

Tracey Delaney
Evaluation Consultant
Mornington, Victoria
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RESEARCH FOUNDATION (ESRF)

51 Uporofo Street, (Off Alli Hassan Mwinyi Road), Ursino Estates
P. O. Box 31226, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.
Phone: (255-22) 2760260, 2760751/2, 2760758
Mobile: (255 754) 780133 Fax: (255 22) 2760062
Email: esrf@esrf.or.tz Web: www.esrf.or.tz

University of Melbourne,
Australia.

9th April, 2008

To Whom It May Concern

This letter is to confirm that the Economic and Social Research Foundation (ESRF) supports the research of Ms. Donna Loveridge on evaluation capacity development in the Government of Tanzania.

The Economic and Social Research Foundation (ESRF) was established in 1994 as an independent, not-for-profit institution for research and policy analysis. The formation of ESRF was based on the assumption that there was need and demand for an improved understanding of policy options and development management issues, and that the capacity for this was lacking in the Tanzania civil service. The primary objectives of the Foundation are to strengthen capabilities in policy analysis and development management and to enhance the understanding of policy options in the government, the public sector, civil society, and the donor community and the growing private sector.

ESRF addresses this gap by putting into place qualified professional staff, modest resources and a favourable research environment for the analysis and discussion of economic and social policy. ESRF hosts international research students and fellows on the key areas: Growth and Wealth Creation; Good Governance, Globalization and Regional Integration; and Social Services and the Quality of Life. We also undertakes collaborative research with people and institutions outside Tanzania on matters of importance to Tanzania and the world.

We will be Ms Loveridge’s Institutional sponsor for the purposes of obtaining the necessary research visa from the Government of Tanzania. We will also help Ms Loveridge to undertake her research by introducing her to key Government of Tanzania Ministries, Departments and Agencies; providing access to the ESRF Information Centre and research fellows at ESRF and the University of Dar Es Salaam. Her work will contribute to current efforts by our Government to strengthen transparency and good governance.

If you have any questions please do not hesitate of contact me.

Yours Sincerely,

Dr. H. Bohela Lunogelo
Executive Director

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ANNEX K: RESEARCH PERMIT

TANZANIA COMMISSION FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
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Ali Hassan Mwinyi Road
P.O. Box 4302
Dar es Salaam
Tanzania

RESEARCH PERMIT


1. Name: Donna L Loveridge

2. Nationality: Australian

3. Title: Evaluation Capacity Development (ECD) in the Government of Tanzania

4. Research shall be confined to the following region(s): Dar es Salaam

5. Permit validity 16th June 2008 to 15th June 2009.

6. Local Contact/collaborator: Dr. H. Bohela Lunogelo, Economic and Social Research Foundation (ESRF)

7. Researcher is required to submit progress report on quarterly basis and submit all Publications made after research.

[Signature]

M. Mushi
for: DIRECTOR GENERAL

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Author/s:
Loveridge, Donna Louise

Title:
Theories of change: monitoring and evaluation capacity development in the government of Tanzania

Date:
2011

Citation:

Persistent Link:
http://hdl.handle.net/11343/35819

File Description:
Theories of change: monitoring and evaluation capacity development in the government of Tanzania

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